Biondillo v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation

Citations: 674 A.2d 1175; 1996 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 149

Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania; April 15, 1996; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

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Linda Biondillo, Anthony Biondillo, and Joanne Leshnack (Plaintiffs) appealed a judgment of non pros entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County in favor of the Department of Transportation (DOT). The case stemmed from a single vehicle accident on June 16, 1985, with Plaintiffs filing suit against DOT on June 16, 1987. Following a series of procedural developments, including the filing of an amended complaint and discovery requests, a significant period of inactivity occurred from June 25, 1990, until January 17, 1995, during which Plaintiffs only filed a verification of service for a second set of document requests.

On March 6, 1995, Plaintiffs requested a settlement conference, and shortly thereafter, DOT sought a continuance, leading to the trial court striking the case from the April 1995 trial list based on Plaintiffs' non-compliance with local rules. Subsequently, DOT filed for judgment of non pros on April 6, 1995, which the trial court granted on July 13, 1995, citing a lack of due diligence by the Plaintiffs and the absence of compelling reasons for their delay that prejudiced DOT.

The trial court emphasized that despite the lack of activity, there was not an uninterrupted two-year delay. However, it found that Plaintiffs had not sufficiently moved the case toward trial, and DOT demonstrated actual prejudice due to the delay and unavailability of witnesses and documents. Plaintiffs' request for relief from the judgment was denied, with the court stating that they had failed to fulfill their duty to advance the litigation. The court also distinguished the case from a recent Superior Court ruling in Mudd v. Nosker Lumber, Inc., asserting the circumstances were not comparable.

Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the Department of Transportation (DOT) failed to demonstrate actual prejudice from their delay in prosecution and that DOT acted with "unclean hands" when seeking a judgment of non pros. The court clarifies that prejudice for a non pros ruling is not limited to the absence of witnesses but includes loss of documentary evidence due to delay. The court finds DOT's claims of prejudice, such as the destruction of documents due to its purge policy, unconvincing, as DOT itself failed to preserve the evidence. Additionally, although DOT claims certain witnesses have retired, it did not prove they are unavailable.

On the issue of unclean hands, the court references the precedent set in Mudd, where the court held that a party cannot seek a non pros judgment if it acted in bad faith to delay the proceedings. In the current case, although DOT sought a continuance, the trial court struck the case due to Plaintiffs’ procedural noncompliance. The court disagrees with DOT’s argument that this action nullified its motive for the continuance. Instead, it finds that DOT's motion for a continuance was intended to buy time to prepare its non pros petition, thus demonstrating unclean hands.

Ultimately, the court reverses the non pros judgment and remands the case for trial on the merits, relinquishing jurisdiction.

Activity on the docket from June 25, 1990, to June 2, 1993, included significant actions by parties other than the Plaintiffs. Specifically, counsel for the Additional Defendant entered an appearance on October 15, 1990, and filed a reply to new matters on November 1, 1991. During this period, the Department of Transportation (DOT) served the Plaintiffs with requests for expert reports and witness lists for trial. The ruling in the Penn Piping case established that delays of two years or more are presumed prejudicial regarding motions to dismiss for inactivity. Additionally, relevant documents were destroyed according to DOT's seven-year document retention policy. The Court's review focuses on whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the case for lack of prosecution. An abuse of discretion is defined as a substantial misapplication of the law or a judgment that is clearly unreasonable or biased. The court emphasized that accepting claims of prejudice from the delay would contradict the rationale behind granting non pros, which is intended to prevent plaintiffs from exploiting defendants through delays. This principle is intended to apply equally to defendants, ensuring that neither party can unduly prolong proceedings for strategic advantage.