Basy Thomas Townley v. Norfolk & Western Railway Company Norfolk Southern Corporation

Citations: 887 F.2d 498; 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 15888; 1989 WL 122491Docket: 88-2882

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; October 19, 1989; Federal Appellate Court

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Basy Townley, the plaintiff-appellant, appealed a directed verdict from the district court favoring Norfolk Western Railway Company and Norfolk Southern Corporation under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) for injuries sustained as a yard brakeman from 1948 to 1979. Townley suffers from pneumoconiosis, or black lung disease, and claimed his lawsuit was timely. However, the district court ruled his claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

On appeal, Townley argued that the district court erred by incorrectly determining the accrual date of his cause of action and misapplying the legal standard for directed verdicts. The district court acknowledged that it must view evidence favorably for the non-moving party and assess whether a reasonable trier of fact could reach only one conclusion based on the evidence presented.

The court found evidence indicated Townley worked in coal dust for over thirty years and experienced respiratory issues for about ten years prior to his heart attack in 1979, after which he retired on disability. Although he had medical issues, including diabetes and hypertension, his physician did not diagnose him with black lung due to a lack of expertise and equipment.

In 1980, Townley responded to a newspaper notice about black lung benefits, initiating correspondence with a claims agent to gather necessary information for his application. His letter from March 31, 1980, detailed his work history, health struggles, and request for assistance in obtaining black lung benefits, indicating awareness of his potential claim. The appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling, agreeing that Townley’s claim was indeed barred by the statute of limitations.

Basy T. Townley made attempts to obtain necessary medical information regarding his condition from Lewis, receiving it on May 13, 1980, but did not pursue a physical examination then. Townley asserted that he was unaware of having black lung disease until diagnosed on June 29, 1984. His wife, Letha Marie Townley, had family members who died from black lung and recognized similar symptoms in her husband, urging him to seek medical evaluation in 1979 or 1980. Despite this, she believed he did not have black lung until the formal diagnosis in 1984. The district court determined that Townley had enough information by 1980 to be aware of a potential black lung diagnosis, citing the precedent set in United States v. Kubrick, which established that a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff knows both the existence and cause of their injury. Consequently, the court ruled that Townley’s claim, filed on June 1, 1987, was barred by the three-year statute of limitations under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), as his cause of action accrued in 1980. Townley contested this decision, arguing that his case should be governed by Urie v. Thompson, which addresses the accrual of causes of action differently.

The plaintiff in Urie, a fireman, claimed silicosis from working on a steam locomotive and sued the railroad under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). The Supreme Court ruled that a cause of action for occupational disease under FELA accrues only when the plaintiff becomes aware of the disease's symptoms, emphasizing that the injury results from prolonged exposure rather than a specific incident. This interpretation aims to prevent plaintiffs from losing their legal remedies due to the inability to diagnose hidden conditions within the statute of limitations.

In Young, the court clarified that a cause of action does not accrue at the time of injury but when the plaintiff is aware or should be aware of the injury. Townley argued that the statute of limitations on his claim began in 1984 with his formal diagnosis of black lung. However, the court disagreed, stating that Townley’s cause of action accrued no later than 1980 when he acknowledged in correspondence that he suspected he had black lung due to his railroad work.

Both the Kubrick and Urie cases illustrate the discovery rule, which applies when a plaintiff is unaware of critical injury facts. The Young ruling does not necessitate a formal diagnosis for the statute to start running; it begins when a condition is diagnosed unless the plaintiff should have known of the injury earlier. Despite Townley’s claim of ignorance about his condition until 1984, his actions in 1980 indicated that he had sufficient information to recognize his injury. Therefore, the court concluded that the statute of limitations commenced in 1980, barring Townley’s claim, and affirmed the district court's judgment.