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Soon Phat, L.P. v. Alvarado
Citations: 396 S.W.3d 78; 2013 WL 178131Docket: Nos. 14-10-00555-CV, 14-10-00603-CV, 14-11-00033-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; January 17, 2013; Texas; State Appellate Court
William J. Boyce, Justice, addressed a consolidated case involving three appeals related to a physical altercation during an attempted towing of Feliciano Alvarado’s pickup truck from the Charleston Court Apartments on August 28, 2005. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment in part and reversed in part. The incident involved wrecker driver Brock Keith Dion and his helper Samuel Lee Thompson, who attempted to tow Feliciano's truck while he was visiting his brother, Juvenal Alvarado, at the apartment complex. Following the altercation, Juvenal was arrested and initially charged with felony aggravated assault but later had the charge re-filed as a misdemeanor criminal mischief. After serving seven months in jail, he accepted a plea bargain and was released on March 24, 2006. Juvenal and Feliciano subsequently filed a civil lawsuit against multiple parties, including Dion, Thompson, Robert Groce Dill (owner of Arrow Towing), and the ownership group of Charleston Court Apartments, asserting various tort claims such as assault and malicious prosecution. A jury trial in 2010 resulted in a unanimous verdict favoring the Alvarados on all claims, but the trial court later disregarded the jury's findings on malicious prosecution. The judgment awarded damages for other claims, prompting appeals from all parties except for one defendant, Boyles. The appeals involved multiple issues raised by the defendants and cross-points from the Alvarados. Evidence presented included video footage from cameras mounted in the tow truck, documenting parts of the incident. The factual circumstances surrounding the fight were heavily contested, with significant details related to the events leading up to the towing and subsequent altercation. Juvenal, Feliciano, Juan Pinera, and a friend returned from the impound lot in two trucks. Pinera drove Feliciano's truck back to Charleston Court, while Feliciano rode with Juvenal. Upon arrival, they found no parking spaces, as security guard Boyles had already called for a wrecker. Feliciano claimed that Pinera was still in the truck when Dion backed up the wrecker to tow it. Feliciano yelled for Pinera to drive off to prevent the tow, and they assert that Pinera successfully drove away with the truck. Dion, however, could not recall whether he had hooked up Feliciano's truck but denied anyone being inside with the engine running. After Pinera drove off, Feliciano approached Dion to inquire about the towing. While Feliciano stated he was calm, other witnesses, including Javier Cardenas, noted that he appeared angry. Thompson then pepper-sprayed Feliciano and struck him with a flashlight, causing serious injury. Witness Moisés de la Torre corroborated that Thompson hit Feliciano, leading to Feliciano needing 14 staples in his head. Juvenal testified that after Pinera drove off, he parked his truck and Feliciano showed Dion paperwork indicating his truck had been towed earlier. Thompson then allegedly attacked Feliciano with a flashlight. Juvenal was also assaulted by Thompson, resulting in a broken nose. During the altercation, Juvenal's truck inadvertently rolled into the wrecker. Juvenal denied any aggressive actions towards Dion or Thompson, while Cardenas claimed he saw Juvenal hit the wrecker. Dion recalled that Feliciano appeared angry during their encounter and claimed Feliciano either pushed or hit him, prompting his use of pepper spray. Dion also stated he saw Juvenal's truck collide with the wrecker. Dion exited the wrecker’s window and kicked Juvenal’s truck windshield while witnessing a struggle between Thompson and Juvenal inside the truck. Dion claimed Thompson kicked Juvenal to the ground to prevent his escape and held him there until police arrived. Initially, police considered arresting both Dion and Thompson but opted against it after reviewing video footage of the incident. Thompson explained he was inspecting vehicles for parking stickers when he noticed a disturbance involving Dion and the brothers, claiming Feliciano was aggressive towards Dion while he attempted to intervene. Thompson stated Dion used pepper spray on Feliciano, who fled, and denied hitting Feliciano with a flashlight, attributing any injury to Feliciano's escape attempt. Officer Syed Bukhari later arrived to take over the investigation, having been briefed by officers Caldwell and Villarreal, who had already gathered witness statements and contacted the Assistant District Attorney, resulting in charges against Juvenal for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Bukhari reviewed video from the wrecker's cameras, which showed Juvenal’s truck