Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island; June 6, 1991; Rhode Island; State Supreme Court
Philip and Bruce Saccoccio appealed a summary judgment from the Superior Court that favored Silver Lake Pizza, Inc. in a personal injury case involving Kimberly Babbitt. Babbitt had filed a complaint claiming she was injured in an automobile accident on January 30, 1988, while a passenger in a car owned by Silver Lake and driven by Marie Acciardo. She alleged that Bruce Saccoccio negligently struck the Silver Lake vehicle from behind, resulting in her cervical strain. Both Babbitt and Acciardo were employees of Silver Lake at the time of the accident.
In response to Babbitt's complaint, the Saccoccios denied liability and filed a third-party complaint against Acciardo and Silver Lake, seeking contribution or indemnification if found liable. Silver Lake moved for summary judgment, citing a memorandum of agreement made with Babbitt and its workers’ compensation carrier before her personal injury action, which stipulated that she would receive workers’ compensation benefits for her injuries. Silver Lake argued that this agreement waived Babbitt's rights against them under Rhode Island’s Workers’ Compensation Act, specifically citing sections 28-29-17 and 28-29-20, which outline the waiver of common law rights for employees receiving workers’ compensation.
Silver Lake's owner, Andrew Fidas, affirmed that Silver Lake had a workers’ compensation policy at the time of the accident and that Babbitt had not notified them of any claim for common law damages. Therefore, Silver Lake contended it could not be liable to the Saccoccios for contribution or indemnification since they were not liable to Babbitt. In opposition, the Saccoccios contended that Babbitt was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits as she was outside the scope of her employment during the accident. The court ultimately affirmed Silver Lake's motion for summary judgment.
The Saccoccios argued that Babbitt was traveling from work to home at the time of her accident, and they claimed Silver Lake was not immune from third-party actions for contribution or indemnification since Babbitt was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. A motion for summary judgment was heard and granted on December 5, 1989, alongside Silver Lake’s motion for final judgment, leading to an appeal.
Summary judgment is intended to reduce litigation when no genuine issues of material fact exist. The trial court's only concern in such motions is to determine if any material fact requires resolution. If the evidence, viewed favorably for the opposing party, shows no such issues, summary judgment is appropriate. The appellate court applies the same standard as the trial court in reviewing these decisions.
The trial justice found that Babbitt was an employee of Silver Lake at the time of the accident and that a memorandum of agreement had been executed between Babbitt and Silver Lake's workers' compensation carrier for her injuries. According to G.L. 1956 § 28-35-1, as amended, this agreement entitles Babbitt to workers’ compensation benefits. Appeals regarding such agreements are governed by § 28-35-5, which allows for appeals by employers or insurers in cases of fraud, coercion, or mutual mistake, and by injured employees or their beneficiaries under specific conditions laid out in the statute. The statute clearly outlines the grounds for appealing a memorandum of agreement, emphasizing that both parties have rights to contest under defined circumstances.
Section 28-35-5 does not grant a remedy or appeal rights to third parties who do not qualify as employers, insurers, injured employees, or beneficiaries of deceased employees' compensation. Consequently, the Saccoccios were deemed without standing to challenge the agreement between Babbitt and Silver Lake's workers’ compensation carrier. Upon reviewing the record, it was determined that no genuine issues of material fact were present, and Silver Lake was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Silver Lake. As a result, the Saccoccios' appeal is denied and dismissed, the judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded to Superior Court. The excerpt also notes that subsection (5) of G.L. 1956 (1986 Reenactment) § 28-35-5 has been amended to allow aggrieved parties to petition the workers' compensation court to hear additional matters as specified in related chapters.
