Glenn v. Lucas

Citations: 376 S.W.3d 268; 179 Oil & Gas Rep. 655; 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 6334; 2012 WL 3104255Docket: No. 06-12-00006-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; August 1, 2012; Texas; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The case involves an appeal by Max Edmon Glenn and others concerning a trespass to try title suit initiated by Claude A. Lucas and his wife, Bonnie Lucas, over a 63.6-acre tract of land in Shelby County, Texas. The trial court ruled in favor of the Lucases, leading to the appeal focused on a 1932 judgment that foreclosed a vendor's lien related to the Lucases’ predecessor in interest. The appellate court chose to address only the questions raised and ultimately affirmed the trial court's decision.

A historical overview reveals that the land, originally owned by G.C. Estes, comprised a larger 109-acre tract sold to W.M. Bailey on December 5, 1925. This sale involved vendor's lien notes—eight notes of $250 each and a final note of $300, all maturing annually from 1926 to 1934. The notes, which accrued interest at 10% and included attorney's fees for defaults, stipulated that default on any note would accelerate the maturity of all notes. The deed reserved an undivided half interest in minerals beneath the land and maintained the vendor's lien until full payment of the notes.

Estes assigned the first four of nine notes to H.F. Byford, confirming that this lien was superior to the remaining five notes not assigned. On October 2, 1930, Bailey and his wife transferred the property back to Estes in exchange for the cancellation of vendor’s lien notes. The following month, Estes sold the 109-acre tract to Harvey and Willie Mae Hughes, who assumed the notes originally payable by Bailey, with Estes reserving half of the mineral estate. Subsequently, various transfers of interests in the mineral estate occurred, including Hugheses' conveyance to I.F. Bright, who further transferred interests to Josephine Glenn and others. The Hugheses defaulted on their notes to Byford, prompting him to file a foreclosure lawsuit in 1932 against Estes and the Hugheses. At that time, Estes owned half of the mineral interest, while others owned fractional interests. Byford was granted a judgment for foreclosure, confirming his lien was superior to any claims made by the Hugheses and their subsequent grantees. After the judgment, Byford released Estes from liability in exchange for Estes’s interest in the property. However, no actual sale was executed following the judgment.

On October 14, 2010, the Lucases filed a lawsuit against multiple defendants, referred to as the Successors, claiming mineral interests in 63.6 acres in Shelby County, Texas. Additional parties, the Intervenors, also claimed fractional interests in the mineral estate. Initially, the Lucases framed their case as a suit to remove clouds from the title and for declaratory judgment. However, after objections from the Successors and Intervenors, the Lucases amended their complaint to include a trespass to try title claim, which is recognized as the proper legal remedy for resolving competing property claims.

The controversy centers on an oil, gas, and mineral lease between the Successors and Noble Energy, which was assigned to Devon Energy Production Company. A title search by Devon raised questions about ownership, leading the Lucases to assert that their predecessor, Byford, held superior rights. They alleged that the Successors’ predecessors were Josephine Glenn, Mr. and Mrs. O.M. Glenn, and L.S. Buchanon, and claimed that their interests were subordinate to Byford's lien, foreclosed by a 1932 judgment. The Lucases contended that the Successors had no rights to the property and could not legally enter into the lease for the 63.6 acres.

Claude Lucas, the sole witness at trial, testified he purchased the property in 1972 but provided no documentary evidence, failing to present the deed. The property description on record did not confirm any transfer to the Lucases, leaving ambiguity regarding the nature of any conveyance. The court noted the lack of evidence regarding the Lucases' interest in the mineral estate, which typically would result in a dismissal of their claim to recover.

To succeed in a trespass to try title action, a plaintiff must establish their own title rather than rely on the weaknesses of an adversary's title. Options for proving title include demonstrating a regular chain of conveyances, a superior title from a common source, title by limitations, or prior possession. In this case, since the parties agreed to a common source (G.C. Estes), the burden rested on the plaintiff to prove superior title. The trial court, despite the insufficient evidence of title, ruled in favor of the Lucases, granting them title and possession of the property and mineral interests. The court justified its decision by stating that the parties had stipulated to a common source of ownership, negating the need for additional ownership evidence.

The trial court established a chain of title through 1932, asserting that Lucas derived his title from H.F. Byford, with sufficient evidence of superior title to the property. This assertion was not contested on appeal, leading to the assumption that Byford was indeed the Lucases' predecessor in interest. The case would have been straightforward had the appellants raised issues of legal and factual sufficiency regarding the judgment. Instead, they presented questions deemed inconsequential, such as the legal effect of a sheriff's failure to complete a foreclosure sale, the binding nature of an election for judicial foreclosure, inclusion of L.S. Buchanan as a defendant in the 1932 foreclosure, and the existence of a deed in lieu of foreclosure from Harvey Hughes to Byford. 

