Kaluom v. Stolt Offshore, Inc.

Docket: 06-40396

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; October 10, 2007; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Jenggi Kaluom, a Malaysian national employed by PPSB, worked on the foreign vessel DLB 801 from September to November 2002 while it performed operations on the U.S. outer continental shelf. Kaluom was injured on November 27, 2002, and subsequently filed a lawsuit against Stolt Offshore Inc. in October 2004, claiming he was owed wages under U.S. labor laws due to the vessel's operations. He asserted that Stolt's failure to pay him according to U.S. wage standards violated the penalty wage statutes 46 U.S.C. 10313 and 10504. 

Stolt moved for summary judgment, arguing that Kaluom's claims were invalid because the DLB 801 did not meet the voyage requirements outlined in 46 U.S.C. 10301 and 10501, which stipulate that the penalty wage provisions apply only if the vessel is on a foreign, intercoastal, or coastwise voyage. The district court agreed with Stolt, dismissing Kaluom's claims with prejudice on February 6, 2006, concluding that the DLB 801 was not engaged in any of the specified types of voyages during Kaluom's employment, thus negating the application of the penalty wage statutes. The court noted that the vessel only operated out of Fourchon, Louisiana, without evidence of engaging in qualifying voyages.

Under 46 U.S.C. 10301 and 10501, penalty wage provisions do not apply to seamen on vessels not engaged in specified voyages. Kaluom filed a notice of appeal on March 8, 2006, challenging the district court's interpretation of 46 U.S.C. 10313 and 10504, asserting that these provisions should apply to foreign vessels in U.S. harbors without regard to voyage requirements. While Kaluom acknowledged that the DLB 801 was not on a qualifying voyage, he argued that the penalty wage statutes should be interpreted independently from the voyage criteria set forth in 46 U.S.C. 10301 and 10501. However, the court disagreed, asserting that the vessel’s assignment to a foreign company and its foreign registration precluded Kaluom's claims under the penalty wage statutes without meeting voyage requirements. The court also noted that it would not address the question of whether Kaluom had sued the correct party, as liability under the penalty wage provisions is limited to the vessel's master or owner. The DLB 801 was owned by a Bermuda corporation and documented under Panama’s laws. Additionally, the court refrained from deciding whether the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) applied to Kaluom, as the FLSA exempts employees employed as seamen on non-American vessels from minimum wage and hour requirements.

The definitions of terms under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Jones Act differ. Kaluom contends that the DLB 801 qualifies as an 'American vessel' due to its ownership by the American company Stolt, which also managed the vessel. Kaluom claims he is not considered a 'seaman' for the purposes of the FLSA, rendering certain exemptions irrelevant; however, this argument is not addressed as the case is resolved based on the voyage requirements of 46 U.S.C. 10301 and 10501.

46 U.S.C. 10313 outlines a seaman's wage entitlements, stating that wages commence upon the start of work or as specified in the employment agreement. Wages are not contingent on the vessel's freight earnings. If a vessel is lost or wrecked prematurely, the seaman is entitled to wages for the time served. Improper discharge before a voyage begins entitles the seaman to earned wages plus one month's wages as compensation. Seamen are not entitled to wages for periods of unlawful non-work or lawful imprisonment unless directed by a court.

After the voyage begins, a seaman can demand half of unpaid wages at ports of call, with specific limitations on the timing and frequency of these demands. If the master fails to comply, the seaman is released from their agreement and entitled to all earned wages. Final wage payments must be made within 24 hours after cargo discharge or within four days after the seaman's discharge, whichever comes first. If delayed, the seaman is entitled to additional compensation for each day of delay.

46 U.S.C. 10301 states that this chapter applies to U.S. vessels on specific voyages, including those between U.S. and foreign ports or between U.S. ports on the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, provided certain tonnage requirements are met.

Chapter 103 exempts vessels where seamen share in voyage profits from its provisions and does not apply to foreign vessels unless specified. Kaluom contends that 46 U.S.C. 10313(i) limits the penalty wage provision to domestic vessels, but this interpretation is rejected as section 10301’s requirement for foreign or intercoastal voyages governs all related provisions, including section 10313. Since the DLB 801 was not on such a voyage, the penalty wage provision is inapplicable to Kaluom.

Section 10504 outlines a seaman's wage rights after a voyage begins, stipulating that they may demand half of their unpaid wages from the master after five days, with specific limitations on demands and the obligation to pay within two days of agreement termination or discharge. If the master fails to pay, they owe two days’ wages for each day of delay. However, this section does not apply to fishing, whaling vessels, yachts, or vessels engaged in coastwise commerce. It does apply to foreign vessels in U.S. harbors.

Section 10501 states that this chapter applies to vessels over 50 gross tons on interstate voyages, with similar exemptions as in Chapter 103 regarding vessels where seamen share voyage profits or foreign vessels. Kaluom's analysis of section 10504 aligns with that of section 10313, emphasizing seamen's entitlement to wages under specific circumstances.