colliding with the wrecker, confirming the appropriateness of the aggravated assault charges. However, he noted that the trial video was of inferior quality and not continuous. Dill, the wrecker owner, stated he had turned the recording over to the District Attorney's Office after an unsuccessful download attempt. Assistant District Attorney Ian Frazier McNeil later extracted the video and, after further investigation, downgraded the charges against Juvenal from felony to misdemeanor, leading to a plea bargain. The jury trial occurred from January 5 to January 15, 2010, resulting in favorable findings for the Alvarados on all 34 jury charge questions. Key findings included: 1. Dion and Thompson committed assault against Feliciano and Juvenal, with Boyles assisting and encouraging the assault, leading to a conspiracy finding among the three. 2. Thompson falsely imprisoned Juvenal, while Dion and Boyles assisted, forming a conspiracy to false imprison him. 3. Dion, Thompson, Boyles, and Dill were found to have maliciously prosecuted Juvenal, with the same individuals involved in the conspiracy to do so. 4. Dill and Soon Phat, L.P. were found to have engaged in a joint enterprise. 5. The jury ruled that Dion and Thompson were not justified in their use of force against Juvenal and Feliciano. 6. Actual damages were awarded for assault, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. 7. Exemplary damages were assessed against Dion, Thompson, and Boyles for assault, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, as well as against Dill for malicious prosecution. 8. The jury found Dill and Soon Phat, L.P. negligent in their hiring and supervision of Thompson and Boyles, respectively. 9. Clear and convincing evidence indicated that the harm suffered by Juvenal and Feliciano resulted from gross negligence by Dill and Soon Phat, L.P. 10. Thompson was found to have committed aggravated assault, with findings that Dill acted maliciously in retaining him or ratified his actions. 11. Similar findings were made regarding Boyles, including his managerial role and the malicious actions of Soon Phat, L.P. On March 4, 2010, the Charleston Court Appellants filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, to disregard jury findings, and for a new trial. Dion, Thompson, and Dill filed similar motions on April 9, 2010. A hearing on these motions took place on April 30, 2010, during which the trial court requested briefs on whether Juvenal could pursue a malicious prosecution action despite ultimately pleading guilty to a misdemeanor after the aggravated assault charge was dismissed. The trial court issued an order on June 8, 2010, granting the Alvarados' motions to disregard the jury's verdict regarding their claims for malicious prosecution, concluding these claims were legally foreclosed. Following this order, the court rendered a final judgment based on the jury's findings and the June 8 ruling. The court determined liability for Feliciano's assault claim, requiring Dill, Thompson, Dion, Soon Phat, L.P., and Boyles to pay $86,920 in actual damages, along with specific exemplary damages from each defendant. Additionally, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at a rate of five percent was mandated for the damages awarded. For Juvenal, the court ordered a total of $68,000 in actual damages for assault and false imprisonment, with similar exemplary and interest payments as outlined for Feliciano. The excerpt also discusses the standards for disregarding jury findings under Texas law, specifying conditions under which a jury finding may be deemed immaterial or legally insufficient, emphasizing the need for evidence to be evaluated in a manner that supports the jury's verdict. Evidence that permits only one inference cannot be disregarded by jurors or reviewing courts. In legal sufficiency reviews, if reasonable minds could differ, jurors must be allowed to reach varying conclusions. The test for legal sufficiency centers on whether evidence enables reasonable jurors to support the verdict. Favorable evidence must be credited, while contrary evidence may be disregarded unless reasonable jurors cannot do so. The reviewing court is not to substitute its judgment if the evidence falls within a reasonable disagreement zone. When no objections are raised regarding the jury charge, the sufficiency of evidence is evaluated based on the unchallenged legal standards in that charge. In factual sufficiency reviews, all evidence must be weighed, and a verdict can only be set aside if evidence is weak or the finding is against the overwhelming weight of evidence. The Alvarados argue that the trial court improperly disregarded jury findings on Juvenal's malicious prosecution claim and related damages, and that evidence of Boyles carrying an unauthorized firearm was wrongfully excluded, affecting their punitive damages claim against Soon Phat, L.P. The