Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island; August 21, 1984; Rhode Island; State Supreme Court
Wendall J. Flanders, Director of the Department of Transportation, appealed a Superior Court judgment that permanently enjoined him from interfering with an access driveway built by Speedy Muffler King, Inc. (Speedy) for its business. The court reversed this judgment. In 1959, the State of Rhode Island condemned property owned by Alfred J. Gemma, Barbara L. Gemma, and Frank Zabatta for constructing a portion of Interstate Route 95, with a condemnation map clearly indicating the land was designated for freeway purposes. Under Rhode Island law, a freeway is defined as a thoroughfare where abutters do not have rights of access due to the designation. The law also allows the director to extinguish existing easements and regulate access to the freeway. In 1976, the State reconveyed a portion of the condemned property back to the Gemmas and Zabatta, but this deed contained a restriction explicitly reserving the right of access to the State, thereby preventing access to the adjacent Service Road No. 7. An amended plat was filed in 1976, altering the freeway line to run along the boundary of Service Road No. 7. In 1979, a representative from Speedy evaluated the reconveyed property for potential business development.
An option contract was negotiated to purchase property for a Speedy facility, contingent on obtaining necessary permits, including a twenty-six-foot-wide driveway access from Service Road No. 7. The Gemmas and Zabatta later sold the property to Speedy without any deed restrictions regarding access to this road. The required driveway permit was issued by Traffic Engineer Frank A. Tibaldi, who was unaware of an established freeway line along Service Road No. 7, which would have necessitated approval from the Director of Transportation. At trial, it was established that Speedy required access to Service Road No. 7 for effective business operation, but the trial justice found existing access via Carpenter and Cottage Streets inadequate and deemed that allowing access to Service Road No. 7 would not create a traffic hazard. However, the trial justice mistakenly overlooked evidence of constructive notice regarding the freeway line, which was documented in city records dating back to 1959, as well as prior conveyances and an engineer’s survey from 1979 that clearly indicated highway and freeway lines. This evidence suggests Speedy had both actual and constructive notice of the freeway line, contradicting the trial justice’s findings. Therefore, the claims that Speedy was unaware of the freeway line, that access would not pose a traffic hazard, and that Speedy was severely disadvantaged due to lack of access could not support the trial judgment. Additionally, the permit from the traffic engineer was ineffective without the necessary approval from the Director of Transportation, which had not been obtained.
The director's authority to grant access rights is constrained by 23 U.S.C.A. 111 (1966) and 23 C.F.R. 620.203 (1979), which require Federal Highway Administrator approval for freeway access. In this case, the Federal Highway Administrator's representatives contested the access granted to Speedy, prompting the current litigation. Speedy had both constructive and actual notice of the access limitations, thus a court of equity cannot provide relief to create access rights despite these restrictions, as it would contradict statutory duties. The director and the Federal Highway Administrator are not legally obligated to override these statutory rights and duties. Consequently, the director's appeal is upheld, the Superior Court's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for a judgment favoring the director. Additionally, General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment), 34-13-2 establishes that recorded documents serve as constructive notice to all regarding their contents.
