Portia Motter, and Lawrence Motter, H/w v. Everest & Jennings, Inc.
Docket: 89-1222
Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; October 5, 1989; Federal Appellate Court
Portia Motter appealed a judgment n.o.v. from the United States District Court that favored Everest Jennings, Inc., overturning a $700,000 jury verdict for her. The appellate court, reviewing the case under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 and exercising plenary review, found sufficient evidence to support the jury's decision and reinstated the verdict for Motter.
Motter, a nurse's aide at Leader Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, was injured while using an economy model shower chair manufactured by Everest Jennings. On October 13, 1986, a patient caused the chair to tilt by pushing against the floor, leading Motter to support the chair with her arm to prevent the patient from falling. This resulted in significant injuries to her left arm, neck, and shoulder. Despite receiving medical treatment and returning to light duty, Motter was ultimately unable to work due to permanent impairment and pain.
Motter and her husband filed a product liability suit against Everest Jennings on August 10, 1987, alleging negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty, claiming the shower chair was defectively designed and that the caster attachment method was negligent. The breach of warranty claim was withdrawn during trial. Expert testimony presented during the jury trial indicated that the chair's caster was held by a steel split O-ring, which was designed to secure the caster but may have contributed to its failure.
The left front caster of the shower chair detached from its leg, causing the accident, which was uncontested during the trial. It was acknowledged that the caster should have remained secured and that the split O-rings were prone to corrosion due to the wet environment of use. Users could not visually inspect the caster stems or O-rings due to their placement within the tubular leg. Motter's design defect claim focused on how the caster was attached, arguing that water intrusion led to crevice corrosion, ultimately causing the O-ring's failure. She suggested that a brass O-ring would have been more suitable for this environment. In defense, Everest. Jennings claimed that post-delivery modifications, improper maintenance, and misuse contributed to the issue. The district court denied their motion for a directed verdict, resulting in a jury verdict favoring Motter.
On appeal, the court reviewed the evidence to determine if it supported the jury's decision, applying the strict liability standards under Pennsylvania law, which require proof of a defect when the product left the manufacturer and that this defect caused the injury. It was established that Everest. Jennings's design for affixing the caster had not changed since 1965, and the chair involved in the accident was shipped to Motter's employer in 1980, although the specific chair was lost. Motter demonstrated the chair was constructed with steel split O-rings and needed to prove this design was defective. Expert testimonies from Dr. Alan Lawley and Dr. Donald H. Thomas supported her claim, with Dr. Lawley asserting that the design and materials would inevitably lead to corrosion, based on his examinations and analyses of the casters and the manufacturer's specifications.
Dr. Thomas identified a defect in the design of the economy shower chair, particularly criticizing the attachment method of the caster using steel components in a wet environment, which leads to rusting and degradation of the split O-ring. This erosion reduces friction, causing the caster to loosen and detach. Both Thomas and Lawley advocated that the O-ring should have been constructed from brass to prevent corrosion. Motter provided comparative evidence showing that competing shower chairs did not use a split steel O-ring method; instead, two employed a bolt and nut system, while others featured non-corrosive covers to mitigate crevice corrosion.
In contrast, Everest Jennings presented testimony from rehabilitation engineer Peter W. Axelson and product safety director Curtis Wright. Axelson argued that the split O-ring design was not defective despite lacking scientific testing or review of relevant specifications. He claimed that rust could create a stronger bond between components and estimated that corrosion would not impair the O-ring's function for 20 to 30 years, although he later conceded that the removed O-rings would not last that long. He could not identify any manufacturers using the same steel O-ring method nor provide standards supporting his position.
Wright indicated that the chair was expected to be replaced every four to five years, yet marketed as durable, with no established useful life recorded by the company. He acknowledged the potential for the chair, excluding casters, to provide years of service, evidenced by the availability of replacement casters. However, his assertion that customers desiring longer-lasting casters should opt for pricier models was contradictory, as those models used the same caster attachment method.
Everest Jennings argued that its caster-affixing method was not defectively designed, citing a lack of prior complaints about casters dislodging. However, it did receive complaints regarding rusting. The district court incorrectly emphasized Wright's testimony, which was based solely on his personal knowledge and a five-year review of records, as older records had been destroyed. Additionally, there was no formal procedure in place for collecting customer complaints, and Wright acknowledged that other employees might have received such complaints. Evidence from Motter indicated that casters had dislodged at a nursing home, undermining Wright's claims.
Under Pennsylvania law, the trial judge must weigh product risks against social utility to determine if a design defect should be presented to a jury. Testimony indicated that redesigning the caster system would not diminish the chair's utility or significantly impact its price. Therefore, the jury was correctly allowed to consider the design defect issue, especially as Motter provided expert opinions and scientific studies suggesting the caster system was defectively designed. The district court erred in interfering with the jury's conclusion regarding the defect.
Regarding legal cause, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defect caused the injury. Although it was agreed that a caster dislodged during the accident, Everest Jennings contended that this was due to negligent maintenance rather than design defect. Motter's causation argument was supported by expert testimonies from Lawley and Thomas, who determined that the rusty condition of the caster stem was the primary reason for its dislodgement, ruling out other potential causes, including the possibility that the caster had previously fallen out and was reinserted.
A theory proposed was that the caster had previously dislodged, with the maintenance department conducting a temporary repair instead of a full replacement. Testimonies from Motter, Packard, and McCorts refuted any claims of makeshift repairs. The jury could reasonably conclude that the deterioration of the split O-ring led to the caster stem's dislodging from the chair's tubular leg. The rust observed on the caster stem was comparable to the original casters, indicating they had not been replaced. Thomas's expansion studies suggested that thermal changes broke rust bonds between the O-ring and the leg, combined with water lubrication, which allowed the stem to dislodge due to insufficient friction from the deteriorated O-ring.
