Court: Supreme Court of Missouri; January 16, 2012; Missouri; State Supreme Court
Tyler McNeely, the Defendant, refused to consent to breath or blood tests after being arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI). The arresting officer ordered a blood draw without obtaining a warrant, which the trial court later suppressed, ruling it violated McNeely's Fourth Amendment rights. The Court is examining under what "special facts" a nonconsensual and warrantless blood draw can be considered a reasonable search and seizure. It acknowledges the competing interests of societal safety from drunken driving and individual Fourth Amendment protections.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber v. California established a narrow exception to the warrant requirement for blood draws in emergency situations where evidence might be destroyed if a warrant was delayed. In Schmerber, the urgency was justified by the circumstances of an accident and the diminishing alcohol levels in the blood. However, in McNeely's case, no such emergency existed; there was no accident to investigate or medical treatment needed for others, and no evidence suggested the officer couldn't have obtained a warrant. The only relevant fact present—the dissipation of blood-alcohol levels—does not automatically constitute an exigency warranting a warrantless blood draw. The trial court's judgment is therefore affirmed.
The facts reveal that a Missouri patrolman stopped McNeely's truck for speeding and observed signs of intoxication. After conducting field sobriety tests, McNeely was arrested for DWI. Upon refusing a breath test, the officer, influenced by an article suggesting recent changes in Missouri law regarding implied consent, opted to proceed without a warrant, despite his prior experience in obtaining warrants for blood tests.
A patrolman transported the Defendant to a hospital for a blood test to gather evidence of intoxication, but the Defendant refused to consent to the blood draw. Despite this refusal, the patrolman instructed a phlebotomist to proceed with the blood draw at 2:33 a.m. The resulting blood test indicated a blood-alcohol content exceeding the legal limit. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the blood test results, claiming a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, which the trial court granted. The State has since filed an interlocutory appeal.
The standard of review for a motion to suppress is that a trial court's ruling will be reversed only if clearly erroneous, with deference given to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility assessments. The Court will review the legal question of whether conduct violates the Fourth Amendment de novo.
The central issue is whether the natural dissipation of blood-alcohol evidence constitutes sufficient exigency to bypass the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, generally requiring warrants unless specific exceptions, such as exigent circumstances, apply. Exigent circumstances may justify immediate action if obtaining a warrant could risk life, allow a suspect to escape, or destroy evidence.
The balance of interests involves the individual's right to privacy against society's interest in crime prevention. The precedent set in Schmerber v. California emphasizes the necessity of warrants for bodily intrusions, highlighting the importance of a neutral magistrate's oversight in determining the need for such searches rather than leaving it to law enforcement’s discretion. Schmerber involved a case where a blood sample was taken without consent or a warrant after a car accident, which serves as a critical reference point for this Court's analysis.
Analysis of the blood sample indicated the defendant's intoxication. The defendant objected to the admission of the blood sample evidence, arguing that the warrantless blood draw violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court acknowledged that a blood draw constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment and typically requires a warrant unless consent is given. However, in the case of Schmerber, the Court established a limited exception to this requirement due to "special facts" that suggested an emergency situation where evidence might be destroyed if a warrant were obtained. These special facts included the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream and the time delays associated with the accident investigation and the defendant's transport to the hospital. Consequently, the Court deemed the warrantless blood draw valid as it was incident to the defendant's arrest.
Although Schmerber framed the exception as a search incident to arrest, it is now often interpreted as an application of the exigent circumstances doctrine. The State argues that Schmerber permits officers to perform warrantless blood draws based solely on probable cause of intoxication, asserting that the natural dissipation of alcohol creates an exigency. However, Schmerber requires additional "special facts" beyond mere dissipation to justify a warrantless blood draw. Jurisdictional precedent supports this interpretation, as seen in State v. Rodriguez, where the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the mere dissipation of blood-alcohol does not constitute a per se exigency. In Rodriguez, evidence from a warrantless blood draw was contested, highlighting that critical circumstances must exist beyond the natural metabolization of alcohol for such actions to be justified.
Rodriguez analyzed the Schmerber case, concluding that the natural dissipation of blood alcohol does not alone create exigent circumstances for a warrantless blood draw. The Utah court emphasized that the exigency is based on the totality of circumstances, including the severity of the accident and evidence of the defendant's impairment, which outweighs the defendant’s privacy interests. The Supreme Court of Utah upheld the justification for a warrantless blood draw in light of these factors. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Iowa, in State v. Johnson, acknowledged that while Schmerber does not create a per se exigency from alcohol dissipation, time-sensitive factors such as the need for investigation and evidence preservation can justify a warrantless blood draw. Johnson's blood draw, conducted two and a half hours post-accident, was deemed permissible as the officer could reasonably conclude an emergency existed that threatened evidence loss if a warrant was sought. The Ninth Circuit also clarified that an arrest is not a prerequisite for a warrantless blood draw; however, officers must still demonstrate probable cause and the existence of an emergency requiring immediate action to prevent evidence destruction, alongside ensuring that the procedures used comply with medical standards.
