Humphreys v. Wooldridge

Citations: 408 S.W.3d 261; 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 1026; 2013 WL 4715349Docket: No. SD 30798

Court: Missouri Court of Appeals; September 3, 2013; Missouri; State Appellate Court

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The appeal involves two recorded easements granted to Powell Humphreys, Anita Humphreys, and the Carl Sellers Revocable Living Trust (Appellants) over property owned by Michael Wooldridge and Jones Glass Co., along with Joshua and Traci Willison (Respondents). Appellants contest the trial court’s denial of their request to remove a business sign from Easement A and the ruling that part of Easement B was extinguished by adverse possession. The appellate court found no error and affirmed the trial court’s judgment, emphasizing that it must uphold the lower court's decision unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, against the weight of the evidence, or legally erroneous. Appellants bear the burden of proof regarding any claimed errors. The court noted that witness credibility and testimony weight are determined by the trial court, and the appellate review is limited to viewing evidence favorably to the prevailing party. The factual background indicates that in May 1983, Danny and Sheila Middleton, along with the Humphreys and Sellers, purchased a parcel of land, which they later divided. In September 1983, they established reciprocal easements, each titled “Easement for Roadway,” granting perpetual rights for roadway access across a designated 40-foot strip adjacent to Highway 63.

Grantees have rights to access and utilize the land for constructing and maintaining a roadway, including the authority to trim or clear vegetation that may obstruct its use. This is referred to as Easement A. In 1993, Sellers sold land to Michael Wooldridge, burdening his property with Easement A. In 1999, Sellers transferred his interest in Easement A to the Carl Sellers Revocable Living Trust. In 2005, Wooldridge sold part of his property to Jones Glass Co., which also became burdened by Easement A. 

Additionally, Easement B, created in 1983, is a 40-foot wide roadway easement that extends from Easement A. It burdens land sold by the Middletons to Charles Case in 1984, which later transitioned to Anthony Clark and then to the Willisons. The Humphreys’ property adjoins Easement A and B. 

In March 2006, Appellants filed a lawsuit for boundary declarations, ejectment, and injunctive relief concerning both easements. The trial occurred in July 2008, with further evidence presented in December 2009, leading to a judgment in May 2010. Appellants contested the trial court's refusal to remove a business sign erected by Wooldridge on Easement A and a ruling that part of Easement B was extinguished by adverse possession. Wooldridge's sign placement, confirmed by survey and photographs, was deemed compliant as it did not obstruct the roadway, and the court ruled that Easement A had not been abandoned or extinguished.

Wooldridge and Jones Glass are permitted to construct a business sign within Easement A, as the trial court found this use reasonable and non-disruptive to the Appellants’ enjoyment of the easement. Consequently, the Appellants' request for the sign's removal was denied. Regarding Easement B, Case, who purchased his property in 1984, erected a fence intended as a permanent boundary in 1988 or 1989, claiming it marked the easement's boundary without permission from the previous owners. Clark, who bought the property from Case in 2000, believed he owned up to the fence and modified it for his driveway, while Joshua Willison used the area up to the fence without objection, maintaining the property.

In 2005 or 2006, Powell informed Case that the fence was incorrectly placed. Joshua began constructing a new fence south of the existing one, which Sellers contested due to the tight corner created. The trial court ruled that the portion of Easement B between the Willison home and the fence had been extinguished by adverse possession, finding that the Willisons met the necessary elements while the Appellants could not prove permissive use. The court ordered the removal of the newly placed fence posts. The Appellants raised four points on appeal, specifically challenging the denial of the sign's removal and the adverse possession ruling concerning Easement B. The court intends to address these points, particularly the issues related to Easement A separately.

Appellants argue that the trial court erred in determining that Wooldridge’s sign construction was a reasonable use of the property and did not interfere with their use of Easement A. They claim that a servient tenant cannot place structures on an easement for ingress and egress without meeting adverse possession criteria. However, Missouri law clarifies that an easement provides a right to use land but does not confer title. Exclusive easements require specific language excluding the servient tenant's rights, which is absent in Easement A, making it non-exclusive. The owner of a property with a non-exclusive easement retains full dominion and can erect structures as long as they do not substantially interfere with the easement holder's use. The burden of proof rests with Appellants to demonstrate substantial interference, which they failed to do. The trial court's ruling was factual, not legal, and did not hinge on adverse possession criteria. 

