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Ittersagen v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp.
Citation: 2021 IL 126507Docket: 126507
Court: Illinois Supreme Court; November 18, 2021; Illinois; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Thomas Ittersagen filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Advocate Health and Hospitals Corporation and Dr. Anita Thakadiyil, claiming negligence in failing to diagnose and treat him for sepsis. During the trial, juror William Glascott disclosed a business relationship with the Advocate Health Care System Endowment, stating it was separate from Advocate Medical but believed it did not bias him. Plaintiff’s counsel requested his removal for actual or implied bias, which the trial court denied. The jury ultimately ruled in favor of the defendants, and the appellate court upheld this decision, rejecting the claim of juror bias. On appeal, Ittersagen argued for a new trial, asserting that Glascott's connection created a presumption of bias that could not be rebutted by his claims of impartiality. The defendants countered that Ittersagen failed to demonstrate a disqualifying relationship due to insufficient evidence of the endowment’s affiliation with Advocate Medical. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing with the defendants based on the unique circumstances and limited evidence presented. Green Courte imposed asset management fees on its limited partners based on their investment amounts, utilizing these fees to cover employee salaries, bonuses, and operational costs. Additionally, the firm received a portion of returns if certain incentive thresholds were met. Juror Glascott, the chief investment officer of Green Courte, oversaw new investments and had a compensation structure that included salary and bonuses linked to the firm's aggregate investments. He believed the trial's outcome would not impact his pay, asserting that those who determine his compensation were unaware of the medical malpractice case. Glascott acknowledged that Green Courte, as the general partner, held a fiduciary duty to its limited partners, including the endowment, but claimed no fiduciary duty was owed to the defendants. He initially did not disclose this duty during jury selection, stating he "didn’t make the connection" due to a lack of specific questioning about relationships with the parties involved. He characterized his connection to the defendants as "several layers removed," recalling that an automated LinkedIn notification about a promotion linked to Advocate prompted his memory of the connection. Glascott differentiated between Advocate Medical and the endowment, asserting that his firm served the endowment and not the medical group, and he had no knowledge of any interactions between them. He speculated that the endowment raised funds for the hospital system’s growth but did not know how funds were allocated. Defense counsel clarified that the salaries of the Medical Group were derived solely from its operations. Glascott emphasized that his business relationship with the endowment would not impede his ability to serve impartially as a juror, insisting on his neutrality and fairness in evaluating the evidence presented. The trial court denied the plaintiff's request to excuse juror Glascott for actual bias, citing the juror's demeanor and his adamant assertion of impartiality. The court determined there was no fiduciary duty between Glascott and the defendants, concluding that Glascott was unaware of any relevant relationship and would not allow it to influence his decision. The judge characterized Glascott as credible, suggesting his failure to disclose the relationship during voir dire was due to its insignificance to him. Upon denying the plaintiff's motion for a new trial, the judge reiterated that any connection to Advocate Medical was extremely tenuous and did not impact Glascott’s impartiality. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that Glascott's relationship with Advocate Medical justified a new trial, arguing the trial court misapplied the law regarding fiduciary duty. The appellate court interpreted this as a claim of implied bias and found that the evidence did not support a presumption of bias. It noted that Glascott did not understand the nature of his relationship with Advocate Medical and believed it would not affect him financially in the case. Defense counsel clarified that compensation for Advocate Medical was derived from its operations, not the endowment related to Glascott. Ultimately, the appellate court concluded there was insufficient evidence to establish any express fiduciary relationship between Glascott and Advocate Medical. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision not to excuse juror Glascott for cause, concluding there was no abuse of discretion. The plaintiff subsequently petitioned for leave to appeal, which was granted under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315. The Illinois Trial Lawyers Association was permitted to submit an amicus curiae brief in support of the plaintiff. