St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Ellisville

Citations: 122 S.W.3d 635; 2003 Mo. App. LEXIS 1704; 2003 WL 22433340Docket: No. ED 82142

Court: Missouri Court of Appeals; October 27, 2003; Missouri; State Appellate Court

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The City of Ellisville, including City Engineer Terrance B. Keran and the Board of Adjustment, appeals a Circuit Court ruling that permanently enjoined them from interfering with St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church's erection of a monument sign. The City argues the trial court's judgment was improper and that the Church had an adequate legal remedy via a writ of certiorari under section 89.110 RSMo 2000. The appellate court agrees, reversing the circuit court's judgment and remanding the case for the trial court to exercise its jurisdiction under the specified statute.

The Church applied for a sign permit on February 20, 2000, which was denied by the City Engineer for several reasons: the sign's height exceeded 10 feet, the sign area exceeded code limits, it included an excessive changeable letter area with prohibited moving characters, and the application inaccurately indicated the sign's location relative to the Manchester Road right-of-way. Following the denial, the Church appealed to the Board of Adjustment, claiming improper application of the sign code and alleging the regulations infringed on its religious freedoms.

Before the Board could act, the Church withdrew its initial appeal and submitted a revised application that corrected the sign's location. However, the City Engineer denied this second application for similar reasons as the first, acknowledging the corrected location. The Planning and Zoning Commission reviewed the Church's situation and forwarded a negative recommendation to the Board. 

Subsequently, the Church filed a petition in the Circuit Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on three counts: challenging the legality of the City’s sign regulations, asserting violations of section 89.020 regarding land use restrictions, and seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for interference with religious practices. While the Church's court case was pending, the Board upheld the City Engineer’s denial of the sign permit by a 3 to 1 vote, indicating that the Church did not demonstrate the unique characteristics of its property that would warrant a variance or show unnecessary hardship if the variance was denied.

Following the Board’s denial, Church amended its petition in the trial court, adding count IV for a writ of certiorari and judicial review regarding the Board’s denial of a variance request under section 89.110. Church's equitable claims for declaratory and injunctive relief remained unchanged, with added assertions that the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) prohibited the City from enforcing its sign code against it. The trial court held a hearing on the amended petition and ruled in favor of Church, determining that Ellisville’s sign regulations constituted land use regulations under Chapter 89 RSMo. The court concluded that the City lacked authority under section 89.020 to enforce its sign regulations against Church, thus acting improperly in denying the sign permit request.

The trial court noted that section 89.020 has historically been interpreted as not granting municipalities power over property used for religious purposes due to Free Exercise guarantees. Citing relevant case law, the court indicated the City's regulatory authority was limited to safety regulations, which were not demonstrated in this instance. Since the denial of the variance was found not to be based on safety concerns, the trial court deemed it arbitrary and capricious, permitting Church to erect its sign without a City permit and permanently enjoining the City from obstructing the sign's construction.

The City appealed, asserting that the trial court improperly ruled on Church’s request for injunctive relief instead of following the statutory review procedures under section 89.110. The City contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested relief while count IV was still pending. However, it acknowledged that statutory review under section 89.110 is not exclusive when challenging the validity of an ordinance, arguing that Church's failure to plead count IV as an alternative undermined its position.

Church was not required to plead count IV in the alternative, as the holding in Normandy does not limit its application to cases where injunctive relief and statutory review are requested alternatively. Church’s amended petition included three counts of declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the application of Ellisville’s code, alongside a review request under section 89.110. The trial court's jurisdiction was not confined to a review under section 89.110; therefore, the City’s first point on appeal is denied.

Regarding the City’s second point, which claims the trial court erred by exercising both general plenary and limited statutory jurisdiction, the court could exercise general plenary jurisdiction over counts I, II, and III only if it abstained from its statutory jurisdiction under section 89.110. If the trial court did not exercise its limited jurisdiction under section 89.110, no conflict arises with its general plenary jurisdiction in considering a declaratory judgment.

