Anderson v. Witt

Docket: No. 1465 C.D. 1996

Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania; April 3, 1997; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

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Appellants, including individuals and the Upper Roxborough Civic Association, contest a decision by the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas affirming the Zoning Board of Adjustment's grant of a variance to Congregation Mishkan Shalom. The Congregation sought to convert a 13,000 square-foot property at 8 Summit Place, currently zoned as R-1 residential, into a synagogue, proposing a one-story addition for a sanctuary and additional parking. During a Board hearing, the Congregation argued the existing building was unsuitable as a single-family dwelling due to its size and claimed the conversion would not lead to traffic issues. In contrast, Appellants raised concerns regarding potential traffic and parking problems.

The Zoning Board, in its September 28, 1995 adjudication, found that the Congregation had demonstrated unnecessary hardship due to the property's unique characteristics, concluding that significant renovations would be needed to convert it to apartments, which was supported by testimonies from real estate broker Louise D’Alesandro and architect Walter Crimm. Appellants appealed, questioning whether the Congregation proved the existence of unnecessary hardship or that the variance would not negatively affect the neighborhood or public welfare. They contended that the Congregation did not establish the property’s current zoning rendered it unusable or valueless. The Board's decision was based on legal precedents outlining the criteria for unnecessary hardship and public interest considerations in variance applications.

To obtain a variance from a zoning ordinance due to undue hardship, mere economic and personal considerations are inadequate (McNally v. Bonner). In Allegheny West, Irwin Associates, Inc. (Irwin) sought variances to develop a contaminated property after failed sales intended for residential housing. The variances were granted, but the appeal highlighted Irwin's inability to demonstrate the property was essentially valueless for its permitted use, as an offer of $200,000 was made despite the contamination. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court deemed it unreasonable to require a property owner to sell at a significantly reduced price to obtain a variance.

In the current case, the property had been used for its intended purpose for 15 years, and the realtor's failure to sell it in nine months did not constitute unnecessary hardship. Although the property's size complicated its sale as a single-family dwelling, this did not render it unsuitable for its current use. The Congregation lacked sufficient evidence for a variance, leading to the conclusion that the common pleas court erred in its decision. Consequently, the order from the common pleas court was reversed. The review scope is limited to assessing whether the zoning board abused its discretion or erred in law, with the common pleas court acknowledging the property's notable history. Since the primary issue was resolved, further examination of remaining issues was unnecessary.