You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.

Creek v. Reese

Citations: 106 S.W.3d 615; 2003 Mo. App. LEXIS 883; 2003 WL 21383287Docket: No. WD 61295

Court: Missouri Court of Appeals; June 17, 2003; Missouri; State Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

The court affirmed the circuit court’s decision granting injunctive and declaratory relief to the City of Sugar Creek in the appeal by Donald and Barbara Edwards and Edward Reese, Jr. The appellants raised three main arguments: 1. The trial court allegedly erred in determining that the special use permit issued to Couts in 1977 did not run with the land, arguing that the permit lacked limitations or restrictions on transferability. 2. They contended that the trial court mistakenly found the permit did not run with the land due to violations of certain conditions and requirements, asserting that the permit itself did not contain such conditions or requirements. 3. The appellants claimed the court erred in favoring the City, arguing the City was barred from pursuing the action based on the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and/or laches. The court concluded that the trial court’s findings were correct and affirmed the decision.

Legal Issues Addressed

Application of Waiver, Estoppel, and Laches

Application: The court upheld the trial court's decision in favor of the City, finding that the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and laches did not preclude the City from pursuing the action.

Reasoning: The appellants claimed the court erred in favoring the City, arguing the City was barred from pursuing the action based on the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and/or laches.

Conditions and Requirements of Permits

Application: The court found that the permit did not run with the land due to violations of certain conditions and requirements, rejecting the appellants' claim that no such conditions or requirements were specified in the permit.

Reasoning: They contended that the trial court mistakenly found the permit did not run with the land due to violations of certain conditions and requirements, asserting that the permit itself did not contain such conditions or requirements.

Special Use Permit Transferability

Application: The court determined that the special use permit issued to Couts in 1977 did not automatically transfer with the land, despite appellants' argument that it lacked any limitations or restrictions on transferability.

Reasoning: The trial court allegedly erred in determining that the special use permit issued to Couts in 1977 did not run with the land, arguing that the permit lacked limitations or restrictions on transferability.