Charleston Court Appellants contend that the trial court erred in awarding joint and several damages against Soon Phat, L.P. for the Alvarados’ claims, citing multiple issues including lack of jury findings for vicarious liability and defective jury charges. They also argue that exemplary damages against Boyles are unjustifiable due to the absence of jury findings on malice or negligence and insufficient evidence linking Boyles to such conduct. Finally, they assert that evidence supporting damages against Boyles for assault and false imprisonment is legally and factually insufficient. Charleston Court Appellants argue that the submission of specific jury questions constituted an improper comment on the evidence, warranting a reversal. They also contend that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's 'no' answers regarding the justification of force used by Thompson and Dion against the Alvarados. Dion, Thompson, and Dill adopt the Appellants' arguments and additionally assert that the trial court wrongly awarded damages to Feliciano and Juvenal for assault and false imprisonment without a jury instruction on assigning fault percentages, as required by Section 33.013 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. They claim there is no evidence of Dill's liability. Moreover, they argue that the exemplary damages awarded to Feliciano against Thompson and Dion were improper because of a defective jury charge and the absence of evidence regarding the defendants' net worth, as well as insufficient evidence of intent. The Alvarados claim the trial court erred by ignoring jury findings related to Juvenal's malicious prosecution claim, asserting he proved all elements necessary for the claim. The Charleston Court Appellants counter that the trial court acted correctly, given Juvenal's plea bargain for a misdemeanor related to the same incident. The prevailing standards for malicious prosecution require showing several elements, including the initiation of prosecution, favorable termination, innocence, lack of probable cause, malice, and resultant damage. The focus is on whether Juvenal's prosecution terminated favorably, considering his initial felony charge, the subsequent misdemeanor charge, and the dismissal of the felony charge prior to his guilty plea for the misdemeanor. The Alvarados assert that Juvenal's time served pertained solely to a misdemeanor offense, as the felony charge had been dismissed prior to the plea agreement. They argue that criminal mischief is not a lesser included offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, emphasizing that Dion was the complainant in the aggravated assault case involving threats made with Juvenal's truck, while Dill was the complainant in the criminal mischief case regarding damage to Dill's tow truck. The document cites legal precedent stating that a favorable termination for malicious prosecution does not necessitate a verdict of 'not guilty' and can occur even if the termination is indecisive, provided the prosecution is not revivable. The prosecutor's actions in this case, which involved filing a misdemeanor charge after dismissing the felony charge, indicate that he believed sufficient evidence existed for a misdemeanor case. McNeil clarified that the filing of misdemeanor charges was not an indication of Juvenal's innocence. The subsequent plea bargain regarding the misdemeanor charges suggests that the prosecution did not conclude in Juvenal's favor, aligning with legal standards that a dismissal resulting from a plea deal does not support a malicious prosecution claim. Therefore, the court's ruling to grant motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and to disregard irrelevant jury findings regarding the malicious prosecution claim was upheld, leading to the conclusion that the claim was legally foreclosed. The Alvarados argue that the trial court incorrectly disregarded jury findings related to Questions 11 and 12, which addressed the assistance and conspiracy to maliciously prosecute Juvenal. They assert there is sufficient evidence supporting the jury's conclusion that Dion, Thompson, Boyles, and Dill assisted in or conspired to commit malicious prosecution. The court instructed the jury that for liability to arise, a primary actor must have committed a wrongful act, specifically the tort of malicious prosecution. The court noted that without a primary actor's wrongful act, the claims of assisting and encouraging cannot hold. Since a malicious prosecution claim was deemed legally foreclosed due to a plea agreement, the court found that Dion, Thompson, Boyles, and Dill could not be liable for these actions. Consequently, the trial court did not err in disregarding the jury findings for both questions and granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Alvarados' claims concerning both assisting and conspiracy to malicious prosecution were