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State v. Gifford
Citations: 595 A.2d 1049; 1991 Me. LEXIS 209
Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine; August 12, 1991; Maine; State Supreme Court
Defendant Frank Gifford appeals two rape convictions and one conviction for gross sexual misconduct. He challenges the jury instructions on the statute of limitations, the indictment's sufficiency, the lack of a limiting instruction regarding certain evidence, and the admission of testimony he claims is hearsay. The case originated from complaints of repeated rape of Gifford's stepdaughter, leading to a July 1989 indictment for two counts of rape and one count of gross sexual misconduct against someone under fourteen. The jury found him guilty based on the victim's testimony about abuse from 1979 to 1988. Gifford argues that the court erred in instructing the jury on the statute of limitations, as it did not differentiate between the periods applicable to the rape and gross sexual misconduct charges. The court's general instruction incorrectly encompassed both charges within the same timeframe. However, the defendant had agreed to this instruction during discussions prior to its issuance, and the appellate court found that the error did not affect his substantial rights. Evidence supported that the misconduct occurred within the correct limitations period, negating the significance of the court's misstep. Additionally, Gifford contests the indictment’s specificity, asserting that the lack of "on or about" language could lead to convictions for acts outside the specified dates, potentially risking double jeopardy for later charges. The appellate court affirmed the judgments, indicating that the legal processes followed were adequate and the defendant’s rights were not infringed. Defendant argues that the overlap in time periods for Counts I and III could lead to a double jeopardy violation if the jury found him guilty of the same rape occurring on September 1, 1984. However, this argument was not raised at trial and is unpersuasive on appeal. The court clarifies that the indictment suffices if it informs a reasonable person of the crime charged, enabling a proper defense and potential plea of former jeopardy. The indictment, in conjunction with trial evidence, clearly indicated that the jury considered defendant's conduct from 1983 through April 11, 1987, thus providing protection against double jeopardy claims. Defendant's claim of possible double conviction for one incident lacks merit, as the victim's testimony covered multiple episodes, and the jury was instructed to evaluate three distinct charges. The court finds no obvious error regarding the overlapping date. Defendant also challenges the court's lack of a limiting instruction for the jury concerning prior bad acts evidence. Although the State introduced such evidence, including incidents from before the victim's abuse, defendant did not renew his objection after the evidence was presented. The court did not provide a specific limiting instruction, but the failure to do so is not deemed an obvious error affecting substantial rights on appeal. Finally, defendant contests the admissibility of testimony regarding a witness's experience of a sexual encounter involving defendant and his wife, which included the phrase “Daddy, don’t” from a child. The objection to this testimony was overruled, and defendant claims it constituted inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is defined as a statement made outside of the courtroom, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, according to M.R.Evid. 801(c). The phrase “Daddy don’t” is not classified as hearsay since it was not used to assert any truth. In cases such as State v. Adams and State v. Northup, prior consistent statements were considered non-hearsay when used to illustrate timing or circumstances rather than truth. The evidentiary value of the discussed statements lies in their mere utterance, not their content. The court correctly admitted the testimony, affirming that the statement did not constitute hearsay. All judgments were affirmed with concurrence. Additionally, during redirect examination, a witness reported that the defendant’s wife stated the defendant was "going in to fuck his daughter" and that he "does it all the time," which were not contested on appeal regarding their admission.