Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals; October 3, 1994; District Of Columbia; State Supreme Court
An appeal has been filed by Earl Taylor following the denial of his motion for costs and counsel fees by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle after he successfully quashed subpoenas in a pretrial discovery dispute. The subpoenas were originally issued by Capital City Mortgage Corporation to compel Taylor and his attorneys, Lee H. Karlin and Richard Ira Lebovitz, to appear for depositions in an ongoing case, despite them being non-parties. Taylor's argument for quashing the subpoenas included claims that they were an attempt to bypass a court order ending discovery in a related case and that questioning litigation counsel under oath violated attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.
On October 27, 1992, Judge Cheryl M. Long granted the motion to quash, stating the subpoenas were improper and premature. Taylor subsequently filed for costs and counsel fees on November 17, 1992, citing the Superior Court's Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly the applicability of Rule 37 which mandates such awards unless justified otherwise. Capital City opposed this motion but did not contest the relevance of the cited rules.
On February 14, 1993, Judge Huvelle denied the motion without providing findings or an explanation. In the appeal, Taylor argues that Huvelle erred by not making necessary findings and abused her discretion by not awarding costs and fees. The appellate court agrees that a more detailed explanation for the denial is required but does not address the substantive merits of the case.
Judge Long granted Mr. Taylor’s motion to quash a subpoena aimed at his attorneys, deeming the motion meritorious based on the arguments presented. The order supports Mr. Taylor’s assertion that the subpoenas attempted to bypass an existing court order and intrude on materials protected by attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. Without explicit contrary evidence, the court must accept Judge Long's endorsement of Taylor's arguments. The court expressed uncertainty about the justification for Capital City’s position and emphasized the need for the trial court to provide a reasoned basis for its ruling to facilitate meaningful appellate review.
Capital City, represented by new counsel, claimed that Rules 26 and 37 were irrelevant and that Super.Ct.Civ. R. 45 should govern the matter of subpoenas, a point not raised at the trial level. The appellate court found it premature to affirm the lower court's ruling without understanding its reasoning, leading to the vacating of the sanctions order and remanding for further proceedings.
Capital City’s motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that discovery orders are not appealable, was denied by a motions division of the court; Taylor's opposition maintained the order was appealable due to his status as a non-party. The court sided with the motions division, dismissing Capital City's concerns.
The document notes that Mr. Taylor was gravely ill, prompting Capital City’s counsel to worry about his ability to testify. Capital City’s opposition characterized Taylor’s counsel in derogatory terms, which did not aid in resolving the dispute. The trial court is not precluded from considering the argument regarding Rule 45 on remand, provided Taylor and his attorneys can respond. Judge Farrell’s concurring opinion indicated that Judge Long may have found the subpoenas premature, suggesting that the case might be recertified to her for clarity on her order.
