Ipock v. Ipock

Citations: 403 S.W.3d 580; 2013 WL 3357609; 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 100Docket: No. 2012-CA-001271-ME

Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky; July 5, 2013; Kentucky; State Appellate Court

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Jack Ipock appeals the Casey Circuit Court's order that allowed the Cabinet for Health and Family Services (CHFS) and Judy Vance, E.E.I.'s guardian ad litem, to intervene in his divorce case with Dana Ipock. He also contests the court's decision to vacate its prior orders concerning paternity and custody of E.E.I., Dana’s minor child. The court found that while there was an abuse of discretion in ruling fraud as a basis for its decisions, it affirmed the intervention of CHFS and Vance and the amendment of the divorce order, excluding Jack as E.E.I.'s father.

Background information includes that E.E.I. was born on February 18, 2011, shortly before Jack and Dana married. They signed a Declaration of Paternity which was filed with the Bureau of Vital Statistics. Following allegations of neglect by Jack, E.E.I. was placed in CHFS custody. After Jack and Dana separated, Jack filed for divorce, asserting paternity and seeking sole custody. A Separation Agreement stipulated joint custody after reunification, but a paternity test conducted in March 2012 revealed Jack was not E.E.I.'s biological father.

CHFS and Vance later filed a motion to intervene, claiming the paternity test results constituted newly discovered evidence and alleging Jack and Dana had committed fraud. Jack countered that there was insufficient basis for the intervention and denied any fraudulent actions, citing "paternity by estoppel" to retain custody. The trial court granted the intervention, rejected Jack's paternity claim, and amended the custody decree to reflect that he was not E.E.I.'s father, leading to this appeal.

Jack contests the trial court's decisions on a motion to intervene and a motion to alter, amend, or vacate its custody ruling. The court reviews the intervention order for clear error, only setting aside findings of fact if they lack substantial evidence. Courts have broad discretion in allowing intervention, while denial of a motion to alter, amend, or vacate is judged under an abuse of discretion standard. This requires determining if the trial court's decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Reconsideration of judgments is rare and should only occur to prevent a "flagrant miscarriage of justice."

Intervention can occur under two conditions: CR 24.01 allows for intervention when a statute grants an unconditional right or when an applicant has a significant interest in the action that may be impacted, provided their interest is not adequately represented. Alternatively, CR 24.02 permits intervention based on a timely application when a statute provides a conditional right or when there are common legal or factual questions between the applicant's claims and the main action. The court must consider whether allowing intervention would delay or prejudice the original parties' rights, and the second rule does not require the intervenor to have a direct personal or financial interest in the case.

CHFS was granted the right to intervene in the divorce case due to its role as custodian of E.E.I., aiming to ascertain E.E.I.'s paternity, which aligns with the trial court's finding of common legal and factual questions between the divorce and neglect cases. However, CHFS's interests would not be impaired if it could not participate in the divorce action, and thus it did not qualify for intervention as a matter of right under CR 24.01. Nonetheless, the trial court correctly allowed CHFS to intervene under the permissive framework of CR 24.02. Similarly, the Guardian ad Litem, Vance, was also permitted to intervene due to overlapping legal and factual issues pertaining to E.E.I. and her custody. The intervention decisions are case-specific and do not set a precedent for future actions involving CHFS or guardians ad litem in private divorce cases.

The trial court granted a motion to amend the custody agreement under CR 60.02 based on two grounds: newly discovered evidence from a paternity test and findings of fraud by Jack and Dana regarding Jack's relationship with E.E.I. In considering fraud, CR 60.02 provides that a party may seek relief from a judgment if it can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the opposing party's conduct involved fraud affecting the proceedings, which hindered the moving party's ability to fully present its case.

CHFS and Vance contended that Dana and Jack were aware that Jack was not E.E.I.’s biological father and actively concealed this knowledge during divorce and neglect proceedings. They based their argument on paternity test results and Jack's April 2012 memorandum, where he acknowledged the possibility of not being E.E.I.’s father. CHFS and Vance argued that Jack's continued claims of paternity constituted fraud upon the court. However, the trial court's conclusion of fraud was deemed unreasonable, as it mischaracterized the evidence, specifically Jack's acknowledgment of only a "remote possibility" of not being the father, which does not equate to the knowledge necessary for fraud.

Moreover, even if Jack and Dana had concealed this information, it did not prevent CHFS or Vance from effectively presenting their case, as they were not parties to the divorce. CHFS failed to provide substantial evidence of fraud beyond Jack's statement and the paternity test results, leading to a determination that the trial court's finding of fraud was erroneous and an abuse of discretion.

