You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.

Cogswell v. Max Silverstein & Sons, Inc.

Citations: 488 A.2d 732; 1985 R.I. LEXIS 455Docket: No. 82-400-Appeal

Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island; March 5, 1985; Rhode Island; State Supreme Court

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil
An appeal was filed regarding a decision by the Workers’ Compensation Commission that denied a petition from the widow of a deceased employee, Clarence Cogswell, to amend a preliminary agreement on compensation. The widow argued that the rate of compensation should reflect the law in effect at the time of the employee's death rather than at the time of his injury. Cogswell was injured on July 2, 1974, and died from those injuries on September 11, 1974, after being totally incapacitated. At the time of his injury, he had one minor child dependent on him. A nonprejudicial agreement was signed on July 3, 1974, establishing compensation at the maximum weekly rate of $81.55, plus dependency benefits, which remained unchanged until after his death. 

Subsequent legislative changes effective September 1, 1974, raised the maximum total disability weekly benefit to $97, but the widow’s agreement was executed after her husband's death. The appeal centers on whether the widow is entitled to the increased benefits established by the new law. The court cited precedent, emphasizing that dependency determinations are based on the date of injury, not subsequent changes in law or benefits. The ruling in Johnson v. Lanifero and Newton v. Rhode Island Company supports that dependency is determined by reliance on earnings at the time of injury. The court indicated that the widow's rights to benefits were bound by the agreement established at the time of her husband's injury.

The dependent widow's right to compensation is intrinsically linked to the employee's right resulting from a compensable injury, establishing that they are based on a single cause of action. Only those who were dependents at the time of the employee's injury are entitled to compensation following his death. According to the amended Section 28-33-12, benefits for the dependent widow are determined by the husband's date of injury, ensuring that these benefits reflect the weekly rate for total incapacity that the deceased employee would have received. The dependent widow's benefits are a continuation of the deceased husband's benefits and cannot exceed what he would have received had he survived. The ruling states that the petitioner’s compensation benefits are governed by the statute in effect on July 2, 1974, leading to the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal and affirmation of the decree. Additionally, Public Laws 1974, chapter 268, removed previous limitations on benefits but maintained that the widow's compensation is limited to what the employee would have received.