Reid v. Arkansas Department of Human Services

Citations: 380 S.W.3d 918; 2011 Ark. 187; 2011 WL 1599266; 2011 Ark. LEXIS 173Docket: No. 10-696

Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; April 28, 2011; Arkansas; State Supreme Court

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Alphonzo Reid appeals the Miller County Circuit Court's order terminating his parental rights to his child, C.R., born May 28, 1998, and involving his other children, A.R. and A.R.J. The appeal includes challenges based on alleged violations of his constitutional religious freedoms, the admissibility of taped conversations, and claims that the evidence did not substantiate the grounds for termination. The court affirmed the termination after finding that Arkansas law enforcement, following a confidential tip, investigated child maltreatment at the Tony Alamo Christian Ministry (TACM). On September 20, 2008, six minor females, including A.R. and C.R., were removed from immediate danger, leading to an emergency custody order. The court concluded that the children were dependent-neglected due to Reid’s failure to protect them from physical abuse and sexual misconduct associated with Tony Alamo, a known polygamist. The court highlighted Reid's awareness of severe punishments, his complicity in facilitating illegal marriages, and his negligence in ensuring adequate medical care and education for his children. The ruling mandated various requirements for Reid, including psychological evaluation, counseling, parenting classes, and stable living conditions outside of TACM, while ordering DHS to develop a case plan and oversee the children's welfare.

Appellant appealed a circuit court order declaring his daughters, A.R. and C.R., dependent-neglected, a decision affirmed by the court of appeals. Subsequently, the Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a second dependency-neglect petition for additional children, including A.R.J. The circuit court held an adjudication hearing on January 12, 2009, and found A.R.J. and others dependent-neglected, with the ruling also affirmed on appeal. A review hearing in April 2009 led to a finding that DHS had made reasonable efforts in providing services and that appellant partially complied with the case plan by completing required evaluations and classes.

By September 2009, the court issued a permanency-planning order, determining the children still required DHS services and that returning them to appellant's custody was against their welfare. It was deemed in C.R.'s best interest to terminate parental rights for adoption, while for A.R. and A.R.J., the goal was Another Planned Permanent Living Arrangement (APPLA). Despite some compliance, appellant was found to have not met several key requirements, including securing stable housing and employment, and not paying child support.

On September 10, 2009, DHS filed a petition to terminate parental rights for C.R., citing the child’s absence from home for over twelve months and appellant's failure to remedy the conditions leading to removal. Appellant responded on December 4, 2009, seeking to eliminate two case plan requirements he argued were unconstitutional: abandoning housing provided by TACM and severing employment ties with TACM, asserting these violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and Arkansas constitutional protections. During the January 27, 2010 TPR hearing, DHS presented recordings of conversations involving Tony Alamo, which appellant's counsel objected to on hearsay grounds, questioning their admissibility.

Counsel for the appellant contended that certain telephone recordings should be deemed inadmissible as prejudicial under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 403. However, the circuit court ruled these recordings as business records, determining that their probative value outweighed any prejudicial impact. During the hearing, the appellant claimed that requirements to transition from TACM and seek external employment violated his religious-freedom rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court rejected this motion, citing a compelling state interest in protecting children.

Several witnesses provided testimony during the hearing. Ben Franks, a CASA volunteer, noted that inmates in federal prison could have phone calls and supervised visits with children. Malynda Cree, the CASA program director, stated that the communal living conditions of the children involved were unsafe due to incidents of physical abuse, marriage of minors, and sexual abuse. Cindy Allen, a DCFS supervisor, expressed concerns that the appellant was unable to act independently of Alamo and had not addressed the issues leading to the children's removal. She reported that none of the parents secured safe housing or reliable support for their children outside the ministry.

Miranda Raines, a DCFS family service worker, supervised visits between the appellant and his children and recounted a tense incident where the appellant yelled at the children’s therapist, causing discomfort among the children. Terry Yoya, a DHS employee, testified about her ongoing work with the Reid family, noting the appellant's absence from three case plan meetings and a psychiatric evaluation indicating low-average functioning. Although the appellant completed parenting classes, he failed to secure housing, declined a housing voucher, and showed reluctance to pursue independent employment.

Yoya expressed doubt about the appellant's capability to protect his child, C.R., stating that parenting responsibility fell to TACM members while the appellant sought various jobs. She concluded that terminating the appellant's parental rights was in C.R.’s best interest, describing C.R. as a well-behaved child likely to be adopted. Gayla Griffin, a DHS adoption specialist, confirmed the availability of families willing to adopt children matching C.R.'s profile, indicating a strong likelihood of adoption.

