Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; October 7, 2010; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
Appellant Jason Taylor appeals his convictions for capital murder and kidnapping, receiving a death sentence and life imprisonment, respectively. He raises several arguments: (1) the circuit court's denial of his motion for a directed verdict, (2) refusal to declare Christina Head an accomplice as a matter of law and to submit this issue to the jury, (3) denial of his motion to quash the felony information due to the alleged unconstitutionality of the death penalty statute, and (4) allowance of prosecutorial misconduct. The court affirms the convictions.
The case arose on October 15, 2008, when Derrick Utsey's body was discovered in Saline County. Detective Aaron Washington observed the victim's condition, noting he was shoeless, with his pockets turned out, a sock and electrical tape around his neck, and a gunshot wound to his head. Investigation led to Christina Head, who had been in a relationship with appellant. She testified that appellant had given Utsey a ride after meeting him at a motel and later confessed to her that he had shot Utsey. After obtaining a warrant based on her information, law enforcement arrested appellant.
During an interview post-arrest, appellant waived his right to counsel and admitted the crime, acknowledging the location of the body was on his deer lease. Christina Head corroborated the timeline, detailing her interactions with both appellant and Utsey, including a conversation where Utsey mentioned having $500. She also described appellant's demeanor upon his return after the incident and his admissions regarding the shooting and tying up the victim.
Appellant confessed to Head that he disposed of the victim, Utsey, in the woods and provided multiple justifications for his actions, including beliefs that Utsey had robbed him or was involved with Head. He detailed how Utsey pleaded for his life and admitted to burning their clothes at Buster Logan’s house. Appellant showed Head the revolver he claimed to have used in the shooting, which she described as “old western looking.” After checking into the Executive Inn on October 14, Head and appellant dropped off a truck at Buster Logan’s, where appellant cleaned it out. Although initially claiming to have thrown the gun in a lake, appellant later confessed to keeping it until it was discarded from a moving vehicle during a police stop.
Head revealed her knowledge of the events to her father, who encouraged her to report to authorities. Despite living with appellant at the time, she felt scared yet in love with him. After her statement to the police, she moved in with a friend, but they maintained contact through letters during his incarceration. The letters, admitted as evidence, included appellant urging her not to testify against him, suggesting she could blame another codefendant, Brad Carter, and expressing a desire for her to provide him an alibi if questioned.
Under cross-examination, Head admitted to giving a notarized but untruthful statement to appellant’s attorney, influenced by fear and love for appellant. She acknowledged writing letters while he was incarcerated asserting her falsehoods to police. Brad Carter, a co-defendant and convicted felon, testified for the State without promises of leniency, revealing his history with appellant and his drug use on the day of the crime, as well as lending appellant a truck and requesting a gun.
Carter first encountered the appellant on October 13 at Buster Logan’s house and was later dropped off at Gus Bocksnick’s home. After being at Gus’s for eight to ten hours, the appellant returned around midnight, picked up a gun, and claimed he needed to kill someone. Initially skeptical, Carter was alarmed when the appellant returned shortly after, stating he had a black man tied up in the truck. Carter observed the victim, who was bound and begging for help, and agreed to drive the truck out of curiosity.
They traveled to Buster Logan’s house where the appellant acquired electrical tape and a sock, which he used to gag the victim, identified as Utsey. Carter drove into the woods where the appellant removed the victim from the truck bed. After removing the gag, Utsey pleaded for his life, but the appellant shot him in the head without speaking. The appellant then dragged the victim into the brush and shot him again. Following the murder, they returned to Logan’s house for supplies to conceal the body, which was wrapped in a blanket and disposed of in another wooded area. The appellant burned their clothes, the blanket, and the truck bed liner, and they later spent the night at a motel.
Dr. Frank Peretti conducted the autopsy on the victim, revealing two close-contact gunshot wounds to the head, both of which were fatal. Signs of strangulation were also present, indicating the victim had been alive during that process. The investigation led to a traffic stop on October 22, 2008, involving the appellant as a passenger in a vehicle driven by another individual, during which a handgun was found in the roadway.
