State ex rel. Koster v. Morningland of Ozarks, LLC

Citations: 384 S.W.3d 346; 2012 Mo. App. LEXIS 1206; 2012 WL 4458443Docket: No. SD 31390

Court: Missouri Court of Appeals; September 27, 2012; Missouri; State Appellate Court

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The State of Missouri, through its Department of Agriculture and the Missouri State Milk Board, imposed an embargo on all cheese produced by Morningland Dairy after reports indicated contamination with Listeria monocytogenes and Staphylococcus aureus. Following this, Morningland Dairy recalled its cheese and subsequently sought judicial approval for its destruction, challenging the legality of the condemnation and destruction orders. The dairy, which produces cheese from raw cow and goat milk, was licensed under Missouri regulations governing raw milk businesses.

On August 26, 2010, the Milk Board acted on a report from California, leading to the condemnation of Morningland's entire cheese inventory pending investigation. Testing of samples confirmed the presence of Staph A and L. Mono. Consequently, on October 1, 2010, the Milk Board issued a written order for the destruction of the condemned cheese. Morningland objected on October 6, 2010, but negotiations failed, prompting the State to seek a court injunction to enforce the destruction order.

On May 28, 2011, the trial court granted a permanent injunction for the destruction of the cheese under the supervision of the Director of the Department of Agriculture. Morningland Dairy appealed the decision. The court classified the case as noncontested due to the absence of a formal hearing before the Milk Board, applying de novo review, which allowed the circuit court to evaluate the merits of the agency decision. The trial court's judgment will be upheld unless there is a lack of substantial evidence, it is contrary to the weight of the evidence, or there are errors in law application or declaration.

The appellate court evaluates the circuit court's judgment to ascertain whether its ruling on the agency's decision was constitutional, lawful, reasonable, and not arbitrary or capricious, relying on substantial evidence and correct legal application. The court accepts the trial judge’s credibility assessments and views evidence favorably towards the judgment, ignoring contrary evidence. 

In Point I, Appellant asserts that the trial court improperly denied its motion for a more definite statement regarding the State’s petition, claiming it lacked clarity on (1) the dates of alleged cheese sales or deliveries, (2) the Milk Board's order for destruction, and (3) the specific cheese products to be destroyed. Under Rule 55.27(d), a party may request a more definite statement if the pleading does not allow for adequate response preparation. The trial court's decision to deny this motion remains unchallenged unless it reflects a legal discretion error.

The trial court overruled the motion without stating the rationale, and although a pretrial teleconference occurred, no transcript is available. The record shows that the Milk Board’s order for destruction was presented to the court prior to the ruling. Despite the lack of details in the petition, Appellant could not demonstrate an inability to prepare a response. Specifically, details of the cheese sale dates were primarily within Appellant's knowledge, and the destruction order’s time frame was clearly outlined, requiring supervision by the Director of Agriculture and allowing for scheduling with Appellant. Thus, Appellant's arguments lack merit.

The Appellant identified an error in the Milk Board’s order regarding the scheduling of cheese destruction; the order indicated that the Milk Board would initiate scheduling, while the petition claimed the Appellant was required to do so. This discrepancy highlights a misstatement in the State’s petition. Despite this, Missouri law permits a pleading to remain valid if it adequately states a claim, even if the facts are mischaracterized. The Appellant filed responsive pleadings that clearly referenced the destruction order, demonstrating an understanding of the issue at hand. The Appellant's argument regarding the need to identify specific cheese for destruction lacks merit, as Missouri is a fact-pleading state, and a motion for a more definite statement concedes a cause of action. The court’s denial of such a motion is supported by case law, which states that the requested clarification was likely within the knowledge of the moving party. The State’s petition did identify the cheese products to be destroyed, covering those produced from January 1, 2010, to August 26, 2010, indicating that the Appellant had the means to clarify details if needed. Additionally, the Appellant contended that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof, asserting that the State should prove the cheese was unfit for consumption. However, the court established that the Appellant needed to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that the cheese did not violate specific statutory provisions regarding food safety.

The court did not conclude that the cheese in question was unfit for human consumption. Missouri Dairy Laws aim to promote the orderly and sanitary production and handling of milk and dairy products. Section 196.527 indicates that section 196.545 applies to both manufacturing milk and dairy products derived from it. As a novel issue before the court, there were no prior interpretations of the relevant statute. Section 196.545 outlines five specific circumstances under which the unlawful sale of dairy products, including those made from manufactured milk, can be determined. The court correctly placed the burden on the State to prove the Appellant's violation of the statute regarding the unlawful sale, rather than proving the cheese's unfitness.

