Court: Missouri Court of Appeals; April 2, 2013; Missouri; State Appellate Court
The widow and three children of Stephen Sasnett appealed a judgment favoring the City of Kansas City and Tina Jons in their wrongful death claim. The Sasnetts argued that the circuit court erred by not instructing the jury that Jons owed a higher standard of care than the City, which they claimed led to Jons being assigned too low a percentage of fault. Additionally, they contended that the admission of Jons’s testimony regarding her own children and her understanding of the Sasnetts' desires for her incarceration improperly influenced the jury's fault allocation and reduced their damage award. They also claimed that their motion for costs was wrongly denied. The court affirmed the judgment.
Factual details reveal that on December 21, 2005, while Stephen Sasnett was stopped at a red light, Jons, who had a red light, failed to stop and collided with Ronald Brooks’s vehicle, which had a green light. This collision resulted in Jons’s SUV landing on Sasnett's truck, causing his death. Prior to trial, the Sasnetts settled with Brooks for $250,000. During the trial against the City and Jons, evidence was presented showing that the intersection had a history of accidents, with an employee from a nearby clinic recalling frequent incidents. Testimony indicated that the traffic signals at the intersection were difficult to see and could confuse drivers, contributing to the accident. The City had recognized the intersection as a high accident zone years prior and had considered safety improvements.
Nasseri’s memo indicates that from January 1, 1999, to July 31, 2001, the intersection saw twenty-six accidents, with 58% being right-angle collisions. The primary causes identified were driver failure to see the traffic signal or stop for red lights, potentially due to poor visibility of the signals. He recommended immediate installation of 'Signal Ahead' signs and long-term installation of overhead mast arm signals, neither of which the City implemented before the December 21, 2005, accident. Traffic engineer Dr. John Glennon testified that the intersection was unreasonably dangerous due to the absence of a mast arm signal and 'Signal Ahead' signs. He noted the close proximity of the 18th and Holmes mast arm signal to the pedestal signals at 18th and Charlotte created confusion for drivers, especially given the short distance between the intersections (250 feet compared to a typical short block of 440 feet). Glennon asserted that this proximity could lead drivers to mistake the signals, as evidenced by Jons, who, while driving westbound, saw only the green mast arm signal at 18th and Holmes and not the pedestal signals at 18th and Charlotte. She proceeded through the intersection under the impression that the overhead signal governed her path. Jons acknowledged awareness of the stop bar indicating a traffic control device but misidentified the relevant signal. She was not impaired or distracted at the time of the accident and only saw Brooks a second before the collision. Glennon emphasized that the installation of mast arm signals could potentially reduce right-angle collisions by 74%.
Jons claimed she braked before a collision but no skid marks were found. She testified to adhering to the speed limit of 35 mph, while an eyewitness estimated her speed at 20-25 mph. Accident reconstruction expert Stephen Christoffersen assessed Jons's speed at 37-45 mph and Brooks's at 43-53 mph, concluding both were speeding and that adherence to the speed limit could have prevented Sasnett's fatal injuries. Christoffersen noted that Jons and Brooks had visibility of each other approximately 2.5 seconds before the accident, with adequate sightlines to the traffic signals, which were unobstructed. Jons later pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter, acknowledging her criminal negligence in disregarding traffic signals, resulting in 30 days of house arrest and three years of probation. Her plea was influenced by remorse and the financial burden of a trial. After the accident, Sasnett died from blunt chest and abdominal trauma due to being pinned by his truck. The Sasnetts sought damages for the loss of Sasnett's potential earnings and household contributions; he was the primary breadwinner, earning around $80,000 in 2005, including overtime, and contributing significantly to household chores. Economist Dr. John Ward estimated the family's economic loss at approximately $1,975,000.
The Sasnetts sought damages for loss of consortium and companionship due to the death of Sasnett, presenting testimony on their losses. They moved for directed verdicts on liability, which the court denied for the City but granted for Jons. The court accepted a jury instruction stating Jons was liable for failing to obey a traffic signal, requiring the jury to assign her a percentage of fault. The instruction for the City's liability included assessing fault if the intersection lacked adequate signaling, defining "ordinary care" as the standard expected of a reasonably careful person.
The City objected to the jury instructions, arguing that Jons should be held to a higher standard of care than the City. They proposed a verdict director clarifying that Jons owed the highest degree of care due to her actions as a driver. The court rejected the City's proposed instruction and the Sasnetts did not join in the objection. During the trial, the City was allowed to argue for Jons's higher standard of care in closing arguments, which both parties emphasized. The Sasnetts contended that Jons was 75-85% at fault and the City 15-25%, seeking over $10 million in damages. Ultimately, the jury found Jons 10% at fault and the City 90% at fault, awarding the Sasnetts $2 million in total damages.
The court issued a judgment based on the jury's verdict, adjusting the damages awarded to the Sasnetts from $2,000,000 to $1,750,000 after crediting a prior $250,000 settlement with Brooks. The City’s liability was limited to $381,759, resulting in a judgment of $175,000 against Jons and $381,759 against the City. The Sasnetts filed motions for a new trial or additur and for costs, which the court denied. They subsequently appealed, arguing that the court failed to instruct the jury that Jons owed a higher standard of care than the City. They claimed this omission led to an inadequate allocation of fault to Jons. However, they did not raise this issue during the instruction conference, which is required for preserving such objections for appeal under Rule 70.03. The Sasnetts contended that the City's objection preserved the error for appeal, but the court disagreed, citing that objections must be made by all parties affected. The court ruled that the Sasnetts could not benefit from the City's objection since they were in a different legal position. Furthermore, the court noted that the City’s objection did not guarantee the same ruling would have been made had the Sasnetts objected. The court emphasized that failure to raise specific objections prior to jury deliberation typically prevents appellate review unless there is a plain error, which is infrequently applied in civil cases and requires proof of substantial injustice. The court concluded that the Sasnetts failed to demonstrate that the alleged instructional error constituted plain error that affected the jury’s verdict.