therefore overruled. The Alvarados claim the trial court improperly excluded evidence regarding Boyles being routinely armed, threatening residents, and her actions on the night in question, including transferring a gun to Thompson and pointing it at residents. They argue this evidence was essential for a jury to consider punitive damages against Soon Phat, L.P., and request a new trial focused solely on punitive damages. However, the court rejects this request, stating it cannot remand for a new trial limited to punitive damages, as established in Nowzaradan v. Ryans, 347 S.W.3d 734 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011). The court cites the Texas Supreme Court's ruling that punitive damages must be determined based on the overall evidence from both liability and punitive stages, making a separate punitive damages trial impractical. Consequently, the Alvarados' appeal on this issue is overruled. In addressing the Alvarados’ cross-point about the Charleston Court Appellants' appeal, the court concludes that the Appellants did not waive their right to appeal. The Alvarados argued that the Appellants had unreservedly invited the trial court to enter its judgment, referencing First Nat’l Bank of Beeville v. Fojtik, 775 S.W.2d 632 (Tex.1989). The court notes that proper reservation of appeal rights must be explicit, and the Charleston Court Appellants' response to the motion for an amended judgment indicated disagreement with the judgment's content while approving its form. Therefore, the court finds the Appellants adequately reserved their right to appeal, denies the Alvarados’ motion to dismiss the appeal, and overrules their cross-point. Soon Phat, L.P. is held jointly and severally liable for actual damages awarded to Feliciano and Juvenal for assault claims and for Juvenal’s false imprisonment claim, based on jury findings that Dion and Thompson assaulted the plaintiffs, while Thompson falsely imprisoned Juvenal. The jury also concluded that Dion, Thompson, and Boyles assisted or conspired in these torts. On appeal, the Charleston Court Appellants challenge this liability, arguing it lacks a legal basis since the jury did not find that Soon Phat, L.P. itself committed any tortious conduct. They assert that the jury charge was deficient because it did not include a proportionate responsibility question as per Chapter 33 of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code, but they did not object or propose such a question during the trial. Thus, the appellate focus is on whether the evidence supports Soon Phat, L.P.'s joint and several liability based on the actions of the other defendants. The Appellants argue that any liability must stem from vicarious liability principles, which allow for the attribution of liability from an active tort-feasor to another party due to their relationship. They contend that Soon Phat, L.P. is liable both directly for its own actions and vicariously for those of the other defendants. The Alvarados' appeal focuses on imposing liability on Soon Phat, L.P. through the doctrine of respondeat superior, which holds employers liable for their employees’ torts committed during employment. This liability arises from the employment relationship that grants the employer control over the employee's actions. The appeal references several judicial precedents illustrating that both vicarious and joint and several liabilities serve as mechanisms for enforcing legal remedies, justified by public policy to allocate risk. Typically, respondeat superior claims involve employee negligence occurring within their employment scope. While assaults are generally outside an employee's authority, they may be considered within the course of employment if necessitated by job duties, such as property guarding. The jury charge presented three bases for attributing tort liability to Soon Phat, L.P. regarding the actions of security guard Mesha Boyles: (1) whether Boyles was unfit, and if the company acted with malice in her employment; (2) whether she was acting within the scope of her managerial employment; or (3) whether the company ratified her actions. The jury was instructed to answer Question 34 only if there were affirmative responses to prior questions establishing that aggravated assaults occurred against individuals Juvenal and Feliciano. The Alvarados argue that the jury's affirmative response to Question 34 implicates Soon Phat, L.P. for Boyles' alleged complicity in the assaults. Question 26 examines whether Soon Phat, L.P. was negligent in hiring, training, supervising, or retaining Mesha Boyles, with the jury affirmatively answering "Yes" for both Juvenal and Feliciano Alvarado. This suggests that Boyles' involvement in assault and false imprisonment can be linked to Soon Phat, L.P. The subsequent Question 13 establishes a "joint enterprise" between Robert Groce Dill and Soon Phat, L.P., as the jury again