Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; December 14, 2011; Texas; State Appellate Court
The case revolves around a dispute regarding the Bartolo Escobeda Survey's location and the ownership of minerals produced by Comstock Oil & Gas, LP. The plaintiffs, led by Margaret Brush Conley, claim ownership of minerals severed from the surface estate of the Escobeda Survey in the early 1900s and allege that Comstock illegally produced hydrocarbons from wells drilled on these minerals. The defendants include landowners and the Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas, the latter asserting sovereign immunity against Conley's claims. The trial court initially denied the Tribe's plea for jurisdiction but ultimately ruled in favor of Comstock and the landowners, granting summary judgment that Conley take nothing.
On appeal, the Tribe contends that the trial court erred in denying its plea, arguing that tribal sovereign immunity necessitates dismissal of Conley’s claims against it unless Congress has authorized the suit or the Tribe has waived its immunity. Federal law supports the notion that tribal immunity applies to both governmental and commercial activities. Conley cites two Fifth Circuit cases asserting that tribal immunity does not preclude federal court suits for declaratory or injunctive relief, highlighting that in these cases, the courts upheld jurisdiction over disputes involving tribal interests without requiring exhaustion of remedies in tribal courts.
The Fifth Circuit determined that the declaratory judgment statute does not provide an independent basis for jurisdiction, referencing TTEA and Comstock, which confirm that tribal immunity applies solely to damage awards. Conley argues that the Tribe lacks immunity for a declaratory judgment action concerning the boundaries relating to the Escobeda and Conley’s superior title to minerals. The statute allows such actions to establish boundary lines, but Conley is not pursuing claims against owners asserting title from the Colville and Hampton Surveys, as that issue was previously resolved in Kilgore v. Black Stone Oil Co. Instead, Conley’s claims pertain to rights of possession to real property and acknowledge the action as a trespass to try title, which requires legislative consent when involving the State.
The jurisdictional analysis hinges on whether the essence of Conley's claims falls within a waiver of immunity from suit. The court clarifies that disputes over rival claims to property do not constitute a boundary dispute. Even if a declaratory judgment were deemed a federal question, no federal or tribal waiver of immunity has been identified. The Tribe’s assertion of immunity is upheld.
Conley also contests the trial court's denial of his motion for partial summary judgment, claiming previous judicial determinations of the Escobeda boundaries. He cites prior cases where the jury found no conflict between the Colville and Escobeda leagues, noting surveyor errors and conflicts in survey designations that were acknowledged in earlier rulings.
The Escobeda's location is in dispute, particularly regarding its relation to Big Sandy Creek and other surveys. Key points include the identification of witness trees shared between the Escobeda and Hampton corners, with an agreement to disregard the initial call in the survey. In the case of Collins, title holders of the Escobeda accepted the north corner of the Hampton as the starting point, leading to conflicting interpretations of how the calls should be followed, which could conflict with the Colville survey. A subsequent 1860 re-survey only confirmed the north corner of the Hampton and identified one marked line as the only surveyed line of the Escobeda. Disputes arose over whether Bear Creek was confused with Big Sandy Creek, and differing opinions existed on how to interpret course calls to align with ground features.
The court determined that there was no conflict between the Colville and Escobeda based on jury findings in Collins, which established the boundaries for multiple surveys and set a precedent through stare decisis, limiting further claims from the same parties. In Kilgore, mineral interest owners attempted to raise the same conflict, but the court upheld that previous determinations precluded new assertions of conflict. Conley now claims a different conflict based on new evidence. Each party references the prior litigation to support their claims, with Conley arguing that Collins established the Escobeda's boundaries and Comstock asserting that Conley's current claims are barred by res judicata. The case references Swilley v. McCain regarding the controlling nature of previously determined boundary lines in subsequent litigations, which the court applied in Kilgore.
The Kilgore case established that the Collins parties had operated within certain boundaries for over eighty-three years. Key differences arise when comparing Swilley to Kilgore. Swilley involved real property linked to a common predecessor in title, Zavalla. A notable transaction occurred in 1854 when Zavalla's mother, Emily Hand, conveyed part of the property to George Young. In 1865, Young's heirs partitioned this property, with one heir, George Grozier, obtaining an undivided interest. In 1903, Zavalla transferred the original tract to H. Masterson, who later sued Young's heirs, including Grozier, for title to the property. Masterson settled with Grozier for one of two lots, while the jury found that Zavalla had conveyed 2,000 acres to Hand. This finding was upheld by the Court of Civil Appeals.
Masterson subsequently conveyed his interest to Swilley, who, in 1946, sued a trespasser, Wagers, for part of the partitioned property. Swilley’s title abstract included the jury's finding about the 2000-acre deed from Zavalla to Hand. The Wagers court ruled that while Masterson’s case did not create res judicata for Wagers, the principle of stare decisis barred re-examination of established title under identical facts. Thus, Swilley was entitled to possession against Wagers.