Additionally, the trial court granted a CR 60.02 motion based on the paternity test being "newly discovered evidence." Jack argued that the test did not significantly impact his status as E.E.I.’s legal father, claiming the court erred in its decision. Recent Supreme Court rulings indicate that while CR 60.02 is well-established, its application in disestablishing paternity is evolving. Kentucky statutes, specifically KRS 406.025 and KRS 406.021(4), outline how paternity can be established through voluntary acknowledgment, which creates a rebuttable presumption of paternity that lasts for a specified period unless challenged. After this period, the man who signed the acknowledgment is presumed to be the legal father.

The statute does not clarify whether the presumption of paternity established under KRS 406 is irrebuttable. The Kentucky Supreme Court has suggested that a father's presumed status is not absolute, as demonstrated in J.A.S. v. Bushelman, where DNA testing was deemed an appropriate method to rebut the traditional marital presumption of paternity. The court acknowledged that while this may leave a child without a legal father, it could not disregard DNA test results excluding Jack as E.E.I.’s father. Jack and Dana's voluntary acknowledgment of paternity created a rebuttable presumption under KRS 406.021(4). Despite any presumption, the court's acknowledgment of Jack as E.E.I.’s father could be amended under CR 60.02 due to new evidence, including the DNA test results.

The record did not show that the paternity test results could not have been obtained earlier with due diligence. Therefore, the trial court acted within its discretion in amending the order based on this evidence. The decision also raises concerns about the conflict between traditional public policy, which aims to avoid fatherlessness, and the reliability of DNA testing. Inconsistent court rulings have complicated fathers' rights in paternity cases, as courts sometimes selectively apply public policy to achieve desired outcomes. To address this inconsistency, the ruling emphasizes that in CR 60.02 motions to disestablish paternity, DNA test results should be the primary factor in the court's decision, while allowing for judicial discretion and consideration of other doctrines like paternity by estoppel. This approach aims to rectify perceived inequities in the legal treatment of paternity cases, affirming that DNA evidence should take precedence over public policy considerations.

Justice is a primary goal for the court, which cannot be achieved by declaring a man to be the biological father of a child when such a relationship has been disestablished. The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Crowder v. Com. ex rel. Gregory established this principle, which CHFS now supports to resolve conflicts arising from its previous public policy stance. The court accepts this principle and emphasizes that trial courts must apply it consistently in future cases involving paternity disestablishment.

Jack argues that the trial court erred by granting a motion based on a paternity test that he claims does not affect his legal status as E.E.I.’s parent under the doctrine of paternity by estoppel. This doctrine, recognized in Kentucky jurisprudence since S.R.D. v. T.L.B., requires specific elements for its application, including the conduct of the estopped party and the reliance of the other party on that conduct to their detriment. While the doctrine has been used to prevent a legal father from denying paternity, Jack seeks to use it to prevent CHFS from questioning his status as E.E.I.’s father, despite the paternity test results.

Jack asserts his commitment to E.E.I. as her father, having always presented himself as such and actively working towards her reunification. However, the doctrine of equitable estoppel requires that a party who has induced another to act to their detriment cannot later assert a position inconsistent with that conduct. The court concludes that applying this doctrine in Jack's situation, where he seeks to prevent CHFS from challenging his paternity, represents an unprecedented and unjustified extension of the established equitable principles.

Jack lacks supporting authority to extend the doctrine of paternity by estoppel to situations where a man, found not to be a child's father, can prevent others from excluding him as the father. His references only pertain to distinguishable cases, leading to the conclusion that the doctrine cannot be expanded in this instance. Additionally, it was determined that Jack did not possess "full knowledge" of his non-paternity status, which means he could not have induced CHFS, Vance, or E.E.I. to act detrimentally based on his conduct. Therefore, the doctrine does not support Jack's claims. The court concluded that due to overlapping claims and legal issues regarding paternity and custody, the trial court appropriately allowed CHFS and Vance to intervene. While the trial court's fraud finding was inadequately supported, it correctly amended the divorce order following the paternity test results. The order of the Casey Circuit Court is affirmed, with Judges Caperton and Vanmeter concurring, though Vanmeter concurs in result only. The dissenting opinions of Wintersheimer and Lambert reference past cases but emphasize that not every request for DNA testing will be mandated or funded by the Commonwealth. The ruling specifically pertains to cases with existing paternity test results.