Rabun County Board of Education v. Bronwyn Randel

Citation: Not availableDocket: A21A0753

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; October 8, 2021; Georgia; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Motions for reconsideration must be physically received within ten days of the decision date to be considered timely. The Rabun County Board of Education appeals a superior court decision reversing the Georgia Board of Education's ruling that upheld the termination of Bronwyn Randel as a high school teacher. The Local Board argues that the superior court erred in concluding that Randel was entitled to a tribunal hearing instead of a hearing conducted by the Local Board. The superintendent had notified Randel in May 2018 that her contract would not be renewed, citing reasons such as insubordination and incompetence. Randel requested a tribunal hearing under the Georgia Fair Dismissal Act, claiming the Local Board could not be impartial due to her discrimination charge filed with the EEOC. The hearing officer denied her request, noting the Local Board's ultimate authority in termination decisions. After the Local Board upheld the non-renewal, the State Board affirmed that decision. Randel's appeal to the superior court resulted in a reversal, citing a violation of her due process rights. However, the Local Board argues that the superior court misinterpreted the statute, which permits a tribunal only to make recommendations to the Local Board, not to replace it. The appellate court agrees with the Local Board's contention and reverses the superior court's decision, remanding for further proceedings.

The appeal centers on legal questions regarding due process and equal protection rights in the context of the Fair Dismissal Act. The superior court's interference with a local school board's decisions is limited to instances of gross abuse of discretion or arbitrary action. There is a presumption that local board actions are not arbitrary unless proven otherwise. The State Board’s interpretation of the Fair Dismissal Act is authoritative and respected but not binding. Due process mandates that employees receive notice, a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and a hearing before an unbiased tribunal. The procedural rights in state public employment cases align with federal due process rights. While Eleventh Circuit rulings on federal law are not obligatory, they hold persuasive value. Recusal of board members may be necessary if bias is evident, particularly in cases where a member has previously criticized an employee’s performance. The superior court erred in applying the Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC) to local boards in nonrenewal matters, as the CJC does not automatically apply to them, given that initial proceedings under the Fair Dismissal Act are intended to be conducted by local boards, which may have prior knowledge of the case facts. Local boards also have the discretion to appoint a tribunal as needed.

A wholesale application of the Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC) to the current proceedings is deemed inappropriate. However, due process may necessitate the recusal of local board members with personal or financial biases relevant to the case. Randel failed to demonstrate such biases, lacking evidence that board members are aware of or have opinions related to her EEOC charges. This ruling aligns with precedent from Garrett v. Atkinson County Bd. of Ed., which required disqualification of a board member with a conflict of interest. The document disapproves a previous assertion that the CJC applies to local boards in judicial capacities regarding teacher terminations, clarifying that knowledge of a proceeding does not inherently bias a member against a party, especially when an unfavorable decision could support a discrimination claim. Randel’s claims of bias due to representation by the same attorney in both the Local Board and EEOC proceedings are unsupported and do not merit further discussion. Actual bias alone does not constitute a constitutional violation. The local board's discretion in appointing a tribunal is broad enough in this case to uphold due process. The superior court's ruling that a failure to appoint a tribunal violated Randel's rights is reversed. Randel's alternative arguments regarding notice, subpoena rights, denial of a hearing continuance, and admissibility of evidence are not addressed due to procedural limitations, and the superior court is directed to review these arguments on remand. The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions.