State v. Jackson

Citations: 385 S.W.3d 437; 2012 Mo. App. LEXIS 768; 2012 WL 1994851Docket: No. WD 73323

Court: Missouri Court of Appeals; June 5, 2012; Missouri; State Appellate Court

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Jerel T. Jackson appeals his conviction for two counts of second-degree murder, three counts of armed criminal action, and one count of first-degree assault after a jury trial. The circuit court determined Jackson was a prior and persistent offender, leading to concurrent sentences of twenty-two years for each murder count and the assault count, and three years for each armed criminal action count. Jackson raises four points on appeal: 

1. He argues the court erred by not upholding his Batson challenge against the State's peremptory strike of juror Takeshia Ford, claiming the State's justification was pretextual.
2. He contends the court wrongly denied his motion for acquittal, insisting the evidence was insufficient regarding the first-degree assault and armed criminal action involving nine-year-old Myron Ford.
3. He asserts the court erred in denying his motion for mistrial due to the State's improper closing arguments.
4. He claims a violation of his right to jury sentencing because the State's amended information did not include his prior offender status.

The court affirms in part and reverses and remands in part. The evidence, viewed favorably to the verdict, shows that Jackson, aware of co-defendant Wardell Williams's violent tendencies, participated in a robbery that led to the fatal shooting of Kimberly Ford and Ricky Gardner, as well as serious injury to Myron Ford. Jackson was implicated in the events leading to the shootings, including collecting items from Gardner and directing the getaway. Following the incident, Jackson attempted to conceal evidence and used illicit drugs to cope.

Jackson argues that the circuit court improperly overruled his Batson objection regarding the State's peremptory strike of venireperson Takeshia Ford, claiming the State's rationale was a pretext for racial discrimination. He asserts that the reason given—Ford’s ambition to become a prison chaplain—was irrelevant since the jurors would evaluate the credibility of inmates, and that her goals were to support law enforcement rather than inmates. Jackson contrasts Ford's qualifications with those of white juror Thomas Remley, who was not struck, suggesting Ford would have been a more favorable juror for the State.

The Batson challenge process involves three steps. First, the objecting party must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, the party who struck the juror must provide a race-neutral explanation, which need not be persuasive or plausible—only facially valid. Lastly, the circuit court must determine if the challenging party has proven purposeful racial discrimination by showing the proffered reason was a pretext motivated by race. Relevant factors for establishing pretext include the presence of similarly situated jurors who were not struck, the logical relevance of the explanation to the case, the demeanor of the striking attorney during voir dire, and the court's prior experiences with that attorney. The circuit court's decision is afforded great deference and will only be reversed if clearly erroneous.

The circuit court's role involves assessing the sincerity and credibility of trial counsel and the jury's racial composition, leading to reliance on its judgment regarding the plausibility of explanations for strikes. In this case, Jackson initiated a Batson challenge against the State's strike of African American Venireperson Ford. The State justified the strike by citing Ford's training to become a prison chaplain, which Jackson contested as a pretext for racial discrimination, arguing that such positions are predominantly held by African Americans.

The State countered that individuals pursuing prison ministry demonstrate compassion and possess a unique perspective that could negatively impact the State's case. The court ultimately found the State's rationale to be race-neutral and determined that Jackson did not successfully prove it was a pretext for discrimination. The court's ruling was deemed not clearly erroneous, as the justification was specific and legitimate considering the potential lengthy incarceration of the defendant.

Jackson's additional arguments regarding pretext, raised for the first time on appeal, were considered unpersuasive. Regarding his second point on appeal, Jackson argued that the evidence was insufficient to support charges of first-degree assault and armed criminal action against nine-year-old Myron Ford, asserting he did not aid or encourage the assault as he fled the scene before the shooting. The court's review of the evidence was limited to determining if a reasonable juror could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, focusing on whether Jackson aided or attempted to aid Williams in the offenses as defined by relevant statutes.

