Grieshaber v. Fitch

Citations: 409 S.W.3d 435; 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 761; 2013 WL 3190200Docket: No. ED 98948

Court: Missouri Court of Appeals; June 25, 2013; Missouri; State Appellate Court

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Jason D. Grieshaber appeals the summary judgment granted to Colonel Timothy Fitch, Robert P. McCulloch, and Colonel Ronald K. Replogle regarding his petition to remove his name from Missouri’s sex offender registry. Grieshaber, who pled guilty in January 2001 to two counts of attempted child molestation when he was nineteen years old and the victim was thirteen, registered as a sex offender in 2005. In 2010, he filed an amended petition under section 589.400.8 of Missouri's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), claiming eligibility for removal due to the passage of two years since his guilty plea, the age differential with the victim, and the absence of physical force during the offenses. 

Colonel Replogle's motion for summary judgment asserted that Grieshaber did not meet the criteria for removal and had a federal obligation to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants, concluding that Grieshaber was required to register under Missouri law because he was also obligated under federal law. Grieshaber challenges this finding on appeal, claiming it was erroneous. The appellate review of the summary judgment is de novo, with the court affirming if the judgment is sustainable under any legal theory. The court ultimately agrees with the trial court's determination that Grieshaber has an independent federal obligation to register under SORNA, rejecting his claims.

Grieshaber contends that his obligation to register as a sex offender arises solely from state law, specifically asserting he should be allowed to petition for removal from Missouri’s sex offender registry under Section 589.400.8 of SORA. However, the court reiterates that he has a separate federal obligation to register under SORNA, enacted in July 2006, which establishes a national framework for sex offender registration. The Missouri Supreme Court has clarified in Doe v. Keathley and Doe v. Toelke that a Missouri resident who qualifies as a 'sex offender' under SORNA also bears an independent federal registration requirement that activates their duty to register in Missouri under Section 589.400.1(7) of SORA.

Section 589.400.1(7) mandates registration for Missouri residents required to register under federal law. SORNA stipulates that sex offenders must register in every jurisdiction where they reside, defining a 'sex offender' as someone convicted of a sex offense, including offenses against minors. The Missouri Supreme Court’s decisions emphasize that registration obligations under state law stem from an individual’s current status as a sex offender who is federally mandated to register, not merely from past convictions. Consequently, Grieshaber, having been convicted of attempted child molestation, qualifies as a 'sex offender' under SORNA, thereby incurring an independent federal registration duty that necessitates his registration in Missouri. The court is obliged to follow the precedent set by the Missouri Supreme Court, affirming Grieshaber’s current requirement to register under state law due to his federal obligations.

Grieshaber is ineligible to file a petition for removal from Missouri's sex offender registry under section 589.400.8 because his registration is based on a federal requirement rather than solely on his past convictions. Section 589.400.8 allows for removal after two years only under specific conditions, none of which apply to Grieshaber since he is registered due to his current status as a sex offender required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). 

In his appeal, Grieshaber argues that the trial court incorrectly determined he has a federal obligation to register under SORNA, asserting that he is an intrastate offender and that SORNA's registration requirements do not apply to him. He references two key provisions: the registration requirement in 42 U.S.C. section 16913(a) and the penalty for failure to register in 18 U.S.C. section 2250(a). The latter requires interstate travel for federal prosecution, which Grieshaber claims he has not engaged in. However, the court's previous ruling in Doe v. Keathley established that while interstate travel is necessary for federal prosecution under section 2250(a), it does not exempt individuals from state registration obligations. Consequently, the enforcement mechanisms outlined in SORNA remain applicable regardless of interstate travel status.

The Western District determined that individuals must register as sex offenders with state authorities regardless of any interstate travel requirement, as established in Doe v. Keathley. This conclusion extends to Grieshaber, who is mandated to register in Missouri even as an intrastate offender. The court also referenced Vaughan v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, which rejected arguments against the registration requirement based on a lack of interstate travel since the enactment of SORNA. 

In addressing Grieshaber’s claim that SORNA’s registration requirement is unconstitutional as it applies to intrastate offenders, the court clarified that the Missouri Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over cases questioning the validity of federal statutes. However, the assertion of unconstitutionality does not remove the court's jurisdiction unless the claim is deemed "real and substantial." The court found Grieshaber’s claim lacking in merit, aligning with the Eighth Circuit's ruling in U.S. v. Howell, which dismissed similar arguments regarding the Commerce Clause. The Eighth Circuit concluded that Congress has the authority to regulate intrastate actions that substantially affect interstate commerce, and under both the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, SORNA's registration requirement is constitutionally valid.

The Court evaluated the constitutionality of section 16913(a) of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), concluding that SORNA's intent is to regulate the interstate movement of sex offenders, which aligns with the Commerce Clause’s purpose. The registration requirement under section 16913(a) serves as a crucial tool for establishing a national system to monitor sex offenders, including those who are wholly intrastate but may travel across state lines. The Court emphasized the necessity of knowing both the original and current locations of offenders to effectively track their movements. The Eighth Circuit's prior ruling in Howell supported the constitutionality of this provision, affirming that it is a reasonable means of regulation under Congress’s powers. Grieshaber’s argument attempting to differentiate his case from Howell was dismissed due to lack of legal support. The Court affirmed that Grieshaber had a federal obligation to register as a sex offender under SORNA, reinforcing the decisions from Missouri Supreme Court cases and the Eighth Circuit. The trial court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants was upheld. Grieshaber's assertion that SORNA arose from Congress's Spending Clause power was deemed unnecessary to address given the established constitutional basis under the Commerce Clause.

Congress's authority to enact the statute under the Commerce Clause negated the need to assess its validity under the Spending Clause. Grieshaber contends that this makes section 589.400.8 irrelevant, but this view is rejected. A petition for removal from the state sex offender registry can be filed under section 589.400.8 if the individual's crime necessitated registration under section 589.400.1 of SORA but did not under SORNA. An example provided is a scenario where an offender, aged nineteen, convicted of consensual sexual contact with an eighteen-year-old, is required to register under SORA but not under SORNA due to federal stipulations. The state’s registration requirement stems solely from the state law violation, allowing eligibility for removal from the state registry under section 589.400.8 if other conditions are met. This position aligns with rulings from other federal courts. Lifetime registration under SORA is mandated unless specific conditions apply, such as reversal of convictions, pardons, or successful petitions for removal. Grieshaber is ineligible to file for removal under section 589.400.8.