Everest Jennings presented a defense of negligent maintenance, relying on Axelson’s testimony, which was based on maintenance supervisor Edward Baker's statements. Motter argued that Everest Jennings needed to prove that the caster was a replacement and that it was negligently installed, leading to its dislodging. Lawley asserted that the caster was original, supported by observations of equal rust among all casters, suggesting none had been removed. Lawley also noted that a replacement would have likely dislodged during patient transfers prior to the incident.
Axelson claimed the caster was a replacement, citing Baker's general maintenance practices; however, Baker could not confirm the specific caster’s status. This uncertainty warranted skepticism towards Axelson's claims. Axelson also theorized that negligent installation caused the failure, which Baker refuted, confirming proper installation practices. Wright further testified that negligent installation was nearly impossible. The district court's conclusion regarding wire brushing causing enough metal removal to loosen the caster was unsupported by evidence, with Axelson himself doubting that sufficient metal could be removed to affect a new caster's stability.
The district court's decision to grant Everest. Jennings's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.) was flawed as it did not consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Motter. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to potentially grant relief, and the court did not adhere to established limitations regarding the review of such motions, as outlined in Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Videfreeze Corp. The trial judge and appellate court are required to interpret evidence favorably for the non-moving party and cannot assess the credibility or weight of evidence, which is solely the jury's responsibility. The district court erred by dismissing Motter's evidence and substituting its own interpretations.
Additionally, the court did not address Everest's alternative motion for a new trial, which it indicated it would have granted if not for the n.o.v. ruling. The absence of mention in the district court's order regarding the new trial does not negate its conditional nature, similar to findings in Roebuck v. Drexel University. In line with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(c)(1), the court must rule on a new trial motion when granting a judgment n.o.v. Since the n.o.v. ruling is being reversed, the court must assess whether a new trial is warranted, applying a deferential standard of review and only intervening if there was an abuse of discretion by the district court.
The district court indicated it would have granted a new trial based on the excessive nature of the jury's verdict, particularly focusing on the pain and suffering component. It noted that for a jury verdict to be disturbed, the damages must be so unreasonable as to "offend the conscience of the Court." The court has discretion in determining excessiveness but cannot simply reduce an award because it would have favored a lesser amount.
In reviewing the case, the parties referenced other cases to compare injuries similar to those of the plaintiff, Motter, although none were closely analogous. However, two relevant cases were identified: **Rivera v. Virgin Islands Housing Authority**, where a $250,000 award was upheld for severe injuries leading to continuous pain and limited activity, and **Gumbs v. Pueblo International, Inc.**, which suggested a maximum reasonable recovery of $235,000 for different injuries involving pain and suffering.
Motter was awarded $429,000 for pain and suffering, which the court examined against the context of existing case law. The district court had limited its consideration to pain and suffering, overlooking Motter's claims of embarrassment and loss of life enjoyment. Medical evidence indicated that Motter suffered total and permanent disability and experienced constant, unrelieved pain affecting various aspects of her life, including domestic tasks, relationships, and mental health. The severity and permanence of her condition were corroborated by medical professionals, asserting that her pain was real and debilitating.
Motter's injuries, while lacking a single definitive diagnosis, are serious and include chronic cervical strain, cervical disc herniation, reflex sympathetic dystrophy, and brachial plexus injury, as confirmed by Drs. Jones and Kaneda. Though no single diagnosis encapsulates all her symptoms, both doctors assert that her pain is real and substantiated by objective medical evidence. The district court erroneously diminished the significance of Motter's pain and suffering, despite consistent medical corroboration of her complaints. The evidence supports that she is permanently disabled from nursing home work and unable to engage in activities she previously enjoyed. The jury's award of $429,000, though greater than what the district court might have granted, is justified and not excessively high. The court ruled against granting a new trial on damages, stating that doing so would be an abuse of discretion. Additionally, the district court's failure to address other grounds for a new trial brought by Everest. Jennings was found to be meritless. Ultimately, the court reversed the judgment n.o.v. and reinstated the jury verdict of $700,000. Various medical tests indicated permanent injury, though results were largely negative. The district court's comments on the cause of the caster assembly issue and its characterization of testimonies were inconsistent, ultimately concluding that Motter did not prove a design defect in the chair.
After allocating Motter's past and future medical claims and wage loss, the court concluded that $429,000 of the $700,000 verdict awarded was for pain and suffering. Several cases were cited by Jennings to demonstrate instances where courts found pain and suffering awards excessive. In Nairn, a $400,000 award was deemed excessive because the plaintiff continued to work and was expected to experience minimal future difficulties. In Williams, a $317,000 award was excessive as the plaintiff showed no neurological deficiencies and had recovered fully. Harper's $485,000 award was also excessive despite prior surgeries, as the residual pain was limited. Other cases, such as Laaperi and Kazan, also illustrated courts reducing excessive jury awards based on the absence of continuing disability or insufficient causation of injuries.
Motter's case showed no similar factors justifying a reduction, and comparisons to the Murray case were deemed irrelevant due to the significantly more severe injuries sustained by Murray. Testimony indicated that Motter's pain was expected to be permanent, impacting her daily activities. Concerns were raised regarding the district court's conditional grant of a new trial, which should have been restricted to the damages issue alone, without affecting the jury's liability findings.
