Young America's Foundation v. Eric W. Kaler

Citation: Not availableDocket: 20-3029

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; October 4, 2021; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed the appeal of Young America’s Foundation, Students for a Conservative Voice, and Ben Shapiro against officials from the University of Minnesota. The case arose from the University’s rejection of various venue requests for Shapiro's speaking event due to security concerns, leading to approval of a smaller, remote location. The appellants claimed violations of their rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the University’s events policy was unconstitutional both facially and as applied.

The court determined that the appellants' facial challenges and requests for injunctive relief were moot and that they lacked standing for their as-applied claim. Consequently, the court vacated the district court's orders on these claims and remanded the case with instructions for dismissal without prejudice.

The background includes a prior event featuring conservative speaker Lauren Southern, which had prompted SCV to seek additional security due to anticipated protests. Erik Dussault, an Assistant Director, advised SCV to follow the University’s Large Scale Event Process (LSEP) for future events, although its mandatory nature and existence were disputed. SCV did not submit a proposal for the Shapiro event, and the University subsequently replaced the LSEP with a clearer Major Events policy. Notably, the Southern event experienced significant protest but proceeded as planned despite disruptions.

SCV submitted a reservation request for the Mayo Auditorium for a "Ben Shapiro Speech" scheduled for February 26, 2018, acknowledging the associated fees and insurance costs, while emphasizing the importance of not relocating the event and requesting prior notice of any additional requirements. They estimated an attendance of around 400 people, choosing Mayo Auditorium due to its capacity of 455 and central location on the East Bank of the University campus. University President Eric Kaler expressed concerns about the event's location, suggesting West Bank as a better option to minimize disruption to the campus community. SCV continued to seek larger venues due to the University's pending spring semester schedule, inquiring about Tedd Mann Concert Hall and Northrop Auditorium, but both were unavailable. A request for Willey Hall was tentatively placed on hold as Mayo Auditorium remained reserved. 

On December 19, 2017, SCV and UMPD Lieutenant Troy Buhta conducted a security assessment of Mayo Auditorium, where Buhta deemed the venue unsuitable due to its proximity to the University hospital and potential security risks. Dussault subsequently recommended Ferguson Hall and North Star Ballroom, but SCV rejected Ferguson due to its small capacity. The conversation shifted to Willey Hall and the Continuing Education and Conference Center (CECC), with Buhta indicating Willey Hall's access issues. Ultimately, SCV requested reservations for the North Star Ballroom and CECC, with the Chief of Police recommending relocation to the St. Paul campus due to security concerns and suggesting a crowd limit of 500, anticipating protests.

SCV eliminated the Continuing Education and Student Center as a venue due to its costs and size, opting instead for the North Star Ballroom, which was reserved after a walkthrough. SCV chose a 400-seat configuration to avoid obstructed views and sold out tickets within hours. Dussault later indicated that an additional 49 seats could be added, albeit with obstructed views, and SCV approved the expansion. In late January, SCV and YAF initiated a public pressure campaign on the University for a larger venue, accusing it of viewpoint discrimination in a blog post. Concerns regarding the event planning process were raised by a University Board of Regents member, who noted inconsistencies in the University's messaging and suggested Willey Hall would be easier to secure than the North Star Ballroom. Clark responded that capacity had already been exceeded for safety reasons, stressing that UMPD was not equipped to handle potential protests and that a venue change would necessitate more personnel. SCV's request for Willey Hall was denied since the North Star Ballroom was already booked. SCV later published a statement claiming the University was avoiding risks associated with protests that could disrupt public safety. On February 19, University officials discussed the event's waitlist, with Towle expressing concerns about engaging with SCV and suggesting live streaming as an alternative. Berthelsen confirmed the event would not be moved. The University later held a press conference where Kaler stated that decisions were made for safety, emphasizing the controversial nature of the speaker, Ben Shapiro. Prior to the event, UMPD conducted a security assessment indicating no credible threats to the venue, speaker, or attendees.

