Court: Kentucky Supreme Court; October 25, 2012; Kentucky; State Supreme Court
William D. Slone appeals his conviction by the Campbell Circuit Court for first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender, resulting in a thirty-year prison sentence. He raises several issues for relief:
1. The trial court allegedly abused its discretion by granting a continuance requested by the Commonwealth on the trial's morning.
2. The court erred by not allowing cross-examination of the victim regarding her absence on the initial trial date.
3. The court permitted testimony from the victim about her fear of contracting an STD from Appellant, which he claims was improper.
4. A mistrial was warranted due to the defense not receiving the finalized sexual assault nurse-examiner’s report during the trial.
5. The trial court failed to conduct a competency evaluation before trial and did not arrange for further mental evaluation prior to sentencing.
6. The prosecutor’s closing argument questioned why Appellant did not immediately inform police of a consensual encounter, which Appellant argues infringed on his right to remain silent.
7. The trial court improperly excused a juror without sufficient justification.
The court affirms the judgment. The factual background details that in December 2009, the victim, after socializing with Appellant, claimed he raped and sodomized her in his truck. She discreetly called 911 during the assault, capturing audio evidence of her resistance. Police, after initially unable to locate her, were informed by her sister and found her distraught, fearing an STD from Appellant. A rape kit was performed, leading to Appellant's indictment.
The trial court's decision to grant a continuance for the February 2011 trial was deemed a proper exercise of judicial discretion. Initially set for December 2010, the trial was postponed due to the late discovery of DNA test results and the addition of a new charge of first-degree sodomy. The victim's failure to appear at the rescheduled trial date prompted the Commonwealth to request another continuance, which the court granted over the Appellant’s objection. The trial court released the Appellant on his own recognizance and issued a warrant for the victim's arrest, emphasizing that a future failure of the victim to appear would result in dismissal of the case with prejudice.
The court's decision to grant the continuance is supported by RCr 9.04, which allows postponements for sufficient cause. Key factors considered included the short delay of seven weeks, the justification for prior continuances, and the lack of unreasonable inconvenience to the Appellant, who was released from jail as a result. Denying the continuance would have severely prejudiced the Commonwealth's case, as the victim's testimony was crucial. Overall, the trial court's actions were not arbitrary or unreasonable, thereby showing no abuse of discretion in granting the continuance.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by restricting cross-examination of the victim regarding her failure to appear on the February trial date, including details about her arrest for not appearing and her motivations for testifying, which he claims pertain to her credibility. The trial court allowed questioning about her absence but excluded inquiries into her arrest, citing undue prejudice to the Commonwealth. Appellant's lack of an offer of proof under KRE 103(a)(2) complicates the assessment of potential prejudice from this ruling. The court's decision is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, and it concluded that the victim's failure to appear does not inherently indicate dishonesty, suggesting instead that trauma or external pressures could explain her absence. Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence related to her compelled attendance.
Additionally, Appellant contests the admission of testimony regarding the victim's fear of contracting a sexually transmitted disease from him, asserting it was irrelevant. However, the victim's belief that Appellant engaged with a prostitute prior to the assault, which informed her fears, provides a context for its relevance, particularly as Appellant attempted to reassure her during the assault recording.
Evidence presented indicates that the victim expressed significant concern about potentially contracting a sexually transmitted disease (STD) following the incident, which is pertinent to the issue of consent in a rape case. The victim's fear, grounded in her belief that the Appellant had engaged in sexual activity with a prostitute, supports the relevance of her testimony regarding her concerns. The trial court's decision to allow this testimony was deemed appropriate and within its discretion.
Additionally, the Appellant argued that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial after it was revealed that defense counsel did not receive the final report from sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE), Missy Rittinger, which contained more comprehensive information about the victim’s concerns regarding STDs. The court established that mistrials should only be granted under manifest necessity. Although discovery violations can warrant a mistrial, the Appellant could not demonstrate that the undisclosed report would have significantly altered the trial's outcome, as the same STD issues were already discussed in other contexts. The Appellant's defense strategy was not hindered, and the relevance of the final report's content was effectively addressed during pretrial proceedings. Therefore, the trial court properly denied the motion for a mistrial, finding no abuse of discretion.
Appellant claims the trial court erred by not ordering a pre-trial competency evaluation and by denying his request for further medical testing at KCPC before sentencing. During a KRE 412 rape shield hearing, Appellant testified about a head injury from 2005, which he asserted made him incompetent. He detailed the injury's effects, including frequent seizures and the necessity of supervision, and admitted to drinking while on seizure medication. The trial court, concerned about his competency after his testimony, raised the issue but was informed by defense counsel that Appellant was competent. Under KRS 504.100(1), a competency evaluation is mandated when a reasonable judge questions a defendant's competency, which is defined by KRS 504.060(4) as lacking the capacity to understand or participate in the trial. The court found no grounds to doubt Appellant's competency, noting no signs of incompetency during the trial proceedings and agreeing with defense counsel's assessment. Consequently, the court did not err in failing to order a pretrial competency evaluation.
Post-trial, defense counsel requested a competency evaluation, leading to an order for an assessment by KCPC. Dr. Stephen Sparks evaluated Appellant, concluding he was competent but noted that Appellant's refusal to release medical records hindered the evaluation. Dr. Sparks also reported signs of extensive malingering.
Dr. Sparks testified in court that the Appellant was "very much" competent to stand trial, a conclusion the trial court supported, stating it had no doubts about Appellant’s competence and only ordered an evaluation as a precaution. The court expressed skepticism about Appellant's claims of incompetency, especially since he refused to release his medical records for inspection. Consequently, the trial court determined that Appellant was competent for trial and sentencing, based on Dr. Sparks’ assessment and the lack of evidence indicating any incompetency.
During closing arguments, the prosecutor commented on why Appellant denied being present at the scene of the assault rather than asserting a consensual encounter with the victim. The prosecutor questioned the jury on why an innocent person would not claim consensual sex if that were the case. Defense counsel objected, arguing this was an improper comment on Appellant’s right to remain silent. The court ruled that since Appellant had spoken to police voluntarily, the prosecution could comment on his statements. The prosecutor continued to argue that Appellant’s denial of being in the area was not consistent with his innocence. The appellate review concluded that Appellant did not exercise his right to remain silent, as he had already engaged with police and denied being at the scene. The prosecutor's comments were thus seen as criticisms of Appellant's credibility, rather than an infringement on his right to remain silent.
Prosecutors have significant latitude during closing arguments and may draw reasonable inferences from evidence. In this case, the prosecutor's comments on the appellant's false statements, rather than his silence, were deemed permissible as they highlighted the implication that truthful engagement in lawful activities would have led the appellant to be honest with law enforcement. Consequently, no error was found in the prosecutor's remarks.
Regarding Juror 278, who was struck for cause, he had a history of being prosecuted for criminal non-support, which raised concerns about his ability to serve impartially. He expressed skepticism about the fairness of the charges against him and admitted that his prior experiences might skew his scrutiny of the Commonwealth's case. Under RCr 9.36(1), jurors may be excused if there's reasonable ground to believe they cannot deliver a fair verdict. The court found that Juror 278’s expressed bias warranted his excusal, affirming the trial court's discretion in this matter.
The overall judgment from the Campbell Circuit Court was affirmed, with justices concurring, noting that while evidence such as DNA matched the appellant and could lead to a conviction, the absence of the victim raised potential reasonable doubt for the jury.
The current version of KRE 103 does not mandate avowal testimony to preserve the issue of a trial court's exclusion of testimony, differing from earlier versions. At the trial court's discretion, an avowal may be required. The court can also add statements clarifying the evidence's character, the form of the offer, objections, and rulings, and may direct offers in a question-and-answer format. In a specific case, the victim's excuse for not appearing at the first trial was 'car trouble,' but the trial court required corroboration, leading to the exclusion of this fact from the record. According to Padgett v. Commonwealth, a defendant may waive the statutory right to a competency hearing; however, substantial evidence of incompetence necessitates a hearing, regardless of waivers. The Appellant was not in custody during police questioning, thus not implicating Miranda rights, indicating a potential issue regarding pre-arrest silence, which remains unsettled in law. The Commonwealth cannot use a defendant's post-arrest silence as evidence of guilt, but the implications of a defendant's refusal to speak to police during pre-arrest questioning could raise issues if improperly exploited in court.