affirmed with a "Yes," indicating shared control and purpose. The Alvarados argue Dill is liable for the actions of his employees, which they claim extends liability to Soon Phat, L.P. for the tortious conduct of its agents. In response to challenges regarding Soon Phat, L.P.'s joint and several liability for assault damages, the court reviews various jury questions. The court finds that Question 34, which inquires about malice in relation to Boyles' employment, does not support joint and several liability. It concludes there is insufficient evidence of malice as defined by the jury instructions, specifically lacking evidence that Soon Phat, L.P. intended to cause harm to the Alvarados. Overall, the court determines that Soon Phat, L.P. cannot be held jointly and severally liable based on the evidence presented. Question 34(2) mandates a determination that Boyles was in a managerial role and acted within that capacity when Thompson committed the aggravated assaults. Boyles, employed as a security guard tasked with patrolling an apartment complex and calling emergency services, does not meet the criteria for “managerial capacity” as outlined in the case U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Waldrip, which specifies that evidence must show a company officer status, authority to manage employees, or departmental oversight. Question 34(3) addresses whether Soon Phat, L.P. ratified or approved Thompson's actions; however, there is no evidence presented that supports any form of ratification or approval by Soon Phat, L.P., thus precluding joint and several liability for the assault damages awarded to the Alvarados. The need to evaluate the Charleston Court Appellants’ argument regarding the lack of support for Question 34 is negated by this finding. Regarding Question 26, the Charleston Court Appellants contend that the jury’s verdict does not provide grounds for assault damage awards against Charleston Court, arguing there was no jury finding of assault, any liability would need to be vicarious, and there was no question on Boyles’ agency status. The Alvarados reference a negligent hiring claim in Question 26 as the basis for joint liability. However, Question 26 does not suffice for this purpose, as negligent hiring claims do not require proof that the employee acted within the scope of employment during the tortious act. Such claims are rooted in direct negligence by the employer rather than vicarious liability. Texas law has not definitively outlined the parameters of negligent retention, supervision, or hiring claims, but it requires that the risk leading to the negligent action must also be directly linked to the injuries sustained. The jury found that Soon Phat, L.P.'s negligence in hiring, training, supervising, or retaining Boyles proximately caused an unspecified “occurrence.” However, this finding does not clarify whether it relates to the towing, assaults, false imprisonment, or a combination of events. Importantly, the jury was not asked to determine if this negligence caused the Alvarados' injuries, nor was there a damage question linked to this finding. Consequently, the theory of direct liability based on negligent hiring does not justify the trial court’s judgment holding Soon Phat, L.P. jointly and severally liable for damages resulting from Boyles' actions. Furthermore, the jury’s finding that Dill and Soon Phat, L.P. were engaged in a joint enterprise cannot establish vicarious liability for Soon Phat, L.P. The concept of joint enterprise requires a relationship where each party is an agent of the other, which does not apply here under the circumstances given the lack of a proper negligence question that supports such liability. The only negligence inquiry regarding Soon Phat, L.P. was the negligent hiring issue addressed in Question 26, whose findings do not substantiate the trial court's decision on joint and several liability for the Alvarados' damages. Similarly, Question 25 regarding Dill mirrors Question 26 and faces the same deficiencies, rendering it insufficient to support the judgment. No negligence questions were presented to the jury concerning any defendant, meaning a "yes" answer to Question 13 regarding joint enterprise cannot hold Soon Phat, L.P. accountable for Dill's negligence (Question 25) or vice versa (Question 26). Without established negligence claims, assigning joint and several liability to Soon Phat, L.P. based on the jury's answer would require a significant extension of joint enterprise principles under Texas law, complicating vicarious liability beyond acceptable limits. The Alvarados propose a layered liability structure, suggesting that each defendant's liability flows through the others, but this approach is deemed too attenuated for legal endorsement. Regarding Soon Phat, L.P.'s liability for false imprisonment, the Charleston Court Appellants argue that the company cannot be held