Jackie Mundie, C.R.'s foster mother, reported that C.R. was enrolled in third grade and performed well academically, earning Bs and Cs and receiving awards for good citizenship and perfect attendance. Sheila Keever, a CASA volunteer, recommended terminating the appellant’s parental rights. During the termination of parental rights (TPR) hearing, the appellant testified about his long-term employment with TACM, performing maintenance work from 1971, and discussed his care for his children until his wife left in 2004. He acknowledged having raised the children while they lived with Tamela and A.R. at TACM during C.R.'s time in foster care. The appellant admitted to physically disciplining his children but denied any sexual abuse. He stated he attended dental appointments and some meetings but had not sought employment outside of TACM, which provided him housing and necessities. He claimed he did not need separate housing as TACM was safe for his children and stated that he had not been offered housing assistance or employment services.

The circuit court, after assessing the TPR hearing, determined that the State had a compelling interest in child protection, which justified the requirements of stable housing and employment imposed on the appellant, despite some burden on his religious practices. On April 16, 2010, the court terminated the appellant’s parental rights, granting the Department of Human Services (DHS) authority to consent to adoption. The court found that C.R. had lived outside the appellant's home for over twelve months without remedying the conditions that caused her removal, despite DHS's substantial efforts, which included referrals for psychological evaluation, parenting classes, and housing assistance. The appellant's refusal to participate in counseling and seek independent housing and employment was noted, alongside his failure to provide material support for C.R. The court concluded that factors arising after the initial dependency-neglect petition indicated returning C.R. would be contrary to her health, safety, and welfare. After determining that C.R. was adoptable and considering potential harm, the court ruled that terminating the appellant's parental rights was in C.R.'s best interest. The appellant subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal.

Appellant presents three points on appeal concerning the termination of his parental rights. 

1. **Free Exercise of Religion**: The appellant contends that his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Arkansas Constitution were violated when his parental rights were terminated. He argues for a strict-scrutiny standard to be applied, which he believes the court of appeals misapplied in the case of Thorne v. Arkansas Department of Human Services. The Department of Human Services (DHS) counters that the strict-scrutiny standard is inapplicable since the state action did not target religious activity. The court cites a previous ruling in Myers v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, affirming the circuit court’s decision regarding similar free-exercise claims.

2. **Admissibility of Telephone Recordings**: The appellant challenges the circuit court's admission of taped conversations between Tony Alamo and unidentified women, arguing they should have been excluded as hearsay and not qualifying as business records under Rule 803(6) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. He asserts that the recordings' prejudicial impact outweighed their probative value and that admitting them violated the Confrontation Clause. DHS argues the recordings are not hearsay and that the circuit court’s decision was not erroneous. The court reaffirms its previous ruling in Myers regarding the admissibility of the recordings.

3. **Termination of Parental Rights**: The appellant argues the circuit court erred in terminating his parental rights, claiming DHS failed to prove the necessary grounds by clear and convincing evidence. The standard of review indicates that findings are only considered clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is firmly convinced a mistake was made despite supporting evidence. Under Arkansas law, termination may occur if it is in the children's best interest and if at least one ground for termination is established. The court emphasizes its deference to the trial court's findings based on its superior position to assess credibility and evidence.

Termination of parental rights is evaluated based on two main factors: (i) the likelihood of the juvenile's adoption if termination is granted, and (ii) potential harm to the child’s health and safety if returned to the parent, as outlined in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A). The court is not obligated to find actual harm or identify specific potential harm, as clarified in Lee v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, but should analyze harm in broader terms. Additionally, in McFarland v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, it was established that the factors do not need to be proven by clear and convincing evidence; rather, the overall evidence must clearly and convincingly support that termination is in the child's best interest.

In the current case, evidence presented by the Department of Human Services (DHS) indicated that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of C.R. Testimonies from DHS specialists supported the likelihood of C.R.'s adoption. The potential harm was highlighted by the appellant's lack of compliance with the case plan, particularly the failure to secure suitable housing outside of TACM, a location associated with numerous risks, including minor marriages, sexual abuse, and physical abuse. The appellant's low average functioning and susceptibility to influence suggested a risk of further harm to C.R. The circuit court found that the children had been out of the home for over twelve months and that despite meaningful efforts from DHS to rehabilitate the parent, conditions leading to the removal had not been remedied. Evidence confirmed DHS's reasonable efforts, including counseling and parenting classes, which the appellant largely neglected, failing to secure independent housing or employment. Thus, the court's determination that termination was in the best interest of C.R. was upheld as not clearly erroneous.

The evidence presented met the statutory requirements for terminating parental rights (TPR) based on one sufficient ground. Citing Dinkins v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., the court emphasized that only one ground is required for TPR, and any error in the lower court's finding regarding willful failure to support was deemed harmless due to an alternate valid ground. The circuit court's decision to terminate the parental rights of Alphonso Reid to C.R. was affirmed. During the proceedings, the natural mother, Cynthia Yates, was largely unaccounted for, and a separate TPR hearing for her was rescheduled. This appeal does not address her rights. Additionally, the court clarified the correct spelling of the appellant's name in the case documentation. The Department of Human Services (DHS) is permitted to create a plan for a permanent living arrangement, including independent living services, as outlined in Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-338(c)(6).