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Mendenhall v. Property & Casualty Insurance Co. of Hartford
Citations: 375 S.W.3d 90; 2012 Mo. LEXIS 157; 2012 WL 3106613Docket: No. SC 92202
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri; July 31, 2012; Missouri; State Supreme Court
Ruth Mendenhall appeals a summary judgment favoring Property and Casualty Insurance Company of Hartford regarding her claim for insurance coverage following the death of her husband, Len Mendenhall. The trial court ruled that Mr. Mendenhall was an "employee" under Hartford's policy, which excluded coverage. The appellate court reverses this ruling, determining that Mr. Mendenhall was a "temporary worker," thus entitled to coverage. In May 2006, Mr. Mendenhall was interviewed by the Family Center of Farmington, Inc. but was not hired. However, he was subsequently employed by Jay Walker, owner of a cattle farm, on an as-needed basis. Mr. Mendenhall was compensated by Walker and occasionally performed tasks for the Family Center, using their truck and trailer, which were insured under Hartford's policy. On March 8, 2007, while using the Family Center's truck for work at the farm, Mr. Mendenhall died in an accident. Mendenhall's widow filed a wrongful death suit, resulting in significant judgments against Mr. Walker and the Family Center. An agreement was made to collect any judgment against Walker from Hartford's policy. Hartford denied coverage, asserting that Mr. Mendenhall was an employee, thus excluded under the policy that defines "employee" to include "leased workers" but not "temporary workers." The distinction hinges on whether Mr. Mendenhall was considered an "employee" or a "temporary worker," which determines coverage eligibility. The trial court's conclusion that he was not a "temporary worker" is overturned on appeal. The court reviews the interpretation of an insurance policy and the ambiguity of its coverage and exclusion provisions de novo. Ambiguities are resolved in favor of the insured, with exclusionary clauses interpreted strictly against the drafter. In this case, the key issue is whether Mr. Mendenhall was “furnished to” Mr. Walker by the Family Center, qualifying him as a “temporary worker” under the Hartford policy. The court notes that both parties agree Mr. Mendenhall worked for Mr. Walker as a temporary worker, but they dispute the nature of the relationship between Mr. Mendenhall and the Family Center. Hartford contends that the Family Center could not have "furnished" Mr. Mendenhall as it was not an employment agency, while Mrs. Mendenhall argues that an agency relationship is not required. The term “furnished to” is not defined in the policy, so its ordinary meaning applies, which is to provide or supply what is needed. The court emphasizes that the definitions of “furnish” do not necessitate an employment or agency relationship for the Family Center to have "furnished" Mr. Mendenhall. The court posits that even if the Family Center acted as an employment agency, Mr. Mendenhall could have refused the job—indicating that the agency relationship is not central to the determination. The crucial point is that Mr. Walker relied solely on the Family Center’s referral to hire Mr. Mendenhall without conducting an interview. Thus, the Family Center's referral was instrumental in Mr. Mendenhall being "furnished to" Mr. Walker as a temporary worker. An agency relationship between Mr. Mendenhall and the Family Center is deemed irrelevant to Mr. Walker’s decision to hire Mr. Mendenhall. The term “furnished to” can be interpreted to include situations where employment decisions are based solely on third-party referrals. The ambiguity arises from the Hartford policy’s differing definitions of “leased worker” and “temporary worker,” where the former requires a specific third-party relationship, while the latter does not. Courts have differing interpretations of “furnished to,” with some maintaining it requires an employment agency relationship, while others suggest it can include general referrals. This ambiguity implies that the phrase can be understood in multiple ways, favoring the insured's interpretation. Consequently, Mr. Mendenhall is classified as Mr. Walker’s “temporary worker” under the Hartford policy, which provides coverage. The dissent emphasizes that recognizing coverage in this case implies that anyone referring a potential employee is considered to have furnished that employee, but the core issue is whether the average consumer perceives such referrals as excluded from coverage. The judgment is reversed and remanded, noting that Mr. Mendenhall was not covered by workers' compensation due to his employment in farm labor at the time of his death.