Officer Mull questioned the appellant about a handgun, to which he claimed a friend had left it in the vehicle, and he discarded it while driving to avoid being "around it." The gun was later found damaged after being run over. Witness James Bennett testified that his truck, which he loaned to Brad Carter, was returned in poor condition, missing a bed liner and tailgate, and muddy, with blown tires; Carter attributed this condition to deer hunting. Megan Crews recounted overhearing the appellant threatening to "kill this guy" when he returned to pick up Carter. Gus Boeksnick confirmed the appellant and Carter's visit to his home. Robert Wayne Burnett secured Bennett's truck for the homicide investigation, noting its missing components. Latent-print examiner Bobby Humphries linked a tire impression from the crime scene to the Chevy S10 through a distinctive defect in one of its tires. Firearms examiner Steve Hargis reported that the recovered gun was too damaged for testing but matched the groove pattern of bullets found on the victim, though he could not definitively link them due to the commonality of the pattern among .22-caliber firearms. Forensic analysis revealed the appellant's DNA on the gun's barrel and confirmed that blood on the truck matched the victim's DNA, with results deemed statistically significant. The jury ultimately convicted the appellant of capital murder and kidnapping, imposing a death sentence for the former and life imprisonment for the latter, while rejecting the aggravated-robbery charge.
Appellant argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motions for directed verdict regarding capital murder and kidnapping charges. He claims the State did not adequately demonstrate that he interfered substantially with the victim’s liberty or used force for the kidnapping charge, and similarly failed to prove premeditation and deliberation for the capital murder charge. Appellant challenges the credibility of the State's primary evidence, the codefendant's testimony, which he deems uncorroborated.
In assessing the sufficiency of evidence for a directed verdict, the court considers whether substantial evidence supports the verdict, viewing evidence favorably toward it and only acknowledging evidence that supports the verdict. Circumstantial evidence must align consistently with the defendant's guilt and be inconsistent with any reasonable alternative explanations. The jury, not the court, determines witness credibility and can accept or reject parts of testimonies.
Regarding accomplice testimony, Arkansas law necessitates corroboration from independent evidence to connect the defendant to the crime. This corroborating evidence does not need to confirm every detail of the accomplice’s account but must substantively link the accused to the crime. The essential question is whether the remaining evidence, excluding the accomplice's testimony, independently establishes the crime and connects the accused to it. Evidence of the accused's actions or statements before or after the crime may serve as corroboration, including testimony from family members about the accused's attempts to conceal his whereabouts during the crime.
A jury is not required to abandon common sense when evaluating everyday situations. The appellant contends that the State did not present enough evidence to support the jury's finding of guilt for kidnapping. Under Arkansas law, kidnapping involves restraining someone without consent to significantly interfere with their liberty for purposes such as committing a felony or causing injury. The State primarily relied on a codefendant's testimony that the victim was bound in the truck's bed, which was corroborated by additional evidence. Appellant's girlfriend, Christina Head, testified that he confessed to tying up the victim, who was found with tape around his neck and a gag, indicating strangulation prior to death. Witnesses confirmed the appellant's movements and overheard him make threats against the victim. Blood was also found on the truck, which was missing its bed liner, supporting claims of restraint. Appellant's attempts to manipulate Head into lying and his communications while incarcerated further indicated guilt, thus corroborating the codefendant's testimony.
The court affirmed the kidnapping conviction based on sufficient corroborative evidence. Regarding the capital murder charge, the State presented two theories: felony murder during the kidnapping and premeditated murder. Under Arkansas law, capital murder can occur if a person causes death while committing or attempting kidnapping, or if death is caused with premeditated intent. Premeditation can occur instantly and is often inferred from circumstantial evidence, including the weapon used and the nature of the inflicted wounds.
The capital-murder charge was presented to the jury as a general verdict without specifying whether the conviction was based on felony murder, premeditated murder, or both. The appellant did not challenge the sufficiency of the conviction regarding felony murder. The court may affirm a general verdict if sufficient evidence supports an alternative basis for the charge, as established in Williams v. State. The evidence demonstrated that the appellant acted with premeditation and deliberation in the murder of the victim. Accomplice testimony from Carter provided key details, corroborated by forensic evidence.
On October 13, 2008, the appellant borrowed a truck from Carter, then met the victim outside a motel where his girlfriend, Christina Head, was staying. After borrowing a gun from Carter and indicating intentions to kill, the appellant and Carter drove the victim to a remote area, where the appellant shot him twice in the head. They then attempted to conceal the crime by moving the body, burning their clothes, and creating an alibi. Forensic evidence linked the appellant to the crime, with the victim found bearing gunshot wounds and other indicators of the crime scene.
The appellant also claimed the trial court erred by not declaring his girlfriend an accomplice, which would have required corroboration of her testimony. Under Ark. Code Ann. 5-2-408, an accomplice must engage in specified activities, but the court did not find sufficient grounds to classify her as such. Overall, the evidence supported the conclusion that the appellant caused the victim's death with premeditation and deliberation.
