Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; November 11, 2010; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
Antwan Lavan Fowler entered a conditional guilty plea under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.3 and appealed the circuit court's denial of his motions to suppress evidence and statements. The Arkansas Court of Appeals reviewed the case, initially filed as Fowler v. State, and the Arkansas Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for review, treating the appeal as if originally filed in that court. The circuit court's decision on the suppression motions was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Fowler was arrested on October 22, 2007, for fleeing, initially charged with misdemeanors but detained due to his parole status. During interrogation, he admitted to having illegal items in his home, leading to a search that uncovered a gun, illegal drugs, a stolen credit card, and scales. He faced multiple charges, including possession of a controlled substance and obstruction of justice.
The appeal centered on the legitimacy of the police stops. Officers observed Fowler walking in a backyard near Conway High School, raising suspicions. After calling him over, Fowler fled, prompting a foot chase. He was eventually apprehended, at which point his name was obtained post-arrest, revealing his parole status. The uncertainty of identifying Fowler before his arrest became a key factor in the appeal regarding the validity of the police actions.
Fowler contends that the initial police stop was illegal due to a lack of reasonable suspicion. He argues that his reaction—running away—was a natural response for a young, slight African-American approached by two large white officers, and that the police lacked specific facts to justify a second stop leading to his arrest. Police encounters are categorized into three types: (1) a consensual approach where an officer asks questions without constituting a seizure, (2) a brief detention based on articulable suspicion, and (3) a full-scale arrest requiring probable cause. The initial stop of Fowler was deemed consensual, as police merely asked him to come over and answer questions, which he was free to ignore. His response, which was unintelligible, coupled with his decision to run, raised the question of whether these factors constituted reasonable suspicion justifying the pursuit and second stop. The State argues that Fowler's flight alone justified their actions, while Fowler maintains that without initial reasonable suspicion, the police had no authority to pursue him. The text also references legal precedents regarding reasonable suspicion and the implications of unprovoked flight in such determinations.
In Wardlow, the Supreme Court established that a defendant's nervous and evasive behavior, particularly fleeing from police in an area known for narcotics trafficking while holding an opaque bag, contributes to reasonable suspicion. The Court emphasized that "headlong flight" is indicative of evasion, which, while not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, suggests suspicious behavior. The determination of reasonable suspicion should rely on commonsense judgments about human behavior.
Applying this precedent to the current case, Fowler’s presence in a residential backyard near a school, coupled with his evasive response to police questioning and subsequent flight, provided reasonable suspicion for the officers to pursue him. However, the officers failed to conduct the brief investigation permitted under Wardlow after stopping Fowler. Instead, they arrested him for fleeing without determining if he lived in the area or charging him with trespassing. Fowler's name was only discovered post-arrest, when the officers were informed of his parole status at the police station.
The officers, specifically Schiehtl, did not undertake the required investigation after stopping Fowler, which led to an illegal seizure since they arrested him rather than performing the necessary inquiry that could have confirmed or dispelled their suspicions. Thus, while the initial pursuit was justified, the subsequent arrest was not supported by a proper investigation as mandated by prior case law.
Fowler's appeal includes additional points; however, due to the reversal regarding the second stop and the subsequent arrest, the court will not address the remaining issues. The circuit court's decision is reversed, and the evidence and statements in question are ordered to be suppressed. Judge Brown dissents. According to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.1, a law enforcement officer may stop and detain an individual if present lawfully and has reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in a felony or a misdemeanor that poses a danger of injury or property damage. This detention is permissible for up to fifteen minutes or a reasonable duration based on circumstances, after which the individual must be released without further restraint or formally arrested.
