Sheely v. Beard

Citations: 696 A.2d 214; 1997 WL 354996Docket: No. 00538

Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania; June 27, 1997; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

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An appeal was made following the denial of appellants’ post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial after a jury verdict that favored the appellee, Mildred R. Beard. The appellants, led by Norma J. Sheely, alleged several grounds for a new trial: 1) the introduction of Dr. Gladys S. Fenichel’s first deposition was improper as it was originally intended for the first trial; 2) Dr. Fenichel was not properly qualified as an expert witness; 3) the deposition contained hearsay and should have been excluded; 4) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; and 5) the jury's verdict was improper as no reasonable minds could disagree on the matter. 

The case stemmed from a vehicle collision on May 9, 1991, where Ms. Sheely claimed serious orthopedic and psychiatric injuries due to the alleged negligence of Ms. Beard. A jury trial in December 1994 resulted in a zero damages award, prompting the appellants to file a post-trial motion which was granted for a new trial due to undisputed orthopedic injuries. A second trial occurred in October 1995, where the jury awarded $13,500 for orthopedic injuries alone, leading the appellants to argue that the psychiatric injuries were inadequately considered. The trial court subsequently denied their post-trial motion, resulting in the current appeal. Upon review, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.

Appellants argue that the trial court erred by not granting a new trial due to the improper admission of Dr. Fenichel’s November 3, 1994, videotaped deposition in the second trial. They contend that statutory provisions do not allow depositions from a previous trial to be used again without demonstrating the expert's unavailability, which they claim the appellee failed to prove. Although appellants acknowledge that a medical expert's deposition may be admissible regardless of availability, they assert that the hearsay exception for former testimony does not apply without proof of unavailability. However, they do not demonstrate that any error in admitting the deposition influenced the verdict or caused prejudice, as they had opportunities to cross-examine Dr. Fenichel during both depositions. 

Appellants also claim that Dr. Fenichel was not properly requalified as an expert witness during the September 29, 1995, deposition, despite not disputing her qualifications from the earlier deposition. They fail to show or allege any prejudice or influence on the verdict from this alleged error. Lastly, they contend that Dr. Fenichel’s testimony included impermissible hearsay by referencing opinions from other medical professionals and summarizing medical records. Overall, the appellants' arguments do not warrant a new trial as they have not established that any alleged errors materially affected the trial's outcome.

Appellants' argument is dismissed on multiple grounds. Dr. Fenichel's core testimony was grounded in personal observation and firsthand analysis of the medical evidence, having examined Ms. Sheely prior to trial. References to other doctors' reports comprised a minor part of her conclusions. Pennsylvania law recognizes an exception to the hearsay rule, allowing experts to testify based on reports from others, as long as such reliance is customary in their field. This exception has been established since 1971 and consistently applied. While the reliance on other experts' opinions may affect the jury's assessment of the testimony's weight, it does not necessitate exclusion. The testimony is permissible if the expert integrates her expertise and judgment rather than merely relaying others' opinions. In this case, Dr. Fenichel relied on various sources, including personal observations, to conclude Ms. Sheely did not sustain a psychological injury from the accident, affirming that her reliance on colleagues' diagnoses was appropriate and standard in her profession. Thus, her testimony stands unchallenged.

Dr. Fenichel testified that, based on her examination, other doctors' reports, and the patient's medical history, Ms. Sheely did not suffer a psychological injury from the automobile accident. This application of the Thomas rule was deemed proper. The appellants argued that Dr. Fenichel’s reliance on the police accident report and photographs constituted impermissible hearsay because such materials are not typically used by psychiatrists. However, the record revealed no specific content from the police report or photographs was mentioned, negating the hearsay claim. The appellants also sought a new trial, arguing the jury's verdict contradicted the evidence by only compensating for orthopedic injuries, despite their assertion of psychological injuries. The court maintained that it is the jury's role to evaluate evidence, and a new trial is not warranted unless evidence supporting the verdict is overwhelmingly improbable or shocking to justice. The court emphasized that conflicts in testimony do not justify a new trial, and judgment n.o.v. is only appropriate when no reasonable minds could disagree on the verdict being improper. Ultimately, the court found no abuse of discretion or legal error in denying the appellants' motions for judgment n.o.v. and a new trial.

Appellants provided evidence that Ms. Sheely suffered orthopedic and psychological injuries from an automobile accident. They argued that a head injury led to significant behavioral changes in Ms. Sheely. Three expert witnesses supported their claims: Dr. John Joseph Danyo, an orthopedic surgeon, detailed Ms. Sheely's orthopedic injuries and noted her referral to a neurologist for headaches but did not address psychological injuries. Dr. Letitia Pierce, a psychiatrist, testified that Ms. Sheely had a brain injury from the accident, resulting in memory loss and a seizure disorder. Vocational evaluator Harold Kuhlman assessed that Ms. Sheely was permanently unable to work. Family members, including Ms. Sheely’s brother-in-law, testified to drastic changes in her personality post-accident, describing her as confused and irritable, contrasting with her previous active demeanor. Ms. Sheely herself reported ongoing headaches, a deteriorating relationship with her husband, and suicidal thoughts.

The appellee conceded that Ms. Sheely suffered orthopedic injuries but contested the existence of psychological injuries. To counter the appellants' claims, the appellee presented Dr. Fenichel's videotaped deposition, where she opined that Ms. Sheely did not have a psychological injury. Dr. Fenichel referenced Ms. Sheely's emergency room records, which indicated only minor injuries and no restrictions upon release. Additionally, Dr. Fenichel reported normal EEG and MRI results and suggested that Ms. Sheely's claimed impairments were not observed during her examination, attributing her performance issues to factors unrelated to the accident.

Dr. Fenichel testified that Ms. Sheely exhibited no difficulties in spontaneous speech, memory tests, or recounting her life history. She disputed Dr. Pierce's assertion that Ms. Sheely suffered a brain injury leading to psychological issues and Mr. Kuhlman’s claim that she was unable to work. Dr. Fenichel indicated that she would not have imposed any restrictions on Ms. Sheely’s activities post-accident. Additionally, she noted that several symptoms Ms. Sheely presented after the accident, such as headaches and dizziness, were also present prior to the incident. The jury favored Dr. Fenichel's testimony, concluding that Ms. Sheely did not have a psychiatric disorder, and determined that the evidence presented by the appellants, despite being from ten witnesses, did not undermine the jury’s verdict in favor of the appellee. The trial court’s decisions regarding judgment n.o.v. and the denial of a new trial were upheld, as there was no abuse of discretion found. Ms. Sheely’s husband, Phillip A. Sheely, had filed a claim for loss of consortium. The trial court's discretion in admitting expert testimony was affirmed, and the appellants' claims of prejudice due to new counsel and the use of Dr. Fenichel’s prior deposition were dismissed as insufficiently substantiated. Finally, the distinction from a precedent case concerning hearsay was clarified, emphasizing that Dr. Fenichel's reliance on medical reports was standard practice in her field, which did not constitute hearsay in the context of her testimony.