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Alexander v. Benson
Citations: 812 A.2d 785; 2002 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 993
Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania; December 16, 2002; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court
James K. Aexander appeals the denial of his post-trial relief motion by the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County concerning an incident where his minor son was struck by a vehicle owned by Ridley School District and driven by its employee, Thomas Joseph Benson. The accident occurred when the boy allegedly entered the street between two parked school buses, resulting in a compound fracture to his right arm and a small permanent scar. Aexander filed a lawsuit against Benson and the District, which proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, the defense’s medical expert acknowledged the scar, but the jury found no permanent disfigurement. Aexander's post-trial motions were denied, leading to this appeal, where he contends the trial court should have ruled as a matter of law that his son suffered permanent disfigurement. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, emphasizing that local agencies like the District generally enjoy governmental immunity, with specific exceptions, including negligence in vehicle operation. However, recoverable damages for pain and suffering are limited to cases of permanent bodily function loss or permanent disfigurement. The court referenced definitions from the case Walsh v. City of Philadelphia, which outlined "permanent" as enduring without fundamental change and "disfigurement" as impairing beauty or symmetry. Aexander's argument heavily relied on precedents from Walsh and Norwin School District v. Cortazzo, but the court found insufficient grounds to overturn the jury's verdict. The trial court's decision to deny post-trial motions and its finding of sufficient evidence for the jury's conclusion regarding the minor's permanent disfigurement were upheld. The term "scar" was defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, highlighting that it denotes both a physical mark and a lasting negative effect. Aexander's reliance on previous cases, specifically Walsh and Norwin School District, was deemed misplaced; neither case established that the issue of permanent disfigurement should be removed from the jury's consideration. Walsh involved a bench trial based on stipulated facts, while Norwin School District confirmed that the jury could reasonably conclude a minor had a permanent disfigurement based on evidence presented, including a visible scar. The courts reaffirmed that determining compensable injuries and their extent are jury responsibilities, as noted in Davis v. Mullen and Majczyk v. Oesch. The jury, after hearing all evidence—including expert testimony acknowledging a four-millimeter scar on Aexander’s son—decided that the scar did not constitute permanent disfigurement, a determination well within their authority. Consequently, the trial court did not err in its rulings. Additionally, the jury's first special interrogatory addressed permanent disfigurement rather than the alleged negligence, preventing them from reaching the negligence issue. The trial court's order was affirmed, establishing that the jury found the scar to be insignificant and not warranting damages.