Levin Metals Corporation v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Company, Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellees v. Richard Levin, Counterdefendants, and Montrose Chemical Corporation of California, Counterdefendant-Appellant. Parr-Richmond Terminal Company v. Levin Metals Corporation, and Montrose Chemical Corporation of California
Docket: 87-2732
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; October 28, 1988; Federal Appellate Court
The case involves Levin Metals Corporation and Parr-Richmond Terminal Company, with Montrose Chemical Corporation appealing a district court's decision. The primary issue addresses the requirements for a declaratory judgment action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). The Ninth Circuit's earlier opinion established that defendants must incur cleanup costs from hazardous waste sites to meet CERCLA's requirements for a coercive legal action. Montrose argues that it should be dismissed from the action as it does not meet the necessary prerequisites. However, the court finds that Montrose's involvement is ancillary to Parr-Richmond's declaratory judgment action against Levin Metals, which already satisfies CERCLA's statutory conditions. The court cites the precedent set in *United States ex rel. Payne v. United Pacific Insurance Company*, emphasizing that ancillary jurisdiction allows for joining parties linked by the same transaction and facts. Parr-Richmond seeks a declaration of non-liability for cleanup costs concerning a parcel of land, which is also at issue in its case against Levin Metals. The court identifies a sufficient factual and logical connection between these actions, affirming that Montrose has an interest in the case and thus should not be dismissed. The district court's denial of Montrose's motion to dismiss is upheld, ensuring all interested parties are involved in the proceedings.