Dreibelbis v. State College Borough Water Authority
Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania; December 29, 1994; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court
Galen Dreibelbis appeals a Centre County Court decision that denied his petition to strike a $4,811.40 municipal lien imposed by the State College Borough Water Authority and granted the Authority $2,200 in counsel fees and costs related to a previous equity action Dreibelbis initiated. Dreibelbis, a land developer, owned ten apartment units in Johnson Terrace, located within the Authority's water service area. In 1990, the Authority established a connection fee of $660 per equivalent dwelling unit for new developments. After applying for permits to construct nine additional units, Dreibelbis connected the new units to the existing water system but refused to pay the assessed connection fee. He sought an injunction against the fee and lien, which was dismissed. The Authority subsequently filed a municipal lien. Dreibelbis then filed a petition to strike the lien, contending the amended resolution requiring the fee was retroactive and illegal. The trial court found that he was aware of the fee requirement during construction and concluded that he must pay under both the original and amended resolutions. The court deemed the lien valid and granted the Authority's motion for counsel fees, characterizing Dreibelbis' prior action as unreasonable and vexatious. In his appeal, Dreibelbis argues that his actions were not vexatious or in bad faith, asserting he made an honest mistake in filing his case in equity rather than law, while the Authority counters that he stubbornly pursued an inappropriate remedy despite clear legal options.
The trial court's decision to grant the Authority's motion was deemed erroneous. There was no justification for considering the injunction action as vexatious or brought in bad faith. Dreibelbis' pursuit of the injunction was not merely obstinate, as the Authority's response indicated a legal remedy existed. Although Dreibelbis may have initially erred in how he approached liability for connection fees, the trial court dismissed the equity action shortly after the Authority's answer. The circumstances did not fit the criteria of section 2503, which concerns vexatious litigation. Even if Dreibelbis' injunction petition was improperly filed, it was aimed at challenging connection fees, a right acknowledged by the Authority under 53 P.S. 7182, and thus had a valid basis. Consequently, the imposition of fees and costs under section 2503 was found to be unjustified. Furthermore, the motion for fees was inexplicably filed five months after the injunction was dismissed.
In terms of the statutory authority issue, both parties agreed that the trial court's focus on the retroactivity of the amended resolution resulted in Dreibelbis waiving the argument regarding the lack of statutory authority for the connection fees under the Municipality Authorities Act of 1945 (MAA). Dreibelbis contended this issue had not been waived, citing his claims in the injunction complaint regarding the legality of the fees and the Authority's acknowledgment of the MAA in its legal memoranda. However, the Authority argued that Dreibelbis did not follow the required post-trial procedures, thereby waiving the issue. The court found that Dreibelbis had not adequately raised the MAA issue in his filings or during the trial, leading to the conclusion that the issue was indeed waived. The court noted that while Dreibelbis referred to illegal impact fees, specific references to the MAA were absent in his petition, and the relevant pleadings were not part of the trial court's consideration for the subsequent petition to strike the lien.
Dreibelbis petitioned to strike a lien, arguing against illegal impact fees but did not reference 53 P.S. 306. His attorney, Mr. Mitinger, clarified in court that their argument would focus on the retroactive application of resolutions related to water availability. Mitinger stated that an original resolution existed in January and February 1990, which did not pertain to Dreibelbis’ situation, leading to an amended resolution in December 1990. The court acknowledged the limited scope of Dreibelbis’ argument, which was specifically about retroactivity, and noted that he failed to adequately raise the issue of statutory authority during the trial. Dreibelbis argued that the Authority could not charge a connection fee for units owned by an existing user, but this issue was deemed not before the court for appeal. He contended that the original resolution from February 15, 1990, which imposed connection fees for new developments, did not apply to his nine new units since it was an expansion. However, the Authority argued that Dreibelbis’ activities fell within the original resolution's terms and that the subsequent amendment was a precautionary measure to clarify coverage of new uses. The court's focus remained on whether the original resolution indeed covered Dreibelbis’ actions.
The trial court determined that Dreibelbis’ nine new apartments qualified as a 'new development,' necessitating a connection fee under the original resolution. The court found that the construction met the definitions of 'development' and 'land development' as per local zoning ordinances and the Municipal Planning Code (MPC), categorizing Dreibelbis as a 'developer.' The construction significantly increased the number of dwelling units in Johnson Terrace and activated the existing water tap, resulting in a greater water demand. Consequently, the court ruled that the original resolution applied to Dreibelbis’ project, affirming the decision to uphold the lien for connection fees.
Dreibelbis acknowledged the applicability of the amended resolution but contended it was retroactively enforced after his investment in construction. However, since the trial court's adherence to the original resolution sufficed to validate the connection fee, the retroactivity issue was deemed irrelevant, and no ruling was made on that point.
In conclusion, the court reversed the order granting the Water Authority's motion for counsel fees and costs while affirming all other aspects of the decision. The review of the common pleas court's decisions is limited to identifying any abuse of discretion or legal errors. The amended resolution established a connection fee of $660.00 per equivalent dwelling unit, effective February 15, 1990, outlining the conditions under which this fee is applicable. Definitions from the MPC and local zoning ordinances further clarify the scope of 'land development' and 'development.'