Accomplice liability under Missouri law, as articulated in State v. Barnum, emphasizes that mere presence at a crime scene is insufficient for conviction; however, aiding and abetting includes actions that encourage or approve of criminal behavior. This encompasses various forms of encouragement, such as words, gestures, or association with the crime. In the case involving Jackson and Williams, evidence demonstrated that Jackson collaborated with Williams to rob victims Ford and Gardner, actively participated by stealing from Gardner while Williams threatened the victims with a gun, and failed to assist them afterward. Jackson's argument that he should not be held responsible for the shooting of nine-year-old Myron is dismissed, as Missouri law treats principals and accessories equally, holding all involved parties accountable. 

The court found sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that Jackson aided Williams during the commission of armed robbery and assaults. In a separate issue, Jackson argued that the court improperly denied his motion for a mistrial due to prejudicial closing arguments by the State. He claimed the State suggested it had special knowledge of facts not presented to the jury and misused its position of trust. The court reviews claims of improper argument for abuse of discretion and requires a showing of prejudicial error for reversal. Jackson's counsel criticized the State for allegedly withholding evidence and failing to provide a complete picture to the jury, emphasizing the prosecutor's duty to present all evidence fairly.

Jackson's counsel accused the State of bribing witness Bennett, asserting that her testimony was a result of a 'bribe for a lid of twenty.' Counsel also claimed that the State was deliberately withholding evidence, specifically regarding witness Shannon Aufai, suggesting that this omission was offensive and indicative of misconduct. Jackson's counsel implied that the State's actions were designed to conceal information unfavorable to their case. In response, the State defended its decision not to call Aufai, stating it would not present a witness it believed might commit perjury. The court found no error in the State's retaliatory closing argument, emphasizing that a prosecutor has leeway to respond to provocation from the defense. Furthermore, Aufai had testified in Jackson's defense, allowing the jury to assess her credibility and the inconsistencies in the evidence presented. 

Jackson also argued that his right to jury sentencing was violated due to the State's amended information lacking his prior offender status, as required by law. Initially indicted on multiple charges, the State later included Jackson’s prior offender status on the day of trial. However, an amended information filed before final instructions excluded this status. To succeed in this claim, Jackson needed to prove that the omission violated statutory requirements and resulted in prejudice. The appellate court reviewed the statutory application de novo, without deference to the trial court’s ruling.

The court determined that the State failed to adequately plead and prove Jackson's prior offender status under section 558.021, resulting in prejudicial error due to the denial of jury sentencing. The July 26, 2010 information, which initially identified Jackson as a prior offender, was superseded by the August 2, 2010 amended information, effectively quashing the prior information per section 545.110. Consequently, the court's prior finding of Jackson as a prior offender became void. The State's attempt to reinstate the prior offender charge through a subsequent amended information filed on August 24, 2010, was ineffective, as prior offender status must be established before the case is presented to the jury. The August 2 information did not include all essential elements required to prove prior offender status, leading to the conclusion that Jackson could not be sentenced as a prior offender.

The State argued that the August information did not supersede the prior offender allegation, referencing McGaughy v. State to support its position. However, the court distinguished Jackson’s case from McGaughy, noting that unlike the individualized amendments in McGaughy, the August information fully replaced the previous charges. The State's interpretation that the prior offender allegation should survive the supersession was rejected, as the relevant statutes define prior offenses in relation to current charges, meaning that if the current charges are quashed, the prior offender allegations are also invalidated.

Additionally, the court upheld its decision regarding a Batson objection related to the State's peremptory strike of juror Takeshia Ford, finding the State's rationale to be race-neutral. The court also ruled against Jackson's motion for acquittal on charges of first-degree assault and armed criminal action involving a nine-year-old victim, determining that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that Jackson aided in the commission of those offenses.

The court upheld the decision to deny Jackson's motion for a mistrial related to the State's closing argument, which appropriately addressed the credibility of Jackson's witness and responded to Jackson's allegations against the State. The court determined that the amended information from August 2, 2010, superseded the July 26, 2010 information, nullifying the circuit court's prior and persistent offender status finding based on the quashed information. Consequently, Jackson is entitled to jury sentencing. While affirming Jackson's convictions, the court vacated and remanded the sentencing for jury determination. The court referenced statutory guidelines and prior case law, asserting that challenges regarding alternate jurors are not appealable if no alternate juror served, and noted that the statute applies to informations as well as indictments, despite concerns regarding piecemeal amendments by the State.