In Subpart B, Appellants contend the standard for extinguishing an easement should be clear and convincing evidence of a prescriptive easement, arguing that the trial court extinguished Easement A. This is incorrect; the court explicitly stated that Easement A was not extinguished and ruled that the sign did not substantially interfere with Appellants' use. Appellants did not provide authority to support their claim that the trial court was required to use a prescriptive easement standard.

In Subpart A of Point I, Appellants challenge the trial court's decision that the Willisons gained ownership of part of Easement B through adverse possession, arguing insufficient evidence. However, the law stipulates that the burden of proof for adverse possession lies with the claimant, needing only a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, Subpart A fails.

Appellants contest the trial court's ruling regarding the Willisons' proof of adverse possession. The court found that the Willisons established all elements of adverse possession, which requires possession to be actual, hostile, open, exclusive, and continuous for ten years. Case's credible testimony indicated he built a permanent fence in 1988 or 1989 without permission, intending to mark his property and enclose cattle, effectively excluding Appellants from Easement B. This possession lasted 11 to 12 years, resulting in the extinguishment of Appellants' easement interest. As successors in title, the Willisons inherited the property free of this easement. 

Appellants also argue that the trial court improperly altered the easement boundaries without consent from all dominant tenants. However, since adverse possession negates the need for consent, this claim fails. 

Additionally, in Subpart A, Appellants assert the judgment contradicts the evidence due to Clark's removal of part of the fence for a driveway, which they argue undermined the fence's purpose and the adverse possession claim. The court disagreed, affirming that Case's possession for the requisite period extinguished the easement, and Clark's later actions do not affect the prior adverse possession ruling. Thus, the trial court's findings are upheld, and both Subpart B and Subpart A claims are denied.

Appellants argue that the trial court incorrectly determined that Case's fencing of part of Easement B did not adversely affect their easement rights since the area was wooded. They reference Litchfield v. Boogher and Peasel v. Dunakey to support their position; however, both cases are found to be distinguishable. In Litchfield, an iron fence built across an unused 10-foot private alley did not indicate an intention to obstruct its use, unlike Case, who constructed a permanent fence on what he believed to be the northern boundary of Easement B and intended to use the enclosed land for his own purposes. This action was deemed incompatible with Appellants' right to use that area as a roadway, and the trial court found credible Case’s testimony that Appellants had not utilized that part of the easement during his ownership, leading to the conclusion that their easement interest was extinguished by adverse possession.

Similarly, in Peasel, the court noted that for an easement to be extinguished by adverse possession, the landowner must use it in a way that is incompatible with the easement holder's rights. Unlike Peasel, who did not take action until after the lawsuit to exclude use of the easement, Case's actions fully excluded Appellants from using the fenced area for 17 years. Therefore, Peasel is also factually distinguishable.

Regarding Appellants' argument about permissive use, they contend the trial court erred in finding they failed to establish this. They claimed Case's testimony indicated he had permission from Sellers to place the fence. However, Case specifically denied receiving such permission, and the trial court found this testimony credible. As such, the court deferred to the trial court's credibility determinations, affirming that permissive use cannot support a claim of adverse possession. Consequently, Subpart B fails, and both Point II and Point IV are denied.

Appellants' request to reassess the credibility of Case's testimony is outside the permissible scope of the court's review standards, resulting in a failure of their against-the-weight-of-the-evidence argument, and Point IV is denied. The trial court's judgment is affirmed. The opinion refers to Powell Humphreys and Anita Humphreys collectively as the "Humphreys," and Joshua Willison and Traci Willison as the "Willisons." Court's Exhibit 1, incorporated into the judgment, identifies roadway easements as Easement A and Easement B, with a separate Easement C mentioned but not challenged. The trial court's findings regarding trees along Easement B, which were claimed not to interfere with Appellants’ use, and its order against parking and barricades in Easement B, were not raised as claims of error and thus will not be addressed. Citing applicable legal precedents, the court finds the additional arguments unpersuasive.