Department of Human Services v. Hafford

Citations: 815 A.2d 806; 2003 ME 15; 2003 Me. LEXIS 19

Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine; February 3, 2003; Maine; State Supreme Court

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Michael Hafford appeals a District Court judgment affirming the Department of Human Services' (DHS) right to recover $17,580.34 in back child support, which includes $9,452.00 for support during the mother’s AFDC/TANF period, $7,394.22 for support prior to AFDC/TANF, and $734.12 for medical expenses. Despite the mother’s affidavit indicating she did not wish to collect the pre-AFDC support, the court determined Hafford's obligation based on 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2301 and § 1606 (1998). Hafford argues that the award for the pre-AFDC support should be vacated, citing 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1553, which limits DHS's entitlement to past support only to the extent that DHS provided support. He contends that since no court order existed during the relevant time, DHS's recovery should be restricted to the period when assistance was provided. Hafford further claims that because no debt had been established when the mother applied for AFDC, there was no debt to assign. Additionally, he argues that DHS cannot collect on support the mother has waived. The court concluded that Hafford's support obligation arose at the child's birth, regardless of a support order, and that the mother’s application for public assistance assigned her right to enforce support claims to the State, thus eliminating her ability to waive them. Consequently, the court affirmed DHS's entitlement to recover all unpaid support owed.

DHS's right to collect child support for Hafford’s son prior to its AFDC payments to the child’s mother hinges on two primary issues. First, the resolution of whether Hafford's child support obligation arises automatically at the child's birth, as DHS claims, or if it requires a court order or agreement, as Hafford asserts. Second, if O’Leary had a child support right without a formal order or agreement, she must clarify whether she could waive this right after assigning it to DHS six years prior upon receiving AFDC.

Maine law, under 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1552 et seq., outlines a father's child support responsibilities and limits liabilities for past support to six years under § 1554. Paternity can be established by the mother, alleged father, or public authority if in doubt. Once established, the obligee can enforce support rights, and the state can pursue past support when it has provided assistance to the obligee. Sections 1503, 1504, and 1505 assert that a father's duty to support is immediate upon the child's birth, irrespective of any support agreement.

The legal precedents affirm the father's ongoing obligation to support his child and the requirement to reimburse the mother for prior support provided. Maine's laws permit courts to order past child support under the Uniform Act on Paternity. DHS can seek child support for the six years preceding paternity notice, as established in relevant case law. Hafford's argument against DHS's right to collect past support misinterprets § 1553, which allows public agencies to enforce paternal liabilities irrespective of a formal support order, contrasting with private agencies' recovery limitations.

The First Circuit in Mushero affirmed that a father has a legal obligation to support his child, and the Department of Human Services (DHS) is entitled to recover this support as a condition for providing public assistance. Under Maine law, all parents must support their children, regardless of formal court orders. When the mother assigned her child support rights to the State as a condition for receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the State gained the right to seek reimbursement for benefits paid on behalf of the children. Similarly, O’Leary assigned her support rights to the State, which allowed DHS to enforce reimbursement for AFDC benefits provided. O’Leary's later waiver of this claim is invalid due to the prior assignment. The court did not address whether DHS can retain funds collected beyond what was paid out. The judgment was affirmed, noting that the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), enacted in 1996, replaced AFDC without substantive changes to relevant laws. The document provides specific correspondence between Titles 19 and 19-A of Maine law, illustrating no differences affecting the current case. As of January 19, 2000, the total AFDC/TANF payments made to O’Leary’s child were $17,651, while Hafford was credited with $3,120 for child support during the 1995-1997 period. The law stipulates that public assistance payments create a debt from the responsible parent to the department for past support, which is determined based on the parent’s income and the child support scale. If a support order exists, the debt corresponds to that order and is not limited to the public assistance amount. Any excess collections must be distributed according to specified regulations.

Section 2369 establishes that receiving public assistance for a child automatically assigns the recipient's rights to child and spousal support to the department, including any unpaid support at the time of assignment, while public assistance is being received. The recipient effectively appoints the commissioner as their attorney in fact to endorse all support payments to the department. Federal law mandates that applicants for public assistance must assign their rights to support, both accrued and for family members, to the state. This assignment must be detailed in a court order or determined by a state-approved formula if no order exists. Support obligations can be calculated according to specified state laws.

Further provisions indicate that fathers of children born out of wedlock have the same support obligations as those whose children are born within marriage. Children born out of wedlock are entitled to the same legal rights as those born within marriage, unless otherwise stated by law. Individuals are required to support their children and spouses when in need, regardless of the obligor's or obligee's residence in the state. Additionally, if no support order exists, the department can establish the current support obligation and any past support debt for the responsible parent, either on behalf of itself or an individual seeking services. Past support debt encompasses various obligations owed under specified state sections.