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Staszak v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
Citations: 745 A.2d 1267; 2000 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 12
Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania; January 12, 2000; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court
Wes Staszak is contesting a Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission order that mandated he cease housing discrimination against individuals with disabilities, specifically in response to a complaint filed by Michael Kiel, a quadriplegic. The Commission found probable cause for Kiel’s allegations of discrimination under multiple sections of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Staszak was ordered to pay Kiel $71.50 for travel expenses, $8,000 in damages for humiliation and lost housing opportunity, and a civil penalty of $2,000. The case details Staszak’s background as a landlord who has rented a property near Edinboro University for over 30 years, typically to students. In August 1994, Kiel, planning to attend the university, sought rental options with his caregiver, Pamela Stoltz. They were informed of Staszak's property, which had a level concrete driveway. However, during discussions, Staszak disclosed he did not rent to individuals with disabilities, citing concerns about the property's accessibility and insurance coverage. Despite suggestions from Kiel's father to install a temporary ramp, Staszak ultimately confirmed he would not rent to Kiel because of his wheelchair. Kiel never communicated directly with Staszak nor viewed the property, which had only one accessible entrance for his wheelchair. Consequently, the court reversed the Commission's order against Staszak. Staszak removed his property from the market until December 1994, leasing it out until April 1995. Following this, Stoltz and Kiel rented a different property. The hearing examiner concluded that Staszak’s property qualified as a housing accommodation under the Act and was not his bona fide personal residence during the lease period. Although Staszak occupied the property as a personal residence in the summer, he moved out when renting it, thereby designating it as rental property under the Act. The hearing examiner determined that Staszak violated Sections 5(h)(1), 5(h)(5), and 5(h)(6) of the Act, supported by credible testimony indicating that he discriminated against Kiel, who is disabled. Specifically, Staszak was found to have refused to rent to Kiel due to his disability and made discriminatory inquiries regarding Kiel and Stoltz's handicaps. Staszak’s own testimony was deemed not credible. The Commission ordered Staszak to reimburse Kiel for travel expenses and pay $8,000 in damages for humiliation and lost housing opportunity, along with a $2,000 civil penalty for his actions. The Commission also mandated Staszak to cease discriminatory practices, post fair housing notices, and submit detailed records of rental inquiries and applications. Staszak appealed, raising issues regarding the classification of the property as a personal residence exempt from the Act, the violation findings despite the property’s inaccessibility, and alleged due process violations concerning witness testimony. He argued that the property should be exempt as a personal residence intended by the General Assembly. The Commission determined that Staszak's property was categorized as a personal residence during the summer but transitioned to rental property when rented. Staszak argued this interpretation violates the Act, which exempts personal residences offered for rent, asserting that the Commission's view incorrectly suggests that offering the property for rent negates its status as a personal residence. The Commission countered that once an owner vacates the property and stops using it as their residence, it no longer qualifies as a personal residence under the Act. They noted that Staszak rents the property from September to May, locks away personal belongings, and does not return until the tenant vacates. Therefore, the Commission argued that the property is not a personal residence while leased. The Act defines a personal residence as a dwelling occupied by the owner or their family, and regulations clarify that a property loses its personal residence designation once the owner moves out. However, evidence showed that Staszak maintained his personal property in the home, did not fully vacate, and retained control over essential services and mail during the rental period. Therefore, it was concluded that Staszak never entirely relinquished control of the property, meaning it remained a personal residence despite being rented. Consequently, the Commission's conclusion was deemed erroneous, leading to the reversal of their order, with Judge McGinley dissenting. The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act defines "housing accommodations" to include any building or site intended for residential use, excluding personal residences rented by owners or their agents. A "personal residence" is specifically a dwelling for no more than two individuals or families living independently. Under Section 5(h), discrimination based on disability in housing practices is prohibited, including refusal to lease, discriminatory statements, and inquiries about an individual's disability. Kiel's complaint against Staszak included allegations of discrimination under Sections 5(h)(3) and 5(h)(7). The hearing examiner ruled there was no lease between Kiel and Staszak, resulting in no violation of Section 5(h)(3). Regarding Section 5(h)(7), which mandates accessibility in housing, Staszak's property was found not subject to compliance due to its 1950s construction, as relevant laws apply to newer constructions only. The Fair Housing Act's exemption for single-family homes rented by owners with three or fewer properties was noted. The court's review of the Commission's determination is limited to constitutional violations or legal errors, and since the classification of the property as a personal residence resolved the key issue, other points raised by Staszak were not further considered.