State v. Harrington

Citations: 689 A.2d 399; 1997 R.I. LEXIS 26; 1997 WL 28717Docket: No. 96-323-C.A.

Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island; January 23, 1997; Rhode Island; State Supreme Court

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The court heard oral arguments on December 5, 1996, regarding an appeal by defendant William D. Harrington from a conviction for leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death and driving so as to endanger resulting in death. Harrington was sentenced to five years for the first count and ten years for the second, with both sentences to run concurrently, along with a twenty-year suspension of his driver's license. The incident occurred on July 6, 1992, when Harrington struck jogger Timothy Rhow while driving at an estimated speed of fifty to sixty miles per hour in a forty-five-mile-per-hour zone. Following the collision, Harrington did not stop to assist Rhow, who died from multiple blunt traumatic injuries; instead, he fled the scene, later setting his vehicle on fire. The court affirmed the conviction, noting that Harrington did not contest the first count but raised issues solely related to the second count concerning driving to endanger. Additionally, the testimony of the Chief Medical Examiner indicated that there was little likelihood Harrington applied the brakes before the impact, which the defendant contested.

Testimony indicated that injuries in automobile collisions tend to be higher on the body when brakes are not applied, though various factors influence this conclusion. The defendant challenged the doctor’s expertise in accident reconstruction, but the trial justice permitted the testimony based on the doctor’s qualifications in forensic pathology and trauma evaluation. The testimony was deemed cumulative, as a passenger corroborated that the brakes were not applied. The trial justice denied the defendant's motion for a new trial, citing compelling evidence of recklessness, including excessive speed, intoxication, and crossing into the breakdown lane. Testimony from several officers confirmed the defendant exhibited signs of intoxication post-collision. The trial justice highlighted the significant force involved in the incident, implying recklessness rather than ordinary negligence.

Review of the trial justice's decision on the new trial motion is highly deferential, and her findings did not overlook material evidence. The same analysis applies to the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, where evidence must be viewed favorably towards the state. In this case, the evidence sufficiently supported the denial of acquittal. The defendant also contended that the jury should have been instructed on joggers’ obligations regarding traffic direction and the potential for such violations to be considered independent causes. However, legal precedent indicates that the decedent's negligence does not absolve the defendant unless it is proven to be the sole proximate cause of death.

In a case involving the offense of driving so as to endanger resulting in death, victim negligence is generally irrelevant unless it is determined that the victim's conduct was an independent, intervening, and efficient cause of their own death, solely responsible for the fatality. This necessitates a conclusion that the defendant's illegal actions were not a contributing factor. In the current case, evidence indicated that the defendant’s act of swerving into the breakdown lane and hitting the victim, who was visible from a significant distance, was the proximate cause of death. The victim’s presence in the breakdown lane, due to tying his shoelace, did not qualify as an independent cause of the injury and could not be deemed the sole cause of the fatality. The trial court correctly refused to provide the proposed jury instruction. Consequently, the defendant's appeal is denied and dismissed, affirming the conviction from the Superior Court.