Whitcomb v. Commonwealth

Citations: 424 S.W.3d 417; 2014 WL 712696; 2014 Ky. LEXIS 89Docket: No. 2012-SC-000376-DG

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court; February 19, 2014; Kentucky; State Supreme Court

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On January 21, 2000, Tara Lynn Whitcomb pled guilty to theft by deception in Fayette Circuit Court and was sentenced to one year of probation, which was to be served in Harrison County. Whitcomb failed to report to her probation officer, leading to a warrant for her arrest being issued on March 20, 2000, which remained unserved for nearly eleven years. She was finally arrested on January 14, 2011, during a traffic stop, and a probation revocation hearing occurred on February 10, 2011. The trial court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to revoke her probation because, according to KRS 533.020, her probation period had expired. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, citing that Whitcomb intentionally absconded and could not assert that her probation had lapsed. The case hinges on whether she was discharged from probation prior to the revocation hearing. KRS 533.020(4) outlines that a probation period is fixed by the court and can only be extended or shortened by court order. Since the trial court set her probation at five years without any extensions or modifications, she would have been automatically discharged on February 11, 2005, had no pending warrants existed.

The trial court lost jurisdiction over the Appellant once her probation expired; however, the critical issue is whether an arrest warrant affects the probationary period and prevents automatic discharge under KRS 533.020(4). The court interprets this statute de novo, affirming that its language is unambiguous. For a probationer to be "finally discharged," two conditions must be met: no pending warrants and no prior revocation of probation. The presence of either condition prevents automatic discharge. The court cites recent precedents confirming that an active warrant or prior revocation keeps the probation period open.

In this case, the Appellant's probationary period, set to end on February 11, 2005, was tolled when an arrest warrant was issued on March 20, 2000, and remained active at her February 10, 2011, arrest. Therefore, the Appellant did not satisfy the conditions for automatic discharge, allowing the trial court to retain jurisdiction for a revocation hearing.

The Appellant contends that the statute's use of "and" suggests both conditions must be present for automatic discharge. The court rejects this interpretation, clarifying that either condition being present is sufficient to prevent discharge, thereby maintaining the court's authority to hold a hearing. Furthermore, the court disagrees with the Court of Appeals' reasoning, stating that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply because the Appellant's probation was not discharged, thus affirming the open status of her probation.

Appellant asserts that she has led an exemplary life since her sentencing, being a married stay-at-home mother of three and not committing any further crimes. Although these claims are contested and not directly relevant to jurisdictional matters, they may be considered as mitigating factors during a potential revocation hearing. The court determines that a warrant for probation violation pauses the probation period, preventing automatic discharge under KRS 533.020(4), provided the warrant is issued before the probation period ends. Since the Fayette Circuit Court issued a warrant for Appellant’s arrest within the five-year probationary timeframe, it retained the authority to hold a probation revocation hearing. Consequently, the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the Fayette Circuit Court for further proceedings.