Robert J. ANDERSON Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee

Citations: 887 F.2d 630; 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 16823; 1989 WL 123934Docket: 89-3287

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; November 7, 1989; Federal Appellate Court

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Robert J. Anderson Jr. appeals the denial of his Social Security disability and supplemental security income claim from April 1986. Born on August 25, 1944, Anderson has a high school education and experience in construction management. His initial disability claims stemmed from injuries sustained in 1982 and 1985, which included neck and back issues, as well as an ankle injury. Medical assessments indicated a 10% impairment but suggested he could still engage in some form of employment. 

Anderson’s first claim for benefits was filed on January 29, 1985, but was denied in January 1986 based on the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) finding that he could perform sedentary work and that his pain allegations were not credible. His current claim, filed on April 22, 1986, included a consultative examination by Dr. Williams, who noted conflicting physical findings. Although Anderson used crutches, he was observed walking without a limp and was able to sit comfortably during the examination. 

The ALJ found that Anderson had a severe musculoskeletal impairment that prevented him from returning to his previous work. However, based on the Medical Vocational Guidelines, he concluded that Anderson was not disabled. The appeals council denied further review, and the district court adopted the magistrate's findings, which noted inconsistencies between Anderson's daily activities, such as fishing and shopping, and his claims of debilitating pain. 

Anderson argues on appeal that the ALJ committed three reversible errors: applying an incorrect legal standard, failing to order a necessary medical test, and improperly utilizing the Medical Vocational Guidelines.

A sequential process determines if a claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits, beginning with an assessment of whether the claimant is engaged in 'substantial gainful activity' under 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1520(b). The severity of the claimant's impairment is evaluated next (Sec. 404.1520(c)). If the impairment is severe, it is compared to a list of impairments; meeting or equaling a listed impairment qualifies the claimant as automatically disabled (Sec. 404.1520(d)). If not, the evaluation continues to whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing previous work (Sec. 404.1520(e)). If the claimant cannot continue previous employment, it must be determined if they can perform any other substantial work existing in the national economy (42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(2)(A)). If not, the claimant is deemed disabled.

Initially, the burden of proof lies with the claimant to demonstrate an inability to perform previous work, after which the burden shifts to the Secretary to show available alternative work. If the Secretary meets this burden, it shifts back to the claimant to prove they cannot perform that work (Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296).

In reviewing disability determinations, the Court's role is to assess whether substantial evidence supports the Secretary's factual findings and to identify any legal errors. Substantial evidence must be relevant and adequate for a reasonable mind to accept as supporting a conclusion, but does not require a preponderance (Fraga, 810 F.2d 1302).

The appellant contends that the wrong legal standard was used regarding pain’s role in disability determination, arguing that Social Security Rule 88-13 applies. However, this rule is a statement of policy consistent with Fifth Circuit authority, meaning compliance with circuit precedent suffices irrespective of SSR 88-13 adherence. The denial of benefits is justified under existing law, as pain must be linked to an underlying medical condition (42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(5)(A); 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1529). Once linked to a verifiable condition, the claimant does not need to prove the pain objectively, but must still substantiate the claim (Floyd v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 529; Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378).

The ALJ deemed the appellant not credible regarding his pain complaints, supported by uncontroverted medical evidence. The ALJ observed that the appellant could sit without discomfort and walked without a limp, despite using crutches. Although the appellant claimed disabling pain since 1982, he was injured in 1985 during a car repair. Under SSR 88-13, a Residual Function Capacity assessment must discuss the consistency of reported daily activity restrictions with medical evidence. The appellant argued that the ALJ failed to analyze his daily activities and did not resolve evidence inconsistencies. However, the magistrate, not the ALJ, addressed the appellant’s daily activities, which did not constitute reversible error. The court emphasized that procedural perfection is not required and will not vacate a judgment unless substantial rights are affected. The ALJ's findings regarding the appellant’s activities were consistent with the magistrate's testimony-based conclusions. The appellant's claim that the ALJ did not reconcile evidence inconsistencies was dismissed as groundless; the ALJ chose to disbelieve the appellant based on substantial evidence. Additionally, the appellant argued that the ALJ should have ordered nerve conduction studies. However, since the claimant bears the burden of proof for disability and did not provide sufficient evidence, the ALJ acted within discretion by making a decision based on available evidence without ordering further examinations. Thus, the ALJ concluded there was enough evidence to determine the appellant was not disabled by pain, negating the need for additional testing.

The appellant argues that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) incorrectly relied on the Medical Vocational Guidelines due to a non-exertional impairment that limits his ability to perform sedentary work. The court agrees that the appellant cannot perform his previous work, placing the burden on the Secretary to demonstrate his employability, which can be done through the Medical Vocational Guidelines. Once the ALJ assesses factors such as age, education, skill transferability, work experience, and residual functional capacity, and these align with vocational regulations, a determination regarding disability can be made. However, the guidelines cannot be applied if a claimant has a non-exertional impairment. The court finds that the appellant does not have such an impairment, allowing the Secretary to use the Guidelines.

Additionally, the district court's judgment is affirmed. The appellant did not appeal an earlier administrative decision denying benefits, which is given preclusive effect, preventing him from claiming prior disability benefits. The ALJ did not consider SSR 88-13, which was issued after the denial of benefits, but its provisions should apply to the current case. Even if SSR 88-13 is a policy statement, failure to comply may not constitute reversible error. The appellant's request for the court to reverse the ALJ based on SSR 88-13 attempts to impose a binding ruling on the agency, which is not the court's role. The court concludes that the Secretary adhered to existing precedents and SSR 88-13, thus not addressing the potential consequences of any non-compliance by the agency.