jointly and severally liable for damages awarded to Juvenal. Question 34, which pertains only to assault, is irrelevant to this claim. Question 26 also fails to establish liability for false imprisonment, as negligent hiring claims are based on direct liability rather than vicarious liability. The joint enterprise finding in Question 13 does not support imposing joint and several liability on Soon Phat, L.P. for false imprisonment damages, as such liability is legally precluded. Consequently, issues one, three, and five are upheld, resulting in the Alvarados taking nothing from Soon Phat, L.P. regarding their claims for assault and false imprisonment. Additionally, the Charleston Court Appellants seek to remove exemplary damages awarded to Boyles for the assaults and false imprisonment, arguing insufficient evidence of fraudulent, malicious, or grossly negligent conduct on her part. Boyles should not have been held liable for exemplary damages for the assault because such damages cannot be awarded based on the criminal acts of others. The Charleston Court Appellants lack standing to appeal this issue since Texas law stipulates that parties may only appeal errors that affect their rights. Boyles did not appeal the trial court’s decision, and the Charleston Appellants’ counsel confirmed he did not represent Boyles in the appeal. The exemplary damages were specifically assigned to Boyles and not awarded against any other defendants, meaning the Charleston Appellants are not adversely affected by the ruling. Consequently, the court dismissed the Charleston Appellants' issues related to exemplary damages. Dill, Thompson, and Dion contested their joint and several liabilities for assault and false imprisonment, as well as punitive damages. The Alvarados argued in a cross-point that these appellants waived their right to appeal by inviting the trial court to enter the judgment. The court found this assertion incorrect as Dill, Thompson, and Dion did not participate in any motions for judgment and thus did not waive their appeal rights. The court overruled the Alvarados’ cross-point and denied their motion to dismiss the appeal. Dill also challenged the imposition of joint and several liability for actual damages, claiming there was no legal basis for holding him accountable for the actions of others. He noted the lack of a proportionate responsibility submission under Texas law but did not object to the jury charge during the trial. The court determined that the issue was not about the potential error in the jury charge but rather whether the existing charge allowed for Dill’s joint and several liability for the individual actions of others involved. The analysis will focus on specific questions raised in the trial regarding liability. Question 33 addresses whether Samuel Lee Thompson was unfit and if Robert Groce Dill, d/b/a Arrow Towing Company, acted with malice in employing or retaining Thompson, or if Dill ratified Thompson's actions during an aggravated assault. The jury answered "Yes," indicating malice. This question was contingent upon affirmative answers to prior questions regarding Thompson's assault against Juvenal and Feliciano. The Alvarados argue that this finding establishes Dill’s liability for the assaults and false imprisonment based on Thompson's and Dion’s actions. Question 25 similarly inquires if Dill’s negligence in hiring or supervising Thompson was a proximate cause of the incidents, which the Alvarados claim also supports Dill’s liability. Question 13 relates to joint enterprise theory, asserting Dill's liability for the actions of Boyles, Thompson, and Dion, as all parties are considered agents of one another in such an enterprise. Dill contests his joint and several liability for the assault damages, claiming Dion and Thompson were independent contractors. However, evidence presented, including Dill's testimony that Thompson was a "fit employee" and Dion's exemplary service, supports an employment relationship. Dill’s affirmation of approving Thompson’s conduct and failing to reprimand him further substantiates a basis for joint and several liability under Question 33. The conclusion aligns with legal precedent regarding vicarious liability in employer-employee relationships. A creditor can be held jointly and severally liable for damages resulting from torts committed by a collection agency if the creditor ratified the agency's actions, as established in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Williams and Moore’s Inc. v. Garcia. In the case at hand, Dill was found jointly and severally liable for assault damages awarded to Juvenal and Feliciano based on the jury's findings, leading to the rejection of any other potential arguments for his liability. However, Dill contested his joint and several liability for false imprisonment damages awarded to Juvenal. The court found that Question 33, which pertained