Prejudice from an erroneous jury instruction alone does not warrant reversal; the appellant must demonstrate that the error led to a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice, which the Sasnetts failed to do. They proposed a verdict-directing instruction regarding Jons’s liability, indicating it was appropriate, thus rendering any error self-invited and not grounds for reversal. The Sasnetts also expressed no objections to other jury instructions, undermining claims of manifest injustice. The trial court did not err in accepting their lack of objections.
The verdict directors for both the City and Jons were appropriate. Since the trial court denied the Sasnetts’ motion for a directed verdict against the City, the jury was tasked with determining the City’s liability under an ordinary care standard. The verdict director against Jons correctly instructed that she was liable as a matter of law, requiring the jury to assess her percentage of fault. There was no need to include the definition of 'negligence' since her liability had already been established.
The Sasnetts argued that without a standard of care instruction for Jons, the jury could not adequately compare her fault with that of the City. However, the trial record demonstrated that the jury was well-informed of Jons's higher standard of care through multiple references during the trial, allowing them to make proper fault comparisons. The Sasnetts did not establish any instructional error leading to manifest injustice.
In terms of alleged improper testimony, the Sasnetts contended that the trial court erred in allowing Jons to disclose personal details about her family and employment situation related to her probation.
The Sasnetts argue that the court erred in admitting Jons's testimony, particularly her statement about understanding that the Sasnetts wanted her jailed, claiming it was irrelevant and prejudicial, leading to a miscarriage of justice by attributing only ten percent of the fault to Jons and awarding limited damages to Maria Sasnett. They seek plain error review due to their failure to object at trial. However, plain error review is rarely utilized in civil cases and requires showing that an evident error resulted in significant injustice. The court finds that the Sasnetts' claims do not meet this standard, as evidence related to a party's family status is generally inadmissible but does not constitute reversible error unless it directly affects the case's merits. Jons’s mention of her children was brief and relevant to prior questioning by the Sasnetts. Furthermore, her acknowledgment of the Sasnetts’ desire for her imprisonment was a direct response to their questioning and did not constitute grounds for reversible error. The court concludes that the evidence presented, including acknowledgment of the intersection's dangers and the City’s prior knowledge of the issues, undermines the Sasnetts' claims of manifest injustice. Consequently, Points II and III are denied.
The Sasnetts asserted that the circuit court wrongly denied their motion for costs as the prevailing party entitled to recover $16,682.40 in deposition costs from the City and Jons. The court's discretion in awarding costs is recognized, and an appeal can only succeed if the decision is shown to be arbitrary or unreasonable. The City opposed the motion, indicating the Sasnetts had already received these costs from a settlement with Brooks, which allocated $98,385.65 specifically for case expenses. The court required the Sasnetts to provide an itemized accounting of costs covered by the Brooks settlement but they instead claimed no costs were satisfied. The court found this claim unfounded given the settlement agreement. As the Sasnetts did not demonstrate that the costs claimed were distinct from those covered by the Brooks settlement, their motion for costs was denied. On appeal, while they maintained their entitlement to recover costs from Jons and the City, the court affirmed that they could not recover costs already compensated by the Brooks settlement. The Sasnetts waived their right to recover unsatisfied costs by failing to provide the requested accounting. Ultimately, the circuit court's judgment was upheld, confirming that the jury received appropriate instructions regarding the standards of care applicable to both parties, distinguishing this case from others cited by the Sasnetts where incorrect standards were applied.
In Bean v. Superior Bowen Asphalt Co., 340 S.W.3d 275 (Mo.App.2011), the jury experienced confusion due to conflicting verdict directors, prompting them to seek clarification from the judge. The Sasnetts contended that Jons’s counsel improperly emphasized her transition from being a stay-at-home mom during closing arguments. However, this argument was deemed a fair response to the Sasnetts’ own statements about Jons's family interactions and work. The law generally supports broad latitude in closing arguments, especially when addressing opposing counsel's claims (Boshears v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 272 S.W.3d 215 (Mo.App.2008)). Additionally, the Sasnetts argued that Jons's use of the word "understanding" rendered her statement inadmissible, citing Powell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 173 S.W.3d 685 (Mo.App.2005), which stated that such expressions of belief do not constitute substantial evidence and should be dismissed.
Jons's use of the term "understanding" in her statement did not lead to manifest injustice, as the Sasnetts' desire for her imprisonment was not disputed. The Sasnetts argued that the City and Jons would benefit from not paying $16,682.40 in costs due to a court offset of a $2 million damages award by the full $250,000 Brooks settlement, which included $98,385.65 in costs. However, the record shows the Sasnetts did not object to this offset or claim that the Brooks settlement should not factor into their costs motion. The court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, noting that testimony from Worley and police officers established Jons's duty of care, and the jury was properly instructed on the standards of care, differentiating this case from precedents cited by the Sasnetts. The Sasnetts also claimed Jons's counsel improperly referenced her personal situation in closing arguments; however, this was deemed a fair retort to the Sasnetts' own arguments. Furthermore, the Sasnetts contended that Jons's statement was inadmissible due to its qualifying nature, referencing a previous case where such testimony was considered objectionable. Yet, since the desire for Jons's imprisonment was not contested, the use of "understanding" did not affect the case's outcome.
