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Stolov v. Jackson County School District C-1 of Hickman Mills
Citations: 408 S.W.3d 218; 2013 WL 3989410; 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 915Docket: No. WD 74784
Court: Missouri Court of Appeals; June 11, 2013; Missouri; State Appellate Court
Nathan Stolov appeals a trial court's summary judgment favoring his former employer, Jackson County School District C. 1, regarding his breach of contract claim. Stolov argues the District breached his contract by not renewing it without notice or a hearing, as required by the Missouri Teacher Tenure Act (the Act). The court determined Stolov was not a permanent teacher under the Act because his prior teaching experience did not qualify him for the necessary credit toward permanent status, resulting in his classification as a probationary teacher. Therefore, he was not entitled to the procedural protections he claimed. The trial court affirmed the District’s position, leading to the grant of summary judgment, which Stolov is now appealing. Appellate review of summary judgment is conducted de novo, meaning the appellate court reviews the decision without deference to the lower court's ruling. Summary judgment will be upheld if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and no genuine issues of material fact exist. The record is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, allowing for all reasonable inferences. A defending party can establish a right to judgment by demonstrating: 1) facts negating an element of the claimant’s cause of action, 2) the non-movant’s inability to produce sufficient evidence after adequate discovery, or 3) the absence of genuine disputes regarding necessary facts supporting the movant’s affirmative defense. In this case, Stolov appeals the circuit court's decision granting summary judgment to the District, arguing he was entitled to one year of credit toward permanent teacher status due to his prior instructional experiences. He claims the District breached his contract by failing to provide notice or a hearing before non-renewing his contract for the 2007-2008 school year. The central legal question is whether Stolov's prior experiences qualify for the credit. If they do not, he acknowledges he was a probationary teacher during the 2006-2007 school year, and the District's actions would not constitute a breach of contract. The Missouri Revised Statutes differentiate between permanent and probationary teachers. A permanent teacher is defined as one employed for five successive years within the same district, while a probationary teacher is one employed for five years or less. Permanent teachers enjoy significantly greater procedural protections than probationary teachers regarding contract termination by a school board. Specifically, the termination of a permanent teacher's contract requires written charges detailing the grounds for termination and a hearing if requested, as per section 168.116.1. In contrast, a school board may choose not to renew a probationary teacher's contract for any reason, provided it is not unconstitutional. The only requirement for probationary teachers is notification of non-renewal by April 15 and, upon request, a brief explanation for the decision, as outlined in section 168.126.2. Stolov's breach of contract claims hinge on whether he was classified as a permanent or probationary teacher at the time of his non-renewal. A waiver provision allows for one year of credit toward permanent status for probationary teachers with two or more years of teaching experience in any school system. If this waiver applies to Stolov, he would be considered a permanent teacher and thus entitled to the associated procedural protections. Stolov argues his nine years of teaching experience in other school systems qualifies him for this waiver. However, the District contends that his prior roles did not meet the statutory definition of "teacher," which requires certification as per sections 168.011 and 168.081. The analysis focuses on the terms "any other school system" and "teacher," with the statutory definition necessitating both certification and the performance of duties requiring such certification. Section 168.011.1 mandates that individuals must possess a valid teaching certificate to be employed in any teaching position within public schools. Section 168.081(1) reinforces that, since September 1, 1988, only individuals with a valid Missouri certificate may teach in grades K-12 in public schools. To qualify as a teacher under section 168.104(7), an individual must (1) teach in a public school, (2) in grades K-12, and (3) hold a valid teaching certificate. For a person to be eligible for the waiver in section 168.104(5), their prior teaching experience must have been (1) in public schools serving grades K-12 or a no-fee prekindergarten program, (2) authorized by a valid teaching certificate, and (3) lasting at least two years. Stolov did not obtain his teaching certificate until 2001, thus he could not have qualified as a "teacher" prior to that date under the definition in section 168.104(7). His subsequent teaching experiences at Christ the King Elementary and the Clay County Juvenile Detention Center, occurring after obtaining his certificate, did not fulfill the public school requirement and were also insufficient in duration to meet the waiver criteria. Stolov contends that the statutory definition of "teacher" should not apply to the waiver provision without negating the term "any other school system," suggesting the legislature intended a different meaning. Despite this perceived conflict, the interpretation aligns with the legislature's intent, and the plain language of the statute must be followed. When a statute is ambiguous, statutory construction rules apply to ascertain meaning, ensuring all provisions are harmonized and meaningful, as the legislature is presumed to avoid enacting superfluous provisions. The waiver provision can be interpreted to mean that "any other school system" allows for the inclusion of individuals who meet the qualifications of a "teacher" but have not worked within a defined "school district." This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent of the Act, as it suggests that the term "school system" has a broader meaning than "school district," potentially encompassing experiences from metropolitan school districts. The definitions of "teacher" and "school district" specifically exclude employees from metropolitan districts, indicating that the legislature aimed to allow waivers for these teachers. Contrarily, Stolov's interpretation, which suggests a broader application of "teacher" to include any instructional role in any institution, is inconsistent with the statutory definition and legislative intent. His view would impose waivers on school boards regardless of the educational context, contradicting the strict requirements for probationary teachers to achieve permanent status, which mandates teaching in the same district for over five years. This would create absurd outcomes, as it could classify any educational experience as qualifying under "any other school system," undermining the specific language of the statute. Thus, Stolov’s interpretation is deemed contrary to the legislative intent and would lead to unreasonable results, such as questioning the relevance of teaching experiences across various educational institutions. Stolov's interpretation of the waiver provision under section 168.104(5) is deemed inconsistent with legislative intent and likely to produce absurd outcomes. He asserts that his teaching roles at the YMCA and YWCA qualify as experience within a "school system," despite these institutions not being classified as schools. Stolov references a 1975 Attorney General Opinion, which interprets "in any other school system" to include all full-time teaching positions, but this opinion fails to reference the statutory definition of "teacher" in section 168.104(7) and does not consider the statute as a whole, violating principles of statutory construction. While Stolov argues for a liberal interpretation of the Act to achieve its remedial goals, the court finds that his interpretation would undermine the Act's objectives by easing tenure acquisition for teachers with non-public school experience, which was not intended. Consequently, Stolov does not meet the definition of "teacher," and thus, he does not qualify for the waiver, leaving him classified as a probationary teacher without the right to contract renewal or the procedural protections afforded to permanent teachers. The circuit court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the District is affirmed. Additionally, Stolov's claim regarding a breach of contract for failing to provide procedural protections for probationary teachers was not raised in the trial court and, therefore, cannot be considered on appeal, as new arguments cannot be introduced at that stage. Stolov is not entitled to relief regarding his unpreserved claim because the procedural protections he seeks apply only to terminations for incompetence, as defined in section 168.126.2, RSMo Cum.Supp.2012. A probationary teacher must specifically request the school board to disclose the reason for their termination, and without such a request, the board is not obligated to provide an explanation. The record shows Stolov did not make this request, making it unclear if his termination was due to incompetence or another reason. Without evidence that his termination was based on incompetence, he is not entitled to the written statement or opportunity to correct any faults, as stipulated for probationary teachers under the Act. Additionally, there is a dispute regarding whether the 'two or more years' requirement in section 168.104(5) allows for experience to be combined from different institutions or must be from a single institution. However, this issue is deemed unnecessary to resolve since Stolov does not meet the statutory definition of 'teacher' based on his prior instructional experience and has not provided a clear interpretation of 'school system.'