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the refusal to excuse juror Glascott violated his right to an impartial jury, shifting from a claim of actual bias to one of implied bias. The plaintiff also challenged the appellate court's denial of his motion to take judicial notice of a tax form filed by Advocate Medical with the IRS, asserting it demonstrates a relationship between Advocate Medical and the endowment that juror Glascott had a fiduciary duty to, thus implying bias. The defendants argued that the plaintiff forfeited the judicial notice issue by raising it post-appellate ruling and contended the tax form was not appropriate for judicial notice as it was subject to interpretation. They provided an alternative reading of the form, asserting it indicated no relationship between the defendants and juror Glascott. Regarding procedural issues, the defendants requested that specific sections of the plaintiff’s brief be struck for failing to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h). They claimed the brief lacked a proper introductory paragraph, misrepresented the issues, and included inaccuracies in the statement of facts. The court noted that while the plaintiff's brief did not meet the required standards, the violations were not severe enough to warrant dismissal of the appeal, though the noncompliant sections would be disregarded. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the Supreme Court rules in future submissions. Juror Glascott’s qualification to serve on the jury is challenged by the plaintiff, who claims that his fiduciary duty to the endowment creates a presumption of bias against the defendants. The Supreme Court has ruled that while a litigant is entitled to a fair trial, perfection in trials is unattainable. However, the legal system seeks to prevent even the appearance of unfairness, establishing that individuals with a vested interest in a case cannot serve as judges or jurors. The discovery of juror bias can lead to a judgment reversal and a new trial. Juror bias can be actual or implied; the latter refers to a legal presumption of bias, irrespective of actual partiality, particularly in cases where a juror's relationship to the litigation makes impartiality unlikely. The court's precedent states that individuals with a direct relationship to a party, such as being an employee or having a fiduciary connection, are disqualified from serving as jurors, applicable in both civil and criminal cases. Bias is inherently difficult to identify, and the law presumes bias in certain relationships, negating the need for evidence of actual bias. This principle has been reaffirmed over the years, highlighting that relationships through blood or personal connections can lead to a presumption of juror bias, disqualifying them from the case without needing to demonstrate actual partiality. The plaintiff does not contest the trial court's finding that juror Glascott was credible and showed no actual bias, but disputes the court's characterization of the juror's connection to Advocate Medical, claiming legal error. Defendants argue that not excusing the juror was not an abuse of discretion. The document clarifies the standards of review for actual versus implied bias, indicating that the trial judge's determination of actual bias is discretionary and should not be overturned unless against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court emphasizes that juror impartiality is assessed based on evidence, and mere suspicion does not suffice. In cases of implied bias, stemming from a juror's relationship with a party, the presumption of bias is a legal question. The document cites that state-court findings of 'no bias' may be inadequate in such extraordinary situations. The standard of review for legal questions is de novo. The plaintiff argues that juror Glascott's fiduciary duty to an endowment creates a presumption of bias concerning Advocate Medical, advocating for a rule that disqualifies jurors owing fiduciary duties to parties. A fiduciary relationship, which may be legally defined or established through strong evidence, implies a duty of good faith and interests consideration. The plaintiff contends that Glascott’s fiduciary duty extends to Advocate Medical based on the assertion that both entities are essentially one, despite Glascott’s contrary statements. Rooting out juror bias involves assessing the credibility of the juror, especially when they are the sole source of evidence. Whether the alleged bias is actual or implied, the juror's relationship to the parties is a factual question determined by evidence, and the court's findings are only reversible if against the manifest weight of the evidence. The plaintiff did not provide a record of the jury selection process, which is construed against them. The trial court received unclear testimony from juror Glascott regarding his connection to the defendants. Glascott acknowledged a fiduciary duty to an endowment that supports the hospital system but insisted that it operates separately from Advocate Medical and that he had no knowledge of the doctor involved in the case. He stated that the endowment's decisions would not be impacted by the lawsuit and affirmed that the verdict would not affect his compensation. This testimony was deemed credible by the trial court, alleviating concerns of implied bias. Defense counsel clarified that Advocate Medical's compensation comes from its operations, not the endowment, and this information was not contested by Glascott. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff did not establish a direct relationship indicating implied bias as a matter of law, noting Glascott’s clear statements separating the endowment from Advocate Medical. The appellate court agreed, stating that the evidence did not support a fiduciary relationship between Glascott and the defendant. Ultimately, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate bias, and the trial court's findings regarding the juror's relationship with Advocate Medical were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, affirming the decision not to excuse the juror for implied bias. In People v. Porter, the defendant sought a new trial, citing a lack of an impartial jury due to a juror's alleged connection with the victim's mother, which was unsupported by the record. The court emphasized that the defendant bore the burden of proving the relationship, but evidence showed the juror only recognized the victim's mother during the trial, indicating a non-close relationship. The appellate court found the plaintiff's reliance on prior cases misplaced, noting that implied bias arises from a direct relationship with a party in litigation. For instance, in Wehrle, a juror's role as a commissioner with a financial interest in the outcome was deemed disqualifying, whereas juror Glascott claimed no compensation from Advocate Medical and denied any fiduciary duty. Additionally, in Cole, despite multiple prior contacts with trial participants, the juror asserted impartiality, and the court upheld the trial court’s credibility assessment regarding the juror's statements. The relationships in both Wehrle and Cole were direct, contrasting with Glascott's indirect connection to Advocate Medical. In Marcin, the appellate court overturned a trial court's decision that allowed two prospective jurors, who were patients of the defendant doctor, to remain on the jury. The appellate court concluded that their close patient-doctor relationship could lead to bias, as patients may hesitate to rule against their personal physician due to concerns about reputational harm. The court emphasized that only this specific closeness warranted the jurors' exclusion and acknowledged that in many communities, it may be challenging to find jurors without any prior knowledge of a physician. The court clarified that its ruling should not extend to spouses of patients, noting that juror Glascott's connection to Advocate Medical was too distant to imply bias. The cases of Marcin, Cole, and Roach highlight that allegations of juror bias depend on the overall circumstances surrounding each relationship. In this instance, the court found no error in denying the plaintiff's request to remove juror Glascott for implied bias. Additionally, the plaintiff contended that the appellate court wrongly refused to take judicial notice of an IRS tax form filed by Advocate Medical, which the plaintiff believed demonstrated a relationship between juror Glascott and the defendants. The form, IRS Form 990, indicated that Advocate Medical did not report holding any endowment assets. The plaintiff argued this implied that Advocate Medical and the endowment were the same entity, while the defendants countered that the absence of an endowment suggested that any assets were held by a different organization. The differing interpretations of this form underscore the complexities of the relationships within the Advocate network, leading the court to defer to the trial judge's conclusions regarding the tenuous connection between juror Glascott and the defendants. On August 31, 2020, the appellate court denied the plaintiff's petition for rehearing and ruled that he forfeited his request for judicial notice of Advocate Medical's 2018 Form 990 tax return. The court noted that the document could have been obtained and presented at the trial court hearing. The plaintiff did not provide legal authority supporting his request to introduce new evidence at the appellate level, as established in People v. James, where similar requests were denied. The appellate court found that the plaintiff could have included the tax return in his motion to reconsider but failed to do so, despite referencing earlier Form 990 filings in 2013. Additionally, the 2018 Form 990 was signed on November 15, 2019, prior to several of the plaintiff's appellate court filings, including his reply brief and petition for rehearing, in which he did not mention the tax return until August 14, 2020, after the court had already made its decision on juror bias. The court concluded that the plaintiff's failure to raise the issue in the trial court constituted forfeiture, which precluded any further consideration of whether the tax document was subject to judicial notice. The court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the juror did not owe Advocate Medical a fiduciary duty, thus affirming the appellate and circuit court judgments. Justice Neville did not participate in the case's deliberation or decision.