The trial court did not try to exercise both jurisdictions, as indicated by its judgment favoring Church, which reflects an exercise of only general plenary jurisdiction over Church’s requests. The court granted Church’s injunctive relief request but did not present evidence suggesting it exercised jurisdiction under section 89.110, nor did it issue a writ of certiorari to the Board as required for statutory review. Consequently, the trial court's statement about dismissing all other relief sought was understood as dismissing Church’s count IV claim under section 89.110. The trial court chose to exercise only its general plenary jurisdiction over Church’s requests without engaging its statutory jurisdiction. As a result, the City’s second point is denied, and the next consideration is whether the relief granted to Church was appropriate under the trial court’s jurisdiction over the claims.

The trial court has broad discretion in shaping injunctive relief, which is upheld unless unsupported by substantial evidence or incorrect in legal application. In the case against Ellisville, the court found that the city's denial of the Church’s monument sign permit exceeded its regulatory authority, referencing Missouri Supreme Court interpretations since 1959 that limit municipal power over properties used by religious organizations due to Free Exercise rights. 

The trial court's conclusions were contested, necessitating a review of relevant case law. In *Congregation Temple Israel*, the appellate court ruled that municipal zoning powers do not extend to regulating religious property locations, emphasizing that zoning ordinances should not aim to exclude churches. Similarly, *Village Lutheran I* asserted that cities could not deny special use permits for church construction without specific safety concerns. However, later rulings clarified that municipalities can impose regulations on churches if they serve health, safety, morals, or general welfare purposes.

In *Lakeshore Assembly of God Church v. Village Board of Westfield*, the court upheld municipal regulations that limited the size of a church sign, reasoning that such restrictions were not arbitrary and were justified by community welfare considerations, including aesthetics and safety. Overall, the legal framework indicates that while municipalities have regulatory authority, it is constrained by constitutional protections of religious practices.

Municipal control over church activities does not inherently violate the free exercise of religion; the impact of such regulation must be evaluated based on each case's specific facts. In this case, the Church is subject to the City's sign ordinance, and the trial court erred in permanently enjoining Ellisville from interfering with the Church's sign construction. As the requested injunctive relief was inappropriate, the Church should have pursued statutory review under section 89.110. The City's third point on appeal, which presupposes the circuit court's jurisdiction, is rendered moot due to the determination that the court's judgment was improper. Consequently, the circuit court's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for jurisdictional exercise under section 89.110 in accordance with this opinion. 

The City Engineer did not review the Church's application under the specific code regulating religious signs, stating that the proposed monument sign exceeded permissible size limits even under more lenient commercial zoning regulations. Although the Church claimed it did not request a variance, the Board treated the application as such, and the Church proceeded accordingly, presenting evidence for a variance. Section 89.110 allows aggrieved individuals to petition the circuit court to review board decisions, granting the court authority to reverse or affirm such decisions. Additionally, section 89.020 empowers city legislative bodies to regulate land use and structures for public welfare. A relevant case involved a school district seeking declaratory relief against a city ordinance, which was resolved with a summary judgment favoring the school district.

The city argued on appeal that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to address the school district’s request for declaratory judgment, claiming that statutory review under section 89.110 was the appropriate method for review. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s summary judgment favoring the school district. The city contended that the precedent set in Normandy indicated that the school district's request for review under section 89.110 was made in the alternative to its declaratory relief requests, suggesting that this precedent should not apply to Church's case since Church did not plead count IV in the alternative. However, the court found no requirement for Church to plead count IV in the alternative and noted that Normandy's ruling is not limited to cases with alternative pleadings. 

The court referenced Deffenbaugh Industries Inc. v. Potts, which established that a circuit court cannot exercise both special statutory jurisdiction and general plenary jurisdiction simultaneously in the same case. It clarified that section 89.110 review necessitates a return from the board to enable the circuit court to assess if the board's decision was backed by substantial evidence. The city further argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue judgment because it did not issue a writ of certiorari under section 89.110; however, since the trial court did not rule on the merits of count IV but instead dismissed it, this part of the city's appeal was denied.

The court also cited Village Lutheran I, referring to the ruling in Congregation Temple Israel, which stated that municipalities do not have authority over the use of properties for religious purposes protected by constitutional rights. It indicated that a requirement for a church to obtain a special use permit does not violate the free exercise of religion. Church's motion to dismiss the appeal was denied.