Notably, the appellants did not contest the sufficiency of the evidence and framed their queries as challenges to the trial court's finding that the 1932 judgment stripped the defendants of any mineral interest and that Byford maintained superior title due to vendor's liens from Hughes. The analysis emphasized the nature of a vendor’s lien, which serves as a contractual charge to secure payment for real property, allowing the vendor to retain superior title until the purchase price is fully paid. The deed in question explicitly retained the vendor’s lien, affirming Byford’s superior legal title. Jurisprudence supports that even absolute conveyances treat the sale as executory until payment is made, allowing the vendor to rescind the sale and recover the property based on their superior title, independent from foreclosure remedies.

The vendor has multiple remedies for the vendee’s default, including suing for payment, rescinding the contract, and recovering title and possession. However, to rescind the contract and reclaim the land, the holder of all vendor’s lien notes must possess all notes in the series at the time of rescission; partial ownership does not grant this right. Byford, holding only four of nine notes, opted for foreclosure in a 1932 suit. The appellants contend that the incomplete foreclosure rendered the judgment ineffective, but this is rejected for two reasons: first, the Hugheses and Estes transferred their interests to Byford post-judgment to avoid liability, making a sheriff's sale unnecessary; second, Byford always held legal title to the property, while equitable title requires payment of the notes. Consequently, the appellants had no legal or equitable title, and the foreclosure sale's completion was not needed to extinguish their title after the 1932 judgment.

Hughes attempted to convey a half interest in the mineral estate to Bright, who then transferred a quarter to Buchanon and Josephine Glenn. The appellants question the foreclosure's impact on Buchanon, who was not a party to the suit. Once a lien is established, the property cannot be cleared without debt payment or a release agreement. Byford’s priority agreement with Estes was binding on the appellants’ predecessors. Bright’s interest was limited to an unmatured equitable right subject to Byford’s lien, placing Buchanon in a similar position. Although not a necessary party to the foreclosure suit, Buchanon could pay off the debt and intervene. The record shows no action regarding Buchanon's interest, and case law indicates that his equitable right to pay and acquire title was barred by laches due to inaction over the years following the foreclosure judgment. Therefore, recognizing Buchanon's claim would be inequitable.

The legal matter evolved from an initial claim to a suit in trespass to try title, which was agreed upon by the parties during the hearing. The Lucases subsequently amended their pleadings to reflect this change. Despite the absence of proof of title at trial, the opposing party, the Successors, did not contest the evidence's sufficiency regarding the trespass to try title claim. An appellate court can only reverse a trial court's judgment if there are properly assigned errors. The trial court's judgment was affirmed with the case originally appealed to the Twelfth Court of Appeals and later transferred to the current court by the Texas Supreme Court. There was no identified conflict between precedents of the two courts on relevant issues.

The excerpt details a quitclaim by Bright, who transferred any interest in the property to Estes in 1952, despite having conveyed his entire interest in 1931. Bright was not mentioned in the trial court’s judgment from the 1932 suit, despite allegations against him. The defendants claimed various mineral interests in the property, including multiple parties with fractional interests ranging from 1/32 to 1/4032. The trial court dismissed parties who disclaimed their interests in the property due to the Lucases’ notices of nonsuit. A default judgment was entered against several individuals, divesting them of any interest in the property and stating they lacked authority to enter into a specific lease agreement.

No evidence supports the claim regarding the identification of the real property in question, particularly in relation to a lawsuit filed by Byford over seventy years ago. The statement made lacks evidentiary backing. The judgment has been appealed by a group of individuals collectively known as the Buchanan Appellants and others, including various members of the Wright and Glenn families. The excerpt explains that the vendor’s lien in question is a contract lien and indicates that the Appellants’ arguments about election of remedies need not be addressed. They reference the case of Zeigler v. Sawyer, which is distinguishable due to its focus on a mortgage that does not confer an estate to the mortgagee. The Appellants inquire about a 'Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure'; however, such a deed does not exist as a specific type. The Hugheses’ conveyance of interest is characterized as a transfer of equitable interest, which remains subject to Byford’s superior lien, as evidenced by recorded liens. The written assignment of vendor's lien notes must be recorded to be valid against subsequent purchasers, serving as constructive notice. The Lucases contend that subcontractors had no equity in the property, which was extinguished when Hughes reconveyed his interest. It is noted that at the time of conveyance, the Hugheses held only the surface estate interest, applicable similarly to Josephine Glenn and the O.M. Glenns’ interests.