Court: Missouri Court of Appeals; April 27, 2012; Missouri; State Appellate Court
Darrel Routledge, the appellant, caused a collision on Highway 60 while attempting a left turn in front of John Hoffman's vehicle. A subsequent accident involving Lankford and Hargis occurred shortly thereafter. The jury assigned fault, finding Routledge eighty percent liable and Lankford twenty percent. Routledge appealed, arguing that Lankford's negligence was, as a matter of law, the intervening cause of the second accident, asserting that the trial court should have granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial. The court affirmed the jury's verdict, stating that the evidence was viewed favorably toward the jury's conclusion and that a verdict cannot be overturned for insufficient evidence unless there is a complete lack of supporting facts. The standard for a new trial is abuse of discretion, which occurs if a ruling is arbitrary or unsupported by the record. Appellant's arguments included descriptions of the highway conditions and the actions of Ms. Mendenhall, a witness who observed both accidents. Mendenhall noted a truck axle on the roadway that Lankford's vehicle may have hit, but her earlier statements did not mention this debris. Additionally, Marie Hoffman, a passenger in the first accident, did not see a reason for Lankford's vehicle to cross the center line. The court's decision to deny the motions was upheld based on the standards of legal evidence and discretion.
Barnes' vehicle was traveling west on U.S. 60 when they parked on the north side of the road in front of Mendenhall's vehicle. Julia Bishop, a nearby resident, observed the initial accident involving Hoffman and Routledge and pulled over on the south shoulder to check on Hoffman’s occupants. Another witness observed Mr. Lankford's truck approaching the accident scene, which he saw move into the eastbound lane and collide head-on with Hargis's vehicle. Lankford claimed he did not intend to cross the centerline; instead, he eased off the gas to avoid debris and potential pedestrian hazards without applying brakes.
Key facts indicate that the accidents occurred within minutes of each other at dusk, with the second accident described as nearly instantaneous. Mendenhall testified that the entire incident spanned about five minutes and noted the road was heavily obstructed with debris, which included parts from the appellant's vehicle. She navigated through the debris by pulling to the right, missing the Hoffman vehicle by inches, and believed her vehicle slightly grazed the axle that Lankford struck.
Mendenhall also had a clear view of the collision between Lankford and Hargis, noting both vehicles were near the center of the road. She suggested that debris contributed to the second accident but was uncertain if either vehicle crossed the centerline. Witnesses reported several other accidents before bystanders realized the need to clear the road, with larger debris remaining until after the police arrived.
Mr. Macy, the tow truck driver, observed that the rear end of the Appellant’s truck was near the white line. Trooper Mason indicated that an open door on the Hoffman vehicle could extend into U.S. 60 by three to four feet. Hargis expressed concern about the potential for someone to exit a vehicle parked on the shoulder and open a door, prompting him to exercise caution. The Highway Patrol's primary responsibility is managing roadway safety and preventing further accidents at accident sites. It is common for bystanders to assist and park near accident scenes, and debris tends to drift in the direction of vehicle travel following a collision. In this case, debris from the first accident was scattered across the roadway, primarily drifting westward. It is expected that accidents generate debris, and the troopers had closed the road in response to the accident. At the time of the second accident, there were no lights or flashers present. Corporal Cornett noted that visibility at the accident site could have been challenging without prior knowledge of the situation. According to an accident reconstructionist, Mr. Lankford would travel 229 feet from the moment he perceives danger to a complete stop on a straight, flat, dry road. Lankford misidentified the debris as the rear end of the Appellant's truck, and the interval between spotting the debris and colliding with the Hargis vehicle was only three to five seconds, which felt instantaneous to him. In attempting to avoid the debris and potential hazards, he failed to notice the Hargis vehicle until just before impact. Hargis also struggled to see the parked vehicles and claimed the accident occurred too swiftly for any human response to avert it. The Appellant contends that Lankford's negligence in not driving on the right side of the road and his lack of attentiveness were the proximate causes of the collision. Legal standards for actionable negligence require a direct causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury. Simply having an injury follow a negligent act does not establish liability; the negligence must be shown to be the proximate cause of the injury. Proximate cause exists when a cause produces an effect without interference from an independent or superseding cause. An efficient intervening cause is defined as a new force that disrupts the causal chain, becoming the immediate cause of injury, but it must not merely be an act of concurrent or contributing negligence.
If an alleged intervening cause occurs simultaneously or in conjunction with prior negligence, it is not deemed an intervening cause. The proximate cause is assessed by determining if the defendant's negligence is a natural and probable consequence of the injury, rather than whether a reasonable person could foresee the specific injury. The defendant's negligence does not need to be the sole cause of the injury, as long as it is one of the efficient causes without which the injury would not have occurred. Whether proximate cause exists is generally a jury question; however, a court may resolve it as a matter of law if an intervening cause significantly overshadows the original negligence's role in the injury.
In *Metzger v. Schermesser*, the court reversed the trial court's decision to grant directed verdicts to the defendants, emphasizing that in cases of comparative negligence, the degree of fault among multiple tortfeasors is typically for the jury to decide. The case involved a plaintiff injured after assisting drivers in a collision during poor visibility conditions, where the court found that the initial negligence contributed to the subsequent injury, establishing a continuous sequence of events.
In *Boggs v. ADM*, the defendant company contested a negligence verdict after a child was struck by a truck while navigating around stopped trucks that obstructed his view. The court noted that the actions leading to the injury were closely linked and did not break the chain of causation, affirming that the negligence of the original drivers contributed to the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's injury.
ADM operated a facility with a single entrance and had closed off a parking lot, leading to trucks stopping on a residential street despite complaints from local residents. ADM instructed drivers to park on the street and allowed certain vehicles to bypass stopped trucks by traveling on the wrong side of the street. ADM claimed that the independent actions of the truck drivers parking in front of the plaintiff's home severed its liability, arguing these actions were an intervening cause. The court rejected this argument, stating that the truck drivers' actions contributed to the events leading to the plaintiff's injuries and did not interrupt the causation linked to ADM's conduct.
The court referenced Schaffer v. Bess to illustrate that negligence leading to an initial accident can be part of a chain of events causing subsequent injuries, emphasizing that multiple parties can share liability for resultant injuries. The appellant's argument that liability ceased once vehicles from the initial accident came to rest was dismissed, noting that debris from the first accident created ongoing hazards. Testimony indicated that the second accident occurred shortly after the first, with visibility issues exacerbated by the absence of flashers or lights on the vehicles involved. Expert testimony suggested that the appellant's negligence was a significant cause of the accidents, confirming that the injuries from the second incident were a foreseeable outcome of the initial negligence, thereby establishing continuous liability.
The accident's timing, proximity of the two accidents, highway debris, and eyewitness accounts indicating that Lankford likely struck the debris, which led him to veer into oncoming traffic, were all factors contributing to the second accident. Lankford's negligence was found to be directly linked to the Appellant's negligence, and it was determined that Lankford's actions were not an independent cause of the injuries from the second accident. The jury was appropriately tasked with evaluating the comparative fault of both drivers. Substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict, reaffirming that the determination of negligence among multiple parties is typically a question for the jury. The judgment was affirmed, with concurrence from Judges Burrell and Lynch. A third accident, unrelated to this lawsuit, was acknowledged. Additionally, an earlier concern regarding the finality of the underlying judgment was raised by the court but later resolved by the parties.
