Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals; December 23, 1998; District Of Columbia; State Supreme Court
In this appeal, the court examines the Good Time Credits Act of 1986 and its relationship with the Sexual Psychopath Act (SPA). The central question is whether a defendant, Lee Shelton, can receive credit for time spent at St. Elizabeths Hospital under the SPA after pleading guilty to sexual offenses but before sentencing. The court concludes that Shelton is entitled to such credit.
Shelton pled guilty in April 1990 to multiple sexual offenses and subsequently moved to compel the government to file a sexual psychopath statement, which the trial court allowed despite government objections. Following a hearing in April 1991, Shelton was deemed a sexual psychopath and committed to St. Elizabeths for an indefinite period. After over four and a half years, Shelton requested to lift the stay on his criminal proceedings, indicating he had benefitted from the hospital's program. The government withdrew the psychopath statement, and the trial court vacated the commitment order in December 1995.
At sentencing, the trial court faced the question of whether to grant Shelton credit for his time at St. Elizabeths. Although the court had doubts about Shelton's entitlement to credit, it opted not to make a ruling, deferring the decision to correctional authorities. The court then imposed significant consecutive sentences for Shelton’s offenses.
On appeal, there is a disagreement regarding the trial court's obligation to rule on the credit issue. This dispute hinges on the interpretation of D.C.Code 24-431(a), which mandates that individuals receive credit for time spent in custody related to their offense. This provision was added to ensure clarity regarding sentence reduction for time served, which had not been explicitly addressed prior to the enactment of the Good Time Credits Act. The interpretation of the statute, particularly the second sentence of subsection (a), is contested by the parties involved.
Shelton argues that the court must determine any disputed credit at sentencing, asserting that such determinations are legal matters affecting the length of the sentence. The government counters that literal application of the statute is impractical since it cannot address parole time before judgment. It notes that credit determinations are typically left to correctional authorities and suggests that the court's duty could be satisfied by generally stating that the defendant should receive credit for pretrial custody time upon request. The government believes that detailed challenges to credit decisions should be made through habeas corpus actions. However, the court sees no need to resolve these arguments as the interpretation of credit law is a judicial matter. Shelton claims, unchallenged by the government, that correctional officials denied him credit for time spent at St. Elizabeths under the Sexual Psychopath Act (SPA).
The SPA, enacted in 1948, addresses individuals unable to control sexual impulses and defines a 'sexual psychopath' as someone dangerous due to their sexual behaviors. To initiate the SPA's procedure, the U.S. Attorney must file a statement indicating that someone is a sexual psychopath, which can occur independently or in connection with criminal proceedings. Following this, two psychiatrists are appointed to evaluate the individual. If both determine the individual is not a psychopath, the case is dismissed; if determined to be a psychopath, a hearing is held, potentially before a jury. If found to be a sexual psychopath, the individual is committed to an institution until deemed safe for release based on a recovery assessment.
Filing a statement during a criminal proceeding under D.C. Code 22-3504(b) or (c) temporarily halts the proceeding until one of several conditions occurs: the dismissal of the SPA proceeding without a hearing under D.C. Code 22-3507, a determination by a fact-finder at an evidentiary hearing under 22-3508 that the patient is not a sexual psychopath, or the patient's discharge from an institution according to D.C. Code 22-3509. The discharge section mandates that if the individual is charged with a crime, the supervisory official must notify the criminal court judge and deliver the individual to court. The SPA specifies that a sexual psychopath must be "not insane," a definition that the D.C. Circuit, in the Millard case, broadened to encompass mental illness due to evolving legal and psychiatric perspectives since the SPA's enactment in 1948. The court emphasized that the SPA's exclusion of the "insane" effectively excludes those categorized as "mentally ill." Prior to the 1964 civil commitment statute, commitment as a sexual psychopath and civil commitment were considered mutually exclusive, with the SPA intended to address gaps in commitment law applicable only to the insane. Millard acknowledged the coexistence of the 1964 civil commitment law and the SPA, although subsequent cases questioned if any gap remained for the SPA. The current case marks the first reported decision addressing commitment under the SPA since the Cross decision. In his appeal, Shelton claims entitlement to credit for time spent committed to St. Elizabeths under D.C. Code 24-431(a) and argues for additional credit under subsection 24-431(c), which allows deductions for time spent in a hospital for examination or treatment before trial. The government contests these claims, asserting that SPA confinement is civil rather than criminal in nature.
To qualify for credit under D.C. Code 24-431(a), confinement must be a direct result of the offense for which a sentence was imposed or part of the criminal process leading to final disposition. This requirement contrasts with civil commitment under the Sexual Psychopath Act (SPA), which is characterized by the government as civil in nature. The SPA extends mental incompetence laws to include sexual psychopaths for commitment, emphasizing remedial treatment rather than punishment. The D.C. Circuit has affirmed that individuals under the SPA are considered patients and not confined for law violations.
Legislatively, it may be permissible for a law to stipulate that time spent in confinement under the SPA does not count towards a subsequent criminal sentence, as supported by case law from Kansas and Florida. However, the focus of the current analysis is on the specific provisions of D.C. legislation. Shelton contends that he was effectively in custody during his time at the John Howard Pavilion, which is the highest security level at St. Elizabeths Hospital, and his claims about being in locked confinement and unable to leave are unchallenged by the government.
