Jennifer L.M. LeMay v. Michael B. Mays

Citation: Not availableDocket: 20-2632

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; November 14, 2021; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity for Minneapolis Police Officer Michael Mays, who was involved in shooting two service dogs, Ciroc and Rocko, during a residential security check. Plaintiffs Jennifer LeMay and Courtney Livingston, who live with LeMay's children and the dogs, claimed that the shootings constituted unlawful seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The incident began when Livingston accidentally triggered a burglar alarm, prompting police response. Despite LeMay's call to clarify the alarm was false, Mays jumped the fence, encountered Ciroc, and shot him, later shooting Rocko as well. Neither dog was killed, but both were severely injured and could no longer serve their roles as emotional support and service animals. The district court dismissed the Monell claim against the City of Minneapolis but upheld the unlawful seizure claim, finding the complaint did not demonstrate that either dog posed an imminent threat, thus questioning the objective reasonableness of Mays's actions. Mays and the City appealed, but the court noted that to reverse the dismissal, they must prove entitlement to immunity based solely on the complaint's face.

The Supreme Court emphasizes the need to address immunity issues early in litigation. A motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo. Qualified immunity protects public officials from civil liability if their actions did not violate clearly established rights known to a reasonable person. To overcome this immunity, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) a statutory or constitutional right was violated and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of the incident. If either condition is unmet, qualified immunity applies.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, which includes privately-owned dogs. Officers must act reasonably when seizing such property; reasonableness is assessed from the perspective of an average officer, not based on the officer's subjective intent. Evaluating the reasonableness of a warrantless seizure involves balancing the intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights against the government's justification for that intrusion, such as protecting life and property when a pet is perceived to pose an imminent danger.

In this case, Mays shot two dogs, Ciroc and Rocko, which allegedly posed no threat; Ciroc approached Mays in a friendly manner, and Rocko was non-threatening. The complaint argues this constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, supported by precedents where officers were denied qualified immunity for similar actions when no imminent danger was present. The complaint sufficiently claims that Mays unreasonably seized the dogs, violating their Fourth Amendment rights.

The second prong of the qualified immunity analysis examines whether the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct in question. Qualified immunity applies if a reasonable officer, given the information available during the incident, could believe their actions were lawful based on clearly established law. A right is clearly established if a reasonable officer would recognize that their actions violate that right. It is well established that an officer cannot shoot a dog without an objectively legitimate and imminent threat. Relevant case law indicates that it is clearly established that unnecessarily killing a pet violates the Fourth Amendment. In this case, the dogs, Ciroc and Rocko, did not pose an imminent threat to Officer Mays, thus a reasonable officer would have known that shooting them would violate the owners' rights against unreasonable seizure of property. 

Mays's argument that the Bailey case provides precedent supporting his actions is incorrect, as there are significant factual differences between that case and the current one. In Bailey, the officers faced aggressive pit bulls, while Mays was dealing with non-aggressive dogs. Therefore, Bailey does not alter the established rule from Andrews that an officer cannot destroy a pet posing no imminent danger. The complaint sufficiently alleges that Mays shot the dogs without imminent threat, disqualifying him from qualified immunity at this stage.

Mays attempts to support his position by referencing videos, a police report, and training materials, asserting they demonstrate a different narrative. However, these materials do not conclusively establish that the shootings were objectively reasonable. In cases of qualified immunity, appellate review focuses on whether plaintiffs have alleged a violation of clearly established law, and Mays must show entitlement to immunity based solely on the complaint's face.

Mays' request to consider certain evidence alongside the pleadings is largely inappropriate. The court acknowledges that only materials inherently part of the pleadings, such as attached exhibits and public records, can be considered, but they cannot be used to assert the truth of the matters contained within them. Mays attempts to validate his claims using a police report and training documents, seeking to have the court accept his narrative as factual, which exceeds permissible evidence at this stage. The court cites precedent, specifically Jackson v. Curry, which illustrates that materials not contradicting the essence of the pleadings cannot substantiate Mays' claims. The videos of the encounter do not provide conclusive evidence of the dogs posing a legitimate threat and do not contradict Mays' allegations sufficiently. Consequently, the court finds the dismissal of the case premature, affirming the district court's decision to deny the motion to dismiss. Furthermore, the court disputes Mays' assertion that discovery is unnecessary due to his sole witness status, noting that other witnesses exist, and discovery could clarify the events in ways the police report did not capture.