Activist groups, including ANTIFA and Black Lives Matter, are expected to protest outside the St. Paul Student Center during an event featuring Ben Shapiro on February 26, 2018. There are concerns about potential violence, similar to incidents at previous events. The University of Minnesota Police Department (UMPD) developed an "incident action plan" for security, deploying 104 to 114 officers and incurring approximately $15,000 in security costs, which were not charged to the event organizers. 

Appellants filed a lawsuit against several university officials, alleging First and Fourteenth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They claimed the university's policies were unconstitutional and that vague language in those policies violated due process and equal protection rights by suppressing conservative views. The district court dismissed several claims, finding that the appellants lacked standing for injunctive relief and that facial challenges under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause were unsuccessful. Qualified immunity protected the officials from personal liability. 

After some developments, the case proceeded with cross-motions for summary judgment focused on the remaining First Amendment as-applied claim. The court ultimately granted summary judgment to the defendants, denying the appellants' claims for damages and injunctive relief. The appellants appeal this decision, specifically contesting the dismissal of their claims related to the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process. The appellees contend that the facial challenges are moot due to the university replacing the challenged policy with a new one.

Article III mootness is tied to the Constitution's requirement for actual, ongoing cases and controversies, meaning a case becomes moot when the issues lose relevance due to time or changed circumstances, preventing effective relief from a federal court. A challenge to a law or policy becomes moot if it has been amended or repealed, except in rare cases where issues are "capable of repetition yet evading review." A mere possibility of reenactment does not suffice; the circumstances must indicate a high likelihood of the policy being reinstated. In this case, the University enacted a new “Major Events” policy on March 27, 2020, which is distinct from the previous LSEP, addressing concerns by providing clearer definitions and standards, such as defining a “major event” based on audience size and stipulating that safety concerns must present a "clear and present risk" to deny event proposals. Additionally, the new policy explicitly prohibits viewpoint discrimination based on potential reactions to events. SCV has not demonstrated that the LSEP is likely to be reenacted, as the new policy governs the entire campus and is more detailed. Consequently, SCV's challenges regarding the LSEP are moot. Furthermore, for Appellants to maintain their as-applied challenge against the LSEP, they must establish standing by proving an actual injury, traceability to the defendant's conduct, and the likelihood of redress from a favorable ruling, with evidence supporting each requirement at every litigation stage.

The plaintiff can rely on general allegations of injury at the pleading stage, but must provide specific evidence at the summary judgment stage to meet their burden. Summary judgment is granted when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In an as-applied challenge, the plaintiff must demonstrate that their injury is fairly traceable to the challenged statute or policy. A plaintiff lacks standing to challenge a policy that was not applied to them. In this case, the Appellants alleged unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by the Appellees concerning the LSEP's application to the Shapiro event. However, at the summary judgment stage, they failed to show sufficient evidence that the LSEP was applied to them. The Appellees’ actions appeared independent of the LSEP, aligning with their university roles, and there was no First Amendment challenge presented beyond the LSEP's application. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for some leniency in pleading, they do not permit the creation of claims late in litigation to evade summary judgment. No evidence suggested that the Appellees mandated SCV to follow the LSEP, nor did SCV participate in it; they only submitted a venue reservation request. The lack of evidence regarding the LSEP’s impact on the Appellees’ actions led to the conclusion that the alleged First Amendment violation was not traceable to the LSEP’s application. Consequently, the Appellants lacked standing for their as-applied challenge. The district court's findings supported this conclusion, noting that SCV did not engage in the LSEP process or meet its requirements. As a result, the claims for injunctive relief were deemed moot, and the district court’s order of dismissal and summary judgment was vacated, with instructions to dismiss the claims without prejudice.

