In re Khamvongsa

Docket: No. 95-FM-153

Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals; June 19, 1997; District Of Columbia; State Supreme Court

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Chantharangsy Khamvongsa, a prison inmate serving a sentence for second-degree murder, was transferred to St. Elizabeths Hospital for emergency psychiatric treatment after a psychiatrist certified him as mentally ill and a risk to himself and others. Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for his hospitalization and ordered his immediate return to the Department of Corrections. Despite this, Khamvongsa was not returned promptly, prompting him to demand a copy of the commitment warrant or a $500 forfeiture from the District of Columbia. The trial court affirmed the earlier decision, stating he was not entitled to forfeiture as no warrant or detainer existed, and he had received the necessary documentation for his transfer. Khamvongsa’s legal representation communicated with the hospital and the court regarding his status, and after additional court orders, he was eventually transferred back to the Department of Corrections. The trial court ultimately denied his request for forfeiture under D.C.Code. 16-1905.

The trial court found that Khamvongsa's demand for a copy of the warrant or detainer for his hospital confinement was moot, as no such document existed. Khamvongsa argued that the court erred in denying his forfeiture request under D.C.Code 16-1905, which mandates that a detainee or their representative may demand a copy of the warrant, and if it is withheld, the detaining officer is liable for a $500 forfeiture. However, the court determined that since no warrant or detainer existed for Khamvongsa's emergency transfer to St. Elizabeths Hospital, forfeiture was not applicable. D.C.Code 24-302 and Super. Ct. Ment. H.R. 9(j) allow for emergency transfers without the need for a traditional warrant when a psychiatrist certifies that the prisoner is mentally ill. Khamvongsa received all required documentation related to his transfer, including the psychiatrist's certification, which sufficed for the legal basis of his emergency transfer. Thus, the trial court's decision to deny the forfeiture request was upheld.

Khamvongsa claims he is entitled to forfeiture under D.C. Code § 16-1905 due to delays in his return to the Department of Corrections. However, issues not raised in the trial court are generally not considered on appeal unless there is a manifest miscarriage of justice, which does not apply in this instance. Moreover, D.C. Code § 16-1905 does not allow forfeiture based on delays in prisoner transfers. While protracted delays are discouraged, reasonable time is allowed for executing court orders. The delay in Khamvongsa’s transfer was attributed to the U.S. Marshal’s Service, but his claim does not target this agency or its officials. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's order, noting that all prisoners sentenced in D.C. are committed to the custody of the Attorney General, with transport provided by the U.S. Marshal’s Service. The term "warrant" is defined as a written order for arrest, while "detainer" refers to the restraint of personal liberty and does not imply immediate surrender, but rather a notification request before release. The District contends that Khamvongsa's forfeiture request was improperly directed to an assistant corporation counsel rather than the appropriate detaining authority. While this issue was raised, it was not necessary to resolve it given the court's decision. Khamvongsa does not argue that he lacked a copy of his commitment order following sentencing.