In a related suit, Grozier’s representative, McCain, attempted to claim Grozier’s interest from Swilley, but the jury did not find in favor of Swilley’s adverse possession claims. The trial court still ruled for Swilley, as the plaintiffs could not prove their title. The appellate court recognized the earlier judgments as muniments of title, preventing Swilley from changing his position regarding the deed from Zavalla to Hand.
The Supreme Court acknowledged a conflict in appellate court rulings on stare decisis concerning boundary lines but deferred resolution since Swilley involved a jury's finding on a lost deed. It clarified that stare decisis applies to legal questions and does not require identical parties, and that factual determinations are not conclusively decided when the same issue arises in unrelated cases. Consequently, as the question of the Emily Hand title was not conclusively established or presented to a jury, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment while affirming the trial court’s decision.
The jury charge from Collins, referenced in the summary judgment record, reflects that the appellate court affirmed the jury's finding regarding the lack of conflict between the Escobeda and Colville leagues of land. The cases of Kilgore and Collins address the same issue, with Collins establishing that the Colville and Escobeda do not conflict, leading to accrued rights based on that decision's finality. However, a determination in Collins does not equate to a finding of conflict between the Escobeda and the fifteen surveys at issue. Although evidence considered in Collins indicated the Escobeda's location as claimed by Conley, no definitive judgment regarding its location was made. This situation parallels Swilley, where the lack of a jury finding on title superiority rendered Collins merely evidentiary, not conclusive.
The court concluded that the doctrine of stare decisis does not legally establish the Escobeda's location, supporting the trial court's denial of Conley's motion for partial summary judgment. Comstock's motion for summary judgment invoked res judicata, necessitating proof of three elements: a prior final judgment, identity of parties, and a second action based on the same claims. Comstock argued that the claims were fully adjudicated in Kilgore and asserted privity with the plaintiffs in that case. Notably, Black Stone Oil Company, which defended a trespass to try title claim in Kilgore, merged into Comstock Oil & Gas, Inc. Conley contested that only Comstock could claim summary judgment based on res judicata, as evidence did not demonstrate that other defendants were involved in Kilgore. The parties also debated whether claims in the current suit could have been raised in the first action, with Conley providing Kilgore's pleadings, which outlined conflicts between the Escobeda and other surveys and asserted superior title to minerals in the conflict area.
The suit primarily aims to address the conflict between the Escobeda and the Colville, Thompson, and Wylie Surveys, rather than to locate the Escobeda itself. The case involves ownership disputes over minerals beneath specific tracts of land adjacent to those in question, referencing Kilgore, which clarifies that Comstock did not demonstrate that the current action is based on claims from a prior case, thus invalidating its res judicata defense for summary judgment.
Comstock also sought summary judgment under the doctrine of presumed lost deed, arguing that Conley and predecessors' long possession of the land and minerals established superior title. The disputed location of the Escobeda is acknowledged but presumed to exist within the conflict with fifteen surveys related to Comstock's mineral interests. The doctrine is supported by the Texas Supreme Court's ruling in Magee v. Paul, which allows the inference of title loss when there is a prolonged adverse claim and nonclaim by the apparent owner.
Conley contends that the doctrine cannot be used for an adverse claim under a different title chain and differentiates it from adverse possession statutes. The doctrine of presumed lost deed is characterized as a common law form of adverse possession aimed at recognizing longstanding claims where complete record title is absent, as indicated in cases like Haby v. Howard and Purnell v. Gulihur. The presumption of lost grant or conveyance can be legally established when evidence is undisputed, as shown in Howland v. Hough, where an uninterrupted chain of title was proven except for an ancient gap.
The Supreme Court determined that the presumption of a lost grant or conveyance can be established as a matter of law due to the ancient nature of the deeds and undisputed evidence. The Escobeda Survey, filed in 1835, forms part of the Landowners’ titles, with related surveys filed between 1847 and 1908. Historical documents indicate a long-standing controversy regarding the Escobeda's location, first noted in 1860, yet no claims to the disputed land have been made by those in the Escobeda chain of title. In 1916 and 2000, title holders claimed the Escobeda was located north and west of the current property. Conley cannot challenge the awareness of other surveys referenced in prior cases, which supported the claims of the Escobeda mineral estate title holders concerning neighboring lands. Despite the lack of binding precedent from previous cases, they demonstrate a consistent disavowal of claims to the land in question since 2007, suggesting acquiescence to the rights of those claiming title under older surveys. The court upheld the summary judgment in favor of Comstock and the Landowners based on presumed grant, as the undisputed facts indicate no efforts were made to assert ownership over the disputed land. Regarding adverse possession, Comstock's summary judgment motion included claims under various statutes of limitations. A successful adverse possession claim requires proof of actual and visible appropriation of property under a claim of right that is hostile to others' claims. The first two adverse possession claims specifically pertain to the Hamman Unit, where Comstock operates three producing wells.