Chapel's interpretation of *Schmerber* aligns with the Court's ruling, emphasizing that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless blood draw from a DWI defendant who had sustained severe injuries in a motorcycle accident. The situation involved the natural dissipation of blood alcohol, the urgency of the accident investigation, and delays in hospital transport, which collectively constituted exigent circumstances. The Court notes that Missouri law does not support a blanket rule that the dissipation of blood alcohol alone is sufficient for nonconsensual blood draws in all DWI cases.
The State's reliance on *State v. LeRette* is critiqued; while it involved a serious injury accident with evidence of alcohol present, the factual context differed significantly from typical DWI stops. In *LeRette*, the officer had time to investigate the accident scene before the defendant was transported to the hospital, allowing for a delay that could destroy evidence. Thus, the case exemplified the special circumstances consistent with *Schmerber* rather than a generalizable rule.
The Court also contrasts its position with jurisdictions like Wisconsin, Oregon, and Minnesota, which have adopted a per se approach that the rapid dissipation of alcohol alone constitutes exigent circumstances for warrantless blood draws. In *State v. Bohling*, the Wisconsin Supreme Court articulated two interpretations of *Schmerber*: one supporting the rapid dissipation as sufficient by itself and another requiring additional factors such as an accident and time delay.
The Wisconsin court interpreted the Schmerber case to indicate that exigency arises solely from the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream. In Bohling, it was established that a warrantless blood draw is permissible when an individual is lawfully arrested for a DUI-related offense and there is a clear indication that the evidence will show intoxication. Similarly, the Oregon Supreme Court recognized the natural dissipation of blood alcohol as an exigent circumstance justifying warrantless blood draws, relying on prior rulings. The Minnesota Supreme Court also ruled that the natural decline of blood alcohol constitutes a sufficient exigent circumstance for warrantless, non-consensual blood draws. However, the current court disagrees with these broader interpretations, emphasizing that Schmerber does not support a blanket exigency based on blood alcohol dissipation alone. The Supreme Court in Schmerber cautioned against such expansive views, highlighting that warrantless intrusions should be considered under strict conditions and require additional exigent circumstances beyond mere alcohol dissipation. Specifically, Schmerber noted that unique facts related to the investigation and transport justified the warrantless blood draw in that case. Consequently, the court concludes that warrantless blood draws must be justified by a totality of circumstances analysis, requiring more than just blood alcohol dissipation. Officers must demonstrate a reasonable belief that a delay in obtaining a warrant would result in the loss of evidence, and the existence of exigency must be assessed based on specific case facts. In typical DUI cases lacking "special facts," a warrant is mandatory before obtaining blood evidence.
The excerpt emphasizes the necessity of obtaining a warrant for blood draws to ensure impartiality and protect Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches. It states that such warrants should be issued by a neutral judge rather than law enforcement officers, who may have a vested interest in crime detection. In the case at hand, the defendant, involved in a routine DWI incident, did not present any exigent circumstances that would justify a warrantless blood draw. The arresting officer failed to identify any special facts necessitating immediate action, as there were no accidents or injuries involved. The blood draw occurred 25 minutes after the stop, with no pressing time constraints akin to those discussed in previous cases like Schmerber. As a result, the court affirmed the trial court's decision to suppress the nonconsensual blood draw evidence, ruling that it violated the defendant’s constitutional rights. However, the state can still pursue the DWI charge using evidence that complies with constitutional standards. The excerpt also discusses changes in Missouri law regarding blood draws and critiques a prosecutor’s assertion that recent amendments permit warrantless actions based on a misinterpretation of legal precedents. Finally, it notes that the Iowa statute allows for non-consensual blood draws under specific circumstances involving emergencies and reasonable belief of intoxication evidence.
The State relies on State v. Ikerman and State v. Setter to argue that warrantless blood draws in DWI cases are permissible, citing these cases as applying the Schmerber decision regarding searches incident to arrest. However, the State concedes that Schmerber has been interpreted more broadly as reflecting the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Consequently, Ikerman and Setter's interpretations that allow nonconsensual warrantless blood draws without exigent circumstances are no longer applicable. Additionally, the precedent set in LeRette, which suggested that the diminishing presence of alcohol in the bloodstream could justify warrantless draws, is also rejected. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has further expanded its rulings in Bohling, permitting nonconsensual, warrantless blood draws even when a defendant has consented to a breath test. An example from Johnson illustrates that significant time can elapse (over two and a half hours) between the incident and the draw, which raises Fourth Amendment concerns regarding unreasonable searches. Consequently, the warrantless blood draw in this case violated the Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, negating the need to consider the State's arguments related to Missouri's implied consent law.