solely to assault, did not support joint and several liability for false imprisonment. Similarly, Question 25, which involved negligent hiring, was deemed insufficient for imposing liability since it did not directly address damages from false imprisonment. Additionally, the jury's determination of a joint enterprise involving Dill and Soon Phat, L.P. was legally insufficient to establish joint liability for false imprisonment. Consequently, the court upheld Dill's non-liability for false imprisonment damages. Regarding Dion and Thompson, they did not contest the jury's findings about their liability for assault and false imprisonment. The jury concluded that neither Dion nor Thompson was justified in their use of force against the plaintiffs, as per the self-defense instructions provided. A person may use force to protect a third party if they would be justified in using force for themselves and reasonably believe that intervention is immediately necessary. Force is not justified solely due to verbal provocation or if the individual provoked the other’s unlawful force, unless they abandon the encounter or clearly communicate their intent to do so. Dion and Thompson argue their use of force against the Alvarados was justified, claiming the jury's negative responses to Questions 13A and 13B lacked legal and factual support. They reference testimony from Bukhari, a police officer, who stated their actions were justified, as well as Thompson's and Dion's claims of fear for safety during the confrontation. However, Bukhari did not interview the Alvarados. Juvenal testified that Thompson struck Feliciano first and then hit him, denying he attempted to harm Dion or Thompson. He described being afraid and retreating when attacked, while his neighbor corroborated his account regarding Thompson's initial aggression. The evidence is deemed sufficient to support the jury's negative answers to Questions 13A and 13B, with no justification proven as a matter of law. Liability for punitive damages is contested by Dion, Thompson, and Dill, who argue that the jury improperly failed to apportion liability. They assert that for joint and several liability, a defendant must be attributed over 50% responsibility or must have acted in concert with another in criminal conduct, as per Section 33.013(b). However, the defendants did not raise this objection during the charge conference, so their argument is not considered. The jury found Dion and Thompson complicit in assaults on both Juvenal and Feliciano, affirming their involvement through affirmative answers to specific questions. Furthermore, the defendants argue that the awards for exemplary damages are invalid due to a lack of evidence regarding their net worth, claiming that such information is essential for the jury to determine punitive damages. However, since the trial court did not require Dill to pay exemplary damages, his net worth is irrelevant. Texas law indicates that while net worth can be relevant for determining the amount of punitive damages, it is not a mandatory element for a plaintiff to recover such damages. Evidence of either low or high net worth can be pertinent, but the plaintiffs, the Alvarados, were not obligated to present evidence of Dion's and Thompson's net worth to pursue exemplary damages. The jury is still permitted to ascertain the amount of punitive damages without this evidence. Dion, Thompson, and Dill's argument against the exemplary damage awards is rejected, as the absence of evidence regarding their net worth does not invalidate the claims. They further contend that there is insufficient evidence to prove that Dion and Thompson acted with the necessary intent—fraud, malice, or gross negligence—required for punitive damages under section 41.003(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Exemplary damages can only be awarded if the claimant establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that the harm resulted from one of the specified behaviors. The standard for this review involves assessing all evidence favorably to the finding, determining whether a reasonable trier of fact could be firmly convinced of its truth. Fraud is defined as any fraudulent behavior other than constructive fraud, while malice refers to the specific intent to cause substantial injury or harm. Malice can be demonstrated through direct or circumstantial evidence. Gross negligence requires proof of both objective and subjective elements: an extreme degree of risk from the defendant's actions and actual awareness of that risk, coupled with conscious indifference to the consequences. The jury's charge did not include a question on whether the Alvarados proved the necessary elements of fraud, malice, or gross negligence, but the absence of such a question was not challenged on appeal. The exemplary damage awards against Dion and Thompson for the assault on Feliciano are upheld if supported