To establish adverse possession under the three-year statute, parties must prove they possessed the disputed property under "title or color of title" for a minimum of three years. Conley argues that holders of titles from a junior survey cannot demonstrate "title or color of title" because their titles are void against holders of the senior survey. He cites a case distinguishing patents issued before and after the 1876 Constitution. For surveys filed before the Constitution and land certificates filed within five years of its ratification, the statute protects possession if acquired adversely for over three years, even when the state grants the same land to multiple parties. Conflicting grants imply both titles are valid against the government but ranked by age, with the junior grantee securing their claim if they hold adverse possession for the statutory period. Although it may seem unjust for the state to issue double grants, these occur due to a lack of accurate land information. The 1876 Constitution originally allowed a five-year period for the survey and return of land certificates and mandated that such certificates only be located on vacant land, prohibiting patents on land already titled or owned. Junior patents issued after the Constitution are generally void for supporting the three-year statute, unless they are deemed color of title. Among the three surveys in the Hamman Unit, two were patented before 1876 and one in 1878, but it remains unclear if the relevant land certificate was issued before the Constitution's ratification. Consequently, the moving party has not shown that Comstock held the entire Hamman Unit under color of title for the requisite three years prior to the lawsuit.
To establish adverse possession under Texas law's five-year statute, a party must demonstrate: (1) cultivation, use, or enjoyment of the property; (2) payment of applicable taxes; and (3) a claim to the property under a duly registered deed (Tex.Civ. Prac. Rem.Code Ann. § 16.025). For severed mineral estates, both drilling and production are required. Comstock's drilling of the Hamman No. 1 well began on April 17, 2002, with a gas well pressure test on October 26, 2002. A lawsuit was filed on October 25, 2007, just under five years post-test, but summary judgment did not confirm that production began more than five years prior, leading to a failure in establishing adverse possession of the minerals.
Under the ten-year statute of limitations, the moving party must show no material fact issues exist regarding peaceable and adverse possession (Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem.Code Ann. § 16.026(a)). Peaceable possession extends to the boundaries specified in a registered deed (Id. § 16.026(c)). Conley contended that Comstock's evidence of sixteen drilled wells did not sufficiently demonstrate mineral use under this statute. However, records from the Texas Railroad Commission indicated that Comstock or its predecessor operated producing wells continuously for ten years before the lawsuit. Though Conley acknowledged a total of twenty-two wells, he argued that gaps in production raised a factual dispute about continuous possession. Nonetheless, a temporary cessation of production does not disrupt continuity if it is reasonable and demonstrates no intent to abandon the claim (Hufstedler v. Sides; Halsey v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co.).
Comstock operated under valid leases without termination, evidencing continuous dominion over the mineral estate necessary for peaceable possession (Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem.Code Ann. § 16.021(3)). Conley further argued that mineral production did not cover the entire disputed area, but adverse possessors under a registered deed are deemed to have constructive possession of all lands within their deed's boundaries not under another's actual possession (Sun Operating Ltd. P’ship v. Oatman). Conley referenced a case regarding an oil company’s adverse possession after lease expiration, which concluded that such possession did not extend beyond the lease's described land. Here, the interests of the Landowners and Comstock were deemed identical rather than adverse.
Recorded leases and Railroad Commission filings establish notice of the claim to minerals and possession through drilling and production. Comstock's adverse possession claim is confined to leased property, while the Landowners assert mineral rights based on a chain of title from fifteen surveys that allegedly conflict with the Escobeda. The identities of record title holders under these surveys are not contentious, as Conley confirmed that all interested parties were joined in the petition. Except for possibly the Rowe, Drew Survey, adverse possession began before mineral severance from the surface estate, benefitting the mineral owners. The motion for summary judgment was based solely on mineral production and must adhere to issues explicitly stated in the motion. Summary judgment was deemed appropriate under the doctrine of presumed grant, showing no reversible error. Conley's issues were overruled, the trial court's denial of the Alabama-Coushatta Tribes of Texas' plea to the jurisdiction was reversed, and judgment was rendered to dismiss the case against them. The trial court's summary judgment, resulting in no recovery for the plaintiffs, was affirmed in part, while the judgment regarding the Alabama-Coushatta Tribes was reversed and rendered. The Hamman Unit, as described, encompasses several tracts within specified surveys. The trial court's judgment details numerous plaintiffs and defendants, but their names are omitted for brevity.