Judge Grasz concurs with the court's finding that the students’ facial challenge to the University’s Large Scale Event Process/Policy is moot, agreeing with part II of the opinion. However, he dissents from part III, arguing that the students adequately alleged facts to establish Article III standing for their remaining First Amendment claims. He emphasizes that the complaint should be read as a whole, adhering to the standard for standing at the pleading stage. Grasz contends that the allegations include a general First Amendment challenge, which neither the district court nor the defendants disputed. He asserts that the court must not reinterpret the complaint in a way that undermines jurisdiction when a reasonable alternative interpretation aligns with its language. Grasz cites precedents requiring that the complaint be construed in favor of the plaintiffs, allowing for general factual allegations to satisfy the standing requirement. He argues that the court’s assessment at the summary judgment stage should still consider the pleading standard, as the issue is not about the sufficiency of evidence but rather the scope of the allegations. He highlights that key paragraphs in the complaint explicitly address the University’s policies that restrict students' expressive rights, reinforcing the argument for standing.

UM's Large Scale Events Policy (LSEP) and related practices are alleged to censor and restrict unpopular speech, infringing upon students' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, collectively termed the "Speech Suppression Policy." The complaint asserts that this policy encompasses both the LSEP and broader defendant practices. However, the court limits the First Amendment challenge to the LSEP alone, despite recognizing that the complaint details broader actions that also infringe upon student rights. 

While the court expresses skepticism about the labeling in the complaint and acknowledges the need to consider the complaint as a whole, it mistakenly substitutes "LSEP" for "Speech Suppression Policy" in its analysis. The complaint cites multiple instances where actions beyond the LSEP are described, including claims that the policy and its application deprive students of constitutional rights, impose prior restraints on speech in public forums, and allow officials to exercise discretion based on the content of the speech. Overall, the court's approach overlooks significant allegations made by the students regarding the broader implications of the Speech Suppression Policy.

Defendants' Speech Suppression Policy, which involved prohibiting certain student organizations from using specific venues for "controversial" events, is claimed to be an unconstitutional restriction on freedom of speech and expression, violating the First Amendment. The policy is alleged to chill and deter plaintiffs from expressing their beliefs. Specific instances include Defendant Kaler denying the SCV the opportunity to host a Shapiro event in a central campus location and instead suggesting a less prominent venue, citing potential security issues without justification. Despite similar events being held in the preferred location, Kaler's decision was made four months in advance. Additionally, Defendant Clark advocated moving the event to the St. Paul campus, reinforcing the notion of security concerns. This forced relocation prevented students from attending the Shapiro lecture, denying them an opportunity for critical dialogue. The venues in question are classified as public forums for student expression, and the First Amendment restricts a public university's ability to limit speech, particularly in these forums. The court's analysis is criticized for not recognizing the broad definition of the Speech Suppression Policy and its implications beyond specific public forums.

A prior restraint on expression under the First Amendment is presumptively unconstitutional unless it meets specific criteria: it must not grant overly broad discretion to government officials, impose only content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions, be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and provide ample alternative communication means. The defendants allegedly violated the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by denying the use of Willey Hall for the Shapiro Event based on their subjective view that the event was "controversial," which constitutes content- and viewpoint-based discrimination. The standing of the students' claims is established through allegations of injury traceable to the defendants' actions, independent of the written LSEP policy application, which is not necessary to determine in this context. The students' complaint meets the minimal standing requirements. 

Furthermore, the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants was deemed inappropriate, given that the evidence, when viewed favorably for the students, supports a First Amendment violation. The handling of the venue request for Ben Shapiro's speech involved direct intervention from the University president, who expressed a clear preference to relocate the event away from the main campus, despite prior controversial speakers being hosted in the same location. The eventual decision to hold the event on the St. Paul campus, far from student housing, further indicated administrative bias. The legal framework allows challenges to policies under the First Amendment regardless of whether they are formally written, reinforcing that the right to protest such policies is universally upheld.

The district court granted summary judgment to University officials, favoring them by inferring that their less favorable treatment of students was due to security concerns. This inference was made despite evidence that other speakers with similar security needs were allowed on campus. The court's approach of accepting the defendants’ claims of innocent intentions contradicts the summary judgment standard, which requires courts to view evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Citing Tolan v. Cotton, it is emphasized that courts should not resolve genuine factual disputes in favor of the summary judgment movant. The record suggests that a reasonable jury could find that the students’ First Amendment rights were violated, warranting a reversal of the summary judgment order.