In addressing the Appellant's argument that the Milk Board lacked authority to condemn the cheese inventory without proving a violation of section 196.545, the court clarified that while a condemnation order requires evidence of illegal manufacturing, the Milk Board's initial embargo of the cheese was based on a probable violation of section 196.030. Consequently, the court upheld the Milk Board's condemnation order, which was justified by the existence of probable cause indicating an immediate threat to public safety. Citing precedent from City of Kansas City v. Jordan, the court affirmed that the State's actions, taken without proof, were a legitimate exercise of police power when public safety was at stake. The court emphasized that the sovereign can take actions impacting property when necessary for public health and safety, with statutory provisions in place for property owners to contest such actions post-demolition.

Missouri law authorizes the condemnation of suspected illegally manufactured food as a legitimate exercise of state police power. The Department of Health and Senior Services is responsible for enforcing food and drug laws (Section 192.080). The Milk Board has the authority to condemn illegal dairy products as defined in Section 196.545, which includes items offered for sale that are deemed unlawful (Section 196.570). If a representative of the Department finds probable cause that any food or drug is adulterated or misbranded, they can tag it, indicating it has been detained or embargoed (Section 196.030).

On August 26, 2010, the Milk Board embargoed all cheese inventory in response to complaints from California regarding contamination with Listeria monocytogenes, which poses a serious health risk. This action was validated as a proper exercise of state police power to protect public welfare, unlike the case in Jordan where the product was destroyed. The condemnation of the cheese requires proof of a statutory violation under Section 196.545, which outlines conditions for illegal dairy products, including adulteration by unauthorized substances (Section 196.545(3)). Missouri law defines food broadly and classifies food as adulterated if it contains poisonous or deleterious substances that could harm health (Section 196.070.2). The Milk Board's condemnation actions are contingent upon establishing such violations, which allows for legal remedies if no violation is found.

Missouri adopts the FDA's statutory language to define the standards for adding poisonous or deleterious substances to food. Any such substance added to food, unless necessary for production or unavoidable through good manufacturing practices, is considered unsafe. Listeria monocytogenes (L. Mono) is classified as an added substance, even if contamination occurs prior to manufacturing. In a relevant case, U.S. v. Blue Ribbon Smoked Fish, the court ruled that L. Mono, a bacterial organism from the environment, is not a natural component of fish but rather an added contaminant, leading to a zero-tolerance stance by the FDA, which has not established acceptable levels for L. Mono.

The presence of L. Mono in the appellant's cheese constitutes a violation of Missouri law, as it poses health risks, particularly to vulnerable populations. Although the appellant did not intentionally add L. Mono, its mere presence in the cheese is sufficient for classification as adulterated food under section 196.545(3). Evidence indicated L. Mono was detected in cheese samples from both California and the appellant’s facility. The appellant’s argument that state proof of adulteration was insufficient was rejected, as testing of a representative sample suffices for condemnation, as illustrated in the case U.S. v. 900 Cases Peaches, where a selective sample revealed contamination justifying the seizure of a larger inventory.

Following an FDA inspection, the defendant analyzed thirty of ninety-six sample cans and found contamination in eight. The FDA tested fifteen remaining cans, discovering insect larvae in six. The contamination levels surpassed FDA tolerance, leading the court to condemn all 900 cases of canned fruit. In the related case, the court clarified that total inventory testing is unnecessary for condemnation but did not specify a minimum sample size. The Appellant argues that this minimum should exceed 0.048% of its cheese inventory, while the State claims its testing of fourteen percent suffices. In the previous case, adequate condemnation was supported by sample testing percentages ranging from 0.46% to 5.5%. The trial court ruled the entire cheese block contaminated if any portion was found affected, validating the State's 14% representative sampling under section 196.545. Consequently, the Milk Board was authorized to condemn the cheese inventory, affirming the trial court's judgment. The Appellant's argument regarding the absence of adulteration in its cheese was deemed not preserved for appeal, as it did not contest that the cheese was unfit for human consumption. All relevant statutes and rules are referenced according to their respective codes.