Douglas L. Perreault v. Loren Hostetler

Citations: 884 F.2d 267; 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 13285; 1989 WL 100173Docket: 88-1410

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; September 1, 1989; Federal Appellate Court

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Douglas L. Perreault filed a complaint on February 27, 1987, alleging police misconduct related to an incident on December 1, 1982, involving nine police officers and officials from Grand Blanc, Michigan, under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The defendants argued that the claim was barred by Michigan's three-year statute of limitations, prompting a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A magistrate recommended dismissal based on this statute, and the district court agreed, also denying Perreault's motion to amend his complaint to add defendants. 

The underlying incident involved Perreault, who was violating probation and hiding from a felony warrant. Police officers Collarday and Hitt entered his parents' home without a warrant, claiming to seek Perreault, who was found armed with explosives and a pistol. An 18-hour standoff ensued, during which Perreault’s actions led police to treat the situation as a hostage crisis. After an unsuccessful attempt to flee, he surrendered and was charged with assault with intent to commit murder. The magistrate ruled that Perreault's claim was time-barred under Michigan's personal injury statute, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Sec. 600.5805(8).

Perreault argued that his imprisonment since December 2, 1982, tolled the statute of limitations for his civil rights claim under MCLA Sec. 600.5851(1), which tolls limitations if a claimant is imprisoned when the claim accrues. However, the magistrate determined that Perreault's cause of action arose prior to his imprisonment, rendering his claim time-barred despite his efforts to secure counsel before filing. The magistrate noted that allowing the tolling would contradict federal civil rights policies, referencing Higley v. Michigan Department of Corrections. The district court upheld the magistrate's recommendation for dismissal, asserting that the police had a duty to disarm Perreault after he threatened violence, with the only potential misconduct being a warrantless entry into his bedroom. The court distinguished this case from Higley, finding that Perreault was not in custody during the alleged misconduct and that his complaint did not reference prison conditions. The court concluded that Perreault was not incarcerated when his claim accrued, and therefore, the tolling statute did not apply, making his complaint against the defendants time-barred. Additionally, any claims against new defendants he sought to add were also time-barred, leading to the denial of his motion to amend. Perreault subsequently appealed the dismissal of his complaint. The district court converted the defendants’ motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment, allowing consideration of affidavits and additional evidence, determining that there were no genuine material facts in dispute warranting a judgment as a matter of law.

Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis and represents himself pro se, resulting in the court applying less stringent standards to his complaint, as established in Haines v. Kerner. The claim arose while the plaintiff was living with his parents, not while imprisoned. Federal courts must apply state tolling statutes for Section 1983 actions, but federal law dictates when a cause of action arises. A cause of action under Section 1983 accrues when the plaintiff is aware of the injury motivating the action, consistent with Michigan law, which states that a cause of action accrues when all elements to prove the wrong are present.

Michigan's tolling statute, MCLA Sec. 600.5851(1), applies to individuals disabled by imprisonment at the time their claim accrues. However, the plaintiff was not incarcerated until after his claim arose, and the tolling statute does not apply to those incarcerated after the cause of action has accrued. The court upheld the interpretation of the tolling statute by a Michigan trial judge, affirming that the statute of limitations bars the plaintiff's claim and that the tolling provision does not apply in this case. The applicable statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Michigan is generally three years. The court found no contrary authority and affirmed the district court's decision regarding the limitations period and tolling. The plaintiff has since been convicted and is currently incarcerated, but there are no details on the status of his parole violation in Texas.