Subsection (a) of 46 U.S.C. 10504 entitles a seaman to demand half of the unpaid wages at each port where the vessel loads or delivers cargo after the voyage has begun. Subsection (b) mandates that a master must pay the remaining wages within 2 days after the termination of the agreement or the seaman's discharge, whichever occurs first. Failure to comply with this requirement incurs a penalty under 46 U.S.C. 10504(c), obligating the master or owner to pay the seaman two days’ wages for each day of delay. Chapter 105, as defined in 46 U.S.C. 10501, applies to vessels not covered by Chapter 103 that are on a voyage between non-adjoining state ports, and subsection 10501(c) specifies that it does not apply to foreign vessels unless expressly stated.

Kaluom relies on 46 U.S.C. 10504(e), which allows for penalty provisions for seamen on foreign vessels in U.S. harbors, but this must be considered in context with the entire chapter. Since the DLB 801 was not on a qualifying voyage as defined in 10501, Kaluom cannot claim the penalty wage provision. Both sections 10313 and 10504 reference "voyage," indicating a consistent interpretation required throughout the statute. The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Su v. M/V S. Aster supports this interpretation, stating that the phrase “in a harbor of the United States” serves a jurisdictional purpose and does not negate the voyage requirement for foreign vessels. The legislative intent is clear: the statutory language applies to both American and foreign vessels, but specific conditions must be met to invoke penalty provisions. 

Regarding the DLB 801, it is uncertain if it met the jurisdictional requirement of being “in a harbor of the United States” at the relevant time, as it was in the Gulf of Mexico when Kaluom was airlifted. Even assuming Kaluom was legally discharged, there is no evidence indicating that the DLB 801 was in an American harbor pertinent to the suit against Stolt.

The decision declines to address the matter directly, as the voyage requirements outlined in sections 10301 and 10501 effectively resolve the case. It is assumed, for the sake of argument, that the requirement of being "in a harbor of the United States" has been satisfied. The document references Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., indicating that while statutes can sometimes produce results contrary to legislative intent, this situation is not one of those rare cases. 

It argues that interpreting subsections 10313(i) and 10504(e) independently, as Kaluom suggests, would render at least one of the subsections related to foreign vessels redundant, as they would not differ meaningfully from the voyage requirements. If Congress intended for these subsections to be exempt from the voyage requirements, it likely would have explicitly created a separate section for foreign vessels regarding penalty wages. 

The legislative intent is further supported by historical context, demonstrating Congress's goal to equalize the rights of American and foreign seamen, as articulated in the Seaman’s Act of 1915 and confirmed in Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon. The interpretation that eliminates the voyage requirements for foreign vessels would unfairly advantage them over American seamen, who could not claim penalty wages under similar circumstances.

Additionally, the legislative history shows a consistent framework from 1878 to 1983, where both voyage requirements and penalty wage provisions were unified. Historical legislative actions affirm that seamen are entitled to wages upon the completion of their voyages, with penalty wages established in the Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872, which also included provisions applicable to foreign voyages. Overall, the conclusion is that the voyage requirements in 46 U.S.C. 10301 and 10501 must apply to foreign vessels under the penalty wage statutes.

In 1874, Congress clarified that penalty wages were not available to seamen on vessels engaged in coastwise trade, with exceptions for trade between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, lake-going trade touching foreign ports, and trade with British North American possessions. The Revised Statutes retained similar language from the 1872 statute regarding penalty wages and voyage requirements. In 1898, Congress amended the statute by removing the ten-day limit for penalty wages and reducing the penalty from two to one day’s pay for delays, while also extending the statute's application to vessels making coasting voyages. However, this amendment did not alter the exclusion of seamen on coastwise voyages from claiming penalty wages. Prior to the 1983 recodification, the statute allowed penalty wages for coasting voyages but excluded coastwise voyages. The current statute does not differentiate between coasting and coastwise voyages, categorizing voyages as foreign, intercoastal, or coastwise. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the exclusion of vessels engaged in coastwise commerce from recovering penalty wages effectively nullifies the penalty wage benefit for coastwise voyages, although instances where a vessel is on a coastwise voyage but not engaged in commerce may exist. The penalty wage provisions were incorporated into the United States Code in Title 46, sections 596 and 597, which remained unchanged until 1983. The Second Circuit interpreted section 597 in conjunction with section 596, affirming that seamen on foreign vessels are entitled to penalty wages, as established in prior cases such as Monteiro v. Sociedad Maritima San Nicolas and Strathearn SS. Co. v. Dillon. The Sonderborg case further clarified the application of these provisions despite conflicting shipping article stipulations.

The court emphasizes the importance of interpreting the statutory provisions for seamen’s penalty wages in conjunction with related sections. It references prior case law, specifically The Cubadist, which asserts that sections 4529 and 4530 should be considered together. The last amendment to section 4529’s penalty wage language occurred in 1983 during a recodification of maritime laws. The amendments reorganized the penalty wage provisions and separated them from voyage type delineations but did not change the substantive law. Following this reorganization, Congress identified an omission regarding vessels in ‘coastwise commerce’ and retroactively amended 46 U.S.C. 10504 to include this exception. Therefore, the legislative history supports the interpretation that the voyage requirements in 46 U.S.C. 10301 and 10501 apply to seamen on foreign vessels seeking to claim penalty wages under 10313 and 10504. The court concluded that since the vessel DLB 801 was not engaged in voyages qualifying for penalty wages, the district court's summary judgment in favor of Stolt is upheld.