Commonwealth v. Childress

Citations: 799 A.2d 805; 2002 Pa. Super. 154; 2002 Pa. Super. LEXIS 865

Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania; May 16, 2002; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

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Raymond Childress appeals the December 18, 2000 order denying his post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of prior counsel. He argues that counsel failed to pursue the suppression of testimony from Commonwealth witnesses, which he asserts was obtained in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. 4952(a)(2), Pa. Rule Professional Conduct 3.4(b), and 18 U.S.C. 201(c)(2), as well as to seek dismissal of charges based on selective prosecution. The court finds no deficiency in prior counsel's representation and affirms the denial of relief.

Childress was arrested on December 28, 1992, and charged with criminal conspiracy and firearms violations, alongside four counts of aggravated assault. He was acquitted of the firearms charge but convicted of the others. His convictions stemmed from his involvement in a narcotics trafficking organization led by co-defendant William “Ricky” Boyd, with Childress actively participating in retaliatory violence against a rival gang after Boyd was shot. Incidents included attempts to kill members of the rival organization, which resulted in multiple shootings.

Following his conviction, Childress's direct appeal was rejected on June 26, 1996, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for further appeal on January 15, 1997.

On March 18, 1998, Appellant filed a PCRA petition within the one-year timeframe following the final judgment of his sentence, which was subsequently denied, leading to this appeal. Appellant claims his prior counsel was ineffective for two main reasons: failing to seek suppression of testimony from two Commonwealth witnesses, and not raising allegations of selective prosecution. These witnesses, Kelly Bell and Kevin Williams, received leniency from the Commonwealth in exchange for their testimony against Appellant.

Appellant argues that their testimony violated specific Pennsylvania statutes and professional conduct rules aimed at preventing witness intimidation and false testimony. However, the court found no evidence suggesting that Bell or Williams testified falsely or were coerced, negating the merit of Appellant's claims related to those violations. Consequently, since there was no basis for asserting that the Commonwealth acted improperly, Appellant could not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel regarding these issues.

Additionally, Appellant contends that counsel failed to argue a violation of 18 U.S.C. 201(c)(2), which prohibits offering anything of value for testimony. However, the court noted that federal appellate courts have consistently ruled that offering leniency for testimony does not constitute a violation of this statute. As a result, Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel lack merit due to insufficient evidence supporting his arguments.

The interpretation of § 201(c)(2) aligns with a unanimous consensus among federal circuit courts that the government does not breach this statute when granting immunity, leniency, or entering plea agreements to secure testimony. All twelve federal appellate courts have concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) does not apply to the government unless explicitly stated, as it would negate other prosecutorial powers. Courts have also determined that applying this statute to the government would be illogical, as it would undermine the government's traditional prerogative to recommend leniency for truthful testimony, a practice rooted in English common law. Plea bargaining is an accepted procedure in both federal and Commonwealth systems, and defendants do not have an inherent right to negotiate deals with the Commonwealth, as district attorneys have discretion in such matters. Historical cases have established the legitimacy of using accomplice testimony in exchange for leniency, a practice recognized by Congress, federal courts, and the Sentencing Commission.

The government holds a long-standing practice of granting leniency for testimony, which has been recognized as a sovereign prerogative with roots in common law and comparable to royal privilege. The U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed that jury credibility assessments can account for any benefits witnesses receive in exchange for their testimony, allowing cross-examination to reveal such benefits. Consequently, the court rejects the Appellant's claim that suppression of witness testimony was legally justified and finds no ineffectiveness of prior counsel in failing to pursue this argument.

The Appellant also argues selective prosecution, which requires proof that similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted for comparable actions and that the prosecution was motivated by impermissible factors such as race or the exercise of constitutional rights. The Appellant failed to demonstrate any improper basis for his prosecution, noting that the Commonwealth had valid reasons for not prosecuting others, as they agreed to testify against the Appellant. Thus, the claim of selective prosecution is dismissed, and the counsel's performance is deemed adequate.

The court affirms the order, with Judge Popovich concurring. Under Pennsylvania law, PCRA relief petitions must be filed within one year of a final judgment, which for the Appellant was April 12, 1997. The court explains that finality includes the period for seeking review from higher courts. Notably, a prior ruling that deemed the government's leniency practice a violation of law was later overruled, establishing that the initial decision was considered erroneous.