The government disputes this characterization of 'custody' by referencing Reno v. Koray, where the Supreme Court defined 'official detention' as a court order committing a defendant to the Attorney General's custody. Since the defendant in Koray was not under such custody, he received no credit for time spent in a community treatment center. The Supreme Court indicated that the change from 'in custody' to 'official detention' was not intended to alter the law's substance. This precedent may not fully clarify the D.C. Council's intent regarding the term 'custody' in 24-431(a), especially in relation to 24-431(c).
In the case of Koray, the defendant was 'released' under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and confined to a community treatment center, contrasting this with the status of 'detention.' In contrast, Shelton was not 'released,' as he was detained in jail for approximately a year and a half prior to his transfer to St. Elizabeths, where he was also entitled to credit for the six months spent in jail awaiting sentencing. A point of contention is whether Shelton's custody was 'as a result of the offense for which sentence was imposed.' Referring to Ali v. District of Columbia, it was determined that if a parole violation warrant for one offense is executed before arrest for a second offense, no credit is given for time spent in custody related to the first offense. The excerpt emphasizes that while the facts in a psychopath statement may pertain to criminal offenses, the basis of SPA (Sexual Psychopath Act) commitment is a 'course of repeated misconduct in sexual matters,' indicating a dangerous inability to control sexual impulses. The relationship between criminal proceedings and SPA commitment is evident in the Act's provisions, which allow for the initiation of SPA actions during criminal proceedings.
Further interpretation of D.C. Code 24-431(a) is informed by 24-431(c), which mandates credit against a sentence for 'all time actually spent' in a hospital for examination or treatment by court order. St. Elizabeths is classified as a hospital, and Shelton's transfer there was court-ordered. The court's recognition in Miller supports that SPA commitments are intended for remedial treatment, with individuals labeled as 'patients.' Although the subsection does not literally apply to Shelton's case, as his SPA confinement was not 'prior to trial' or 'pending an appeal,' the government did not contest its relevance. The government argued that the subsection relates only to hospital commitments integral to the criminal case's final disposition, such as competency examinations. Nonetheless, the subsection suggests that time spent in hospitals for examination or treatment under court order during a criminal proceeding may warrant credit against a sentence associated with that proceeding.
Under D.C. Code 24-431(c), credit is granted for all hospital time spent under court order, regardless of the level of confinement. The court referenced Harman v. United States, which involved an acquittee confined at St. Elizabeths and denied conditional release. The legislature did not intend for 24-431(c) to be interpreted restrictively. In this case, the appellant was committed post-conviction to a maximum security hospital under the Sexual Psychopath Act, qualifying him for custody credit for his time at St. Elizabeths. The case is remanded for the trial court to adjust the sentencing order accordingly.
A statement of facts must demonstrate the defendant's classification as a "sexual psychopath," which, once filed, stays underlying criminal proceedings. The trial judge in this case, Ricardo M. Urbina, later became a federal judge. The appellant claimed continuous confinement without leave, which the government did not dispute. The court did not evaluate if the treatment at St. Elizabeths adhered strictly to the Act but noted a related case, Miller v. Overholser, which questioned the appropriateness of housing conditions for individuals deemed criminally insane versus those simply mentally ill.
In contrast to Miller, where confinement occurred pre-trial, the current appellant expressed a desire to proceed with sentencing. The alternate sentencing structure has failed, with both parties acknowledging disputes over the treatment process. Additionally, D.C. Code 24-431(b) allows for credit against a sentence if a person was in custody due to a charge that was later dismissed or resulted in acquittal. Recent cases, like Francis v. United States, illustrate the adjustment of sentences to reflect policies on presentence custody credit.
The trial court clarified that its sentencing decision was made independently of any consideration for SPA credit, delegating that determination to correctional authorities. The court indicated that it typically does not adjudicate claims for credit during sentencing, stating that defendants should receive any credit they are entitled to from the Department of Corrections. Citing United States v. Wilson, the excerpt emphasizes that under federal law, the Attorney General—not the trial court—initially determines credit eligibility. There is a suggestion that legislative clarification of statutory language may be needed, as the government claims that the Department of Corrections has a standing policy denying the appellant credit for certain time served. The court noted that it had previously conducted a de novo review on related matters, indicating a potential jurisdictional role for the trial court beyond standard agency determinations. Although the trial court was not mandated to rule on Shelton's credit entitlement under the SPA, it possesses the ultimate jurisdiction to do so, particularly given the clarity of correctional officials' stance. As a result, the court decided to remand the case for the trial court to include a provision in the judgment order regarding credit entitlements. Additionally, the excerpt outlines that certain legislation, as established by the Supreme Court, cannot be applied to defendants charged with specific sexual offenses and describes the procedural requirements for filing statements in criminal proceedings. Shelton had made several motions for short-term release during holidays, but all were opposed by the government and denied.
The ruling clarifies that the conditions of confinement under review do not alter the distinction between proving sexual psychopathy and establishing a criminal offense. Previous criminal acts may serve as evidence of a pattern of sexual misconduct but are not used for punitive measures; rather, they are intended to assess the individual's mental state and predict future behavior, as established in Allen v. United States. The document notes a peculiar reference in subsection (c) to "deduction" of time spent in the hospital from the term of confinement instead of crediting it against the sentence, though it finds no significant difference between the two concepts in this context. The legislative history of the Good Time Credits Act does not provide clarity on this matter. It emphasizes that the focus should be on whether the confinement qualifies for sentence credit, with both the Good Time Credits Act and the SPA suggesting that objective criteria apply when a court order is involved. While there is an argument regarding the exclusion of alternatives, the principle of lenity may be relevant. The ruling does not address Shelton’s equal protection claim due to the resolution of the current case.