by any evidence, under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 279. Evidence indicates that Dion and Thompson acted with malice towards Feliciano during an incident involving a dispute over the towing of Feliciano's truck. Witnesses, including Irene Cardenas, Moisés de la Torre, Juvenal, and Javier Cardenas, testified that after Feliciano approached Dion to inquire about the towing, Dion and Thompson physically assaulted him. Testimonies state that Dion and Thompson pepper sprayed Feliciano and struck him with a 20-inch flashlight, causing significant injuries including bleeding and requiring 14 staples in his head. The incident was captured on video, showing Dion with a flashlight, which may have been the same one later seen with Boyles, who handed it to Thompson. Feliciano reported experiencing severe pain and lasting vision problems as a result of the assault. The evidence supports the conclusion that the actions of Dion and Thompson were not only aggressive but could be classified as potentially lethal, given the nature of the weapon used. Legally sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that Feliciano's harm stemmed from the malice of Dion and Thompson, demonstrating their intent to inflict substantial injury. The court overruled the Alvarados' issues in Cause No. 14-10-00603-CV. It sustained the Charleston Court Appellants' first, third, and fifth issues in Cause No. 14-10-00555-CV regarding Soon Phat, L.P.’s joint and several liability for damages awarded for assault and false imprisonment, as well as Dill’s, Dion’s, and Thompson’s third issue in Cause No. 14-11-00033-CV concerning Dill’s joint and several liability for false imprisonment. The court overruled the Alvarados’ cross points seeking to dismiss the appeals of the Charleston Court Appellants, Dill, Dion, and Thompson, and denied their motion to dismiss. Additionally, it reversed the trial court's awards of actual damages and interest for assault and false imprisonment against Soon Phat, L.P. and Dill, ruling that the Alvarados take nothing in those regards, while affirming the trial court's judgment in all other respects. Boyles failed to appear or respond at trial and did not file a notice of appeal. The Charleston Court Appellants’ counsel disclaimed representation of Boyles on appeal. The Alvarados argued that the Charleston Court Appellants waived their appeals by moving for judgment in line with the jury's verdict. The Charleston Court Appellants contended that the trial court erred by not ruling on the Alvarados' request to file a fifth amended petition to add new claims, which changed the theory of liability and reframed the assault claim as aggravated assault. This issue will be addressed in section II of the analysis. Furthermore, during the charge conference, the Charleston Court Appellants’ counsel objected to multiple jury questions on grounds of lack of evidence, duplicity, erroneous definitions, unsupported pleadings, and inappropriate references to a criminal offense in a civil context. The trial court modified the jury instructions for Questions 22 and 23 based on objections from the Charleston Court Appellants and with the Alvarados' consent, while other objections from the Appellants were overruled. The Charleston Court Appellants raised concerns regarding the absence of jury questions about whether Dion and Thompson's assault and Thompson's false imprisonment occurred within the course and scope of their employment with Dill, and similarly for Boyles concerning her conspiracy with them. Only Questions 29, 30, and 34 referenced "course and scope of employment," while Questions 31 and 32 focused solely on aggravated assault and did not pertain to false imprisonment claims. The Texas Pattern Jury Charges highlight issues regarding terminology used in the jury instructions and indicate that there is no question for negligent hiring. According to Rule 279, if elements of a claim are excluded from the jury charge and evidence supports them, the trial court may issue findings on those elements before judgment, or they are deemed found to support the judgment if no findings are made. The Charleston Court Appellants cannot be blamed for any lack of separate jury findings necessary for a proper judgment. The charge concerning negligence did not support joint and several liability for Soon Phat, L.P., leading to the conclusion that Questions 29 and 30, which addressed gross negligence, are irrelevant. Consequently, the appeal issues regarding damages awarded against Boyles individually for assault and false imprisonment are also moot. Additionally, during the charge conference, the counsel for Dill, Dion, and Thompson objected to several questions on grounds of insufficient evidence and claimed that some questions were duplicative or improperly referenced criminal offenses in a civil context. These objections were overruled by the trial court.