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Abrams v. Jones
Citations: 983 S.W.2d 377; 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 191; 1999 WL 12837Docket: No. 14-96-01525-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; January 13, 1999; Texas; State Appellate Court
A licensed clinical psychologist is required to disclose a minor patient's confidential mental health records to the child's parent upon proper request, as determined in this case. The background involves the divorce of Donald Jones and Rosemary Ja-worski Droxler, who were joint managing conservators of their daughters, Karissa and Katryna. A custody agreement allowed both parents equal access to their children's medical and psychological records. In December 1995, Droxler sought counseling for Karissa, who initially resisted due to confidentiality concerns but agreed after assurances from Dr. Laurence Abrams. In February 1996, Jones learned of Karissa's therapy and requested her psychological records, which Abrams denied, citing the need to protect her emotional well-being. Following unsuccessful attempts to obtain the records, Jones filed suit, leading to a trial court ruling in his favor. On appeal, Abrams raised nine points of error, primarily claiming that he was not legally obligated to disclose the records due to his assessment of potential harm to Karissa. He argued that under Texas law, specifically Chapter 611 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, communications between a patient and psychologist are confidential unless certain exceptions apply. The court, however, upheld the trial court's decision, affirming that disclosure to the parent was warranted. Section 611.004 of the Code allows a professional to disclose a patient’s records only to certain individuals. Notably, subsection (a)(4) permits the disclosure of a minor patient's mental health records to the patient's parent. Section 611.0045 details the rights of individuals to access a patient’s confidential mental health records, stipulating that, in general, patients are entitled to access their records unless disclosure is deemed harmful to their well-being. Specifically, subsection (f) mandates that a professional must provide a minor patient's mental health records to the parent acting on the patient’s behalf. In the case at hand, Abrams contends he can deny Jones’ request for Karissa’s confidential records based on his assessment that disclosure would harm her mental and emotional health. However, the language of section 611.0045 is clear and unambiguous, indicating that professionals do not possess an unrestricted right to refuse disclosure to a minor’s parent. The Legislature’s intent is derived from the plain language of the statute, which must be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning. The mandatory nature of subsection (f) reinforces the obligation to disclose records to a parent upon proper request, countering Abrams’ position. Abrams’ first point of error regarding the right to refuse disclosure is overruled. For his second and third points of error, which assert that the evidence supporting the trial court’s judgment is insufficient, it is noted that in a bench trial without filed findings of fact or conclusions of law, the judgment implies necessary factual findings. However, these implied findings can be challenged on legal and factual sufficiency grounds when a complete reporter’s record is included in the appellate record. The standard of review for points raised in this case is equivalent to that applied in jury or trial court fact-finding reviews. When assessing 'no evidence' claims, all evidence is viewed favorably towards the prevailing party, and if any probative evidence exists, the claim fails. For factual sufficiency, the entire record is examined, weighing all evidence both for and against the challenged findings. The trial court's findings are upheld unless clearly unjust or unsupported by evidence. The undisputed evidence establishes that Karissa is a minor child, Jones is her father, Abrams is a professional with access to Karissa’s confidential mental health records, and Jones requested these records, which Abrams denied. Abrams contends that releasing the records would harm Karissa’s well-being. However, Texas law mandates that a professional must release a minor's mental health records to a parent upon proper request, indicating legislative intent to prioritize parental rights in such matters. Abrams argues that conflicting evidence regarding whether Jones acted on Karissa’s behalf undermines the trial court’s order, claiming he was following Karissa's wishes by withholding the records. The court disagrees, interpreting the law to mean that a parent’s request for a child’s mental health records does not require the child’s consent. The court emphasizes that the legislature was aware of existing laws when enacting the statute, which affirms a parent's rights and responsibilities regarding their child's care and decisions. The Legislature has established that parents hold the responsibility for decisions concerning their child's welfare, applicable to any parent designated as a managing conservator. In this case, Jones, acting on behalf of his daughter Karissa, legally requested her mental health records from Abrams. The evidence supports the trial court's finding that Abrams must disclose these records, as Jones, as a joint managing conservator, has rights including access to Karissa's psychological records. Abrams has not provided evidence to counter Jones' entitlement to the records, leading to the conclusion that the trial court's decision was not clearly erroneous. Thus, Abrams' objections are overruled, and the trial court's judgment is affirmed. The relevant Texas statutes affirm that a parent can consent to the disclosure of a minor's mental health records, and Jones' rights are upheld under the Texas Family Code. The court did not need to address whether the custody order was a valid basis for the request since the disclosure was appropriately mandated under the Health and Safety Code.