An individual is considered an accomplice in the commission of an offense if they intentionally promote or facilitate the offense by (1) soliciting, advising, encouraging, or coercing another to commit it, (2) aiding or attempting to aid in the planning or execution of the offense, or (3) failing to prevent the offense when legally obligated to do so. For offenses requiring a specific result, accomplice liability applies similarly if the individual acts with the requisite mental state regarding that result. Simply being present at the crime scene or not reporting the crime does not constitute accomplice status. Key factors in assessing accomplice involvement include proximity to the crime, opportunity to commit it, and associations suggestive of joint participation. The burden of proving a witness’s accomplice status lies with the appellant, who must either have the court declare the witness an accomplice or submit the matter to the jury. The determination of a witness's accomplice status is a mixed question of law and fact, but can be decided as a matter of law if the evidence conclusively establishes it. In this case, the court found no evidence that Christina Head solicited or aided in the crime, nor was she present at the crime scene; her actions post-crime indicated she was merely an accessory after the fact. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that there was no rational basis for considering her an accomplice or instructing the jury accordingly.
Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in denying his pretrial motion to quash the criminal information, claiming violations of his fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendment rights. He asserts that the death penalty is inherently and as applied to him cruel, unusual, and excessive, contending the state's capital-punishment scheme is overly broad, vague, and allows for arbitrary imposition. He argues that the scheme's mandatory death sentence lacks sufficient constitutional safeguards and presents primarily public-policy arguments without substantial legal support, citing only one Arkansas case. The court notes that arguments lacking citation to authority can be dismissed, and has consistently upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty against similar claims. Appellant's specific "as applied" argument was not preserved for review, as his pretrial motions did not address it, and he did not raise it post-trial. The court reiterates that constitutional arguments not raised at trial are waived on appeal. Additionally, appellant fails to provide convincing legal authority for his claims regarding the constitutionality of state statutes governing the death penalty, which have been previously upheld against similar challenges.
In his final point, appellant alleges prosecutorial misconduct, claiming improper witness leading, inappropriate closing statements, and misleading the jury about a potential plea bargain for a codefendant. However, the court finds these arguments unpersuasive.
For a cumulative-error argument related to prosecutorial misconduct to succeed on appeal, the appellant must demonstrate that individual objections were made to the alleged errors and that a cumulative-error objection was raised with a ruling obtained from the circuit court. In this case, no ruling was made, leading to the decision to not address the appellant’s argument. Regarding leading questions, the appellant admitted to frequently objecting to the State's leading of witnesses, with the circuit court sustaining those objections. However, the appellant did not move for a mistrial based on excessive leading and failed to meet the criteria established in Wicks v. State, resulting in this argument being unpreserved for review.
The appellant also claimed that the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments concerning lesser-included offenses and the appellant's inconsistent explanations constituted prosecutorial misconduct. However, the appellant did not specify his objection during the trial. The trial court had earlier reminded the jury that attorney remarks are not evidence, and subsequent objections were not raised by the appellant's counsel. Consequently, the issue was not preserved for review, as it is the appellant's responsibility to secure a clear ruling.
On the merits, the appellant's argument regarding mistrial also fails. A mistrial is considered a last resort, only warranted when justice cannot continue under the circumstances or when an error cannot be rectified through instructions or admonishments. The trial court has broad discretion in controlling closing arguments, and absent an abuse of that discretion, its decisions are upheld on appeal. The prosecutor's comments related to the evidence presented during the trial, specifically the appellant's inconsistent statements, and were appropriate during rebuttal after the defense had suggested a lesser offense. Thus, the prosecutor's actions did not rise to a level requiring a sua sponte mistrial from the circuit court.
Appellant argues that the State failed to disclose to the jury that codefendant Carter would benefit from a favorable plea deal for his testimony against appellant. However, at the time of the trial, no plea arrangement existed for Carter, and his statements could have been self-incriminating. The court notes that appellant provides no legal authority supporting the claim that the State had any obligation to inform the jury about this matter, and thus the argument is rejected. The court reviewed the case under relevant Arkansas Supreme Court rules and found no reversible error, affirming the conviction. Judge Danielson concurs in part but dissents regarding the appellant's claims, emphasizing that substantial evidence supported the jury's guilty verdict for capital murder and the statutory aggravator, which was that the murder was executed in an especially cruel manner. Evidence included the victim being bound, strangled, gagged, and shot while pleading for his life, reinforcing the appropriateness of the death penalty. Appellant does not contest the accuracy of jury instructions or the sufficiency of evidence for the aggravating factor.
