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Timothy A. Brown v. Robert J. Lowen, F. Elwood Kyser, and International Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots

Citations: 857 F.2d 216; 113 A.L.R. Fed. 781; 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2363; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 12324; 1988 WL 94109Docket: 88-2876

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; September 14, 1988; Federal Appellate Court

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Timothy A. Brown, the plaintiff-appellee, is a candidate for president of the International Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots (IOMPP), whose current president is Robert J. Lowen, one of the defendants-appellants. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed an appeal concerning a district court's preliminary injunction favoring Brown, which ordered IOMPP to provide him with mailing labels containing the names and addresses of its voting members. This decision effectively constituted a ruling on the merits, leading to the court affirming the district court's decision.

IOMPP is a labor organization representing maritime workers, holding quadrennial elections where nominations occur at a convention. Eligible members, in good standing, can be nominated, including self-nomination. Ballots are mailed to members within a specific timeframe after the convention, with a 90-day return period for votes.

The primary issue in this case is Brown's request to distribute campaign literature to union members before the nominating convention. IOMPP's current procedures only allow literature distribution after nominations are finalized. However, under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (29 U.S.C. Sec. 481(c)), unions are mandated to comply with reasonable requests from bona fide candidates to distribute campaign materials at their own expense to all members in good standing. Brown asserts his right to have his campaign literature mailed to union members within thirty days preceding the union's quadrennial meeting, relying on this statutory provision.

The Act mandates that unions must comply with reasonable requests from candidates for union office to distribute campaign materials, regardless of their nomination status. The determination of reasonableness hinges on the Act’s directive for unions to conduct elections that are "free and democratic." A reasonable request, particularly one made approximately one month before nominations, should be granted; failure to do so constitutes a continuing violation of Title IV, potentially impacting election outcomes. The Department of Labor has consistently interpreted the statute to emphasize the reasonableness of the candidate's request, rather than the union's rules. Although the Department's opinion is not legally binding, it is significant and aligns with Congress's intent to promote union democracy and mitigate the incumbents' advantages. The Act aims to ensure fair elections by requiring unions to allow access to membership lists for candidates, thereby reducing the benefits of incumbency.

The plaintiff's request is deemed reasonable, with no argument from the union contesting its unreasonableness. The union asserts that its by-laws restrict the distribution of campaign literature until after the nomination process, which unfairly delays insurgent candidates and limits their campaigning time compared to incumbents who have had four years of exclusive access to voter lists and union communication channels. The union justifies its by-law as a means to prevent discrimination among candidates but fails to show how granting the plaintiff's request would disadvantage others. The court finds that granting the request would not discriminate against any candidate, as all candidates would have equal rights. The ruling emphasizes that the assessment should focus on the reasonableness of the plaintiff's request rather than the by-law itself, stating that the union's rationale misinterprets the statutory requirement. The court concludes that the union must comply with the statute, rejecting any notion that the by-law could supersede congressional mandates. The district court's decision to grant relief to the plaintiff is upheld.

The judgment affirms the district court's decision, despite being contrary to the Third Circuit's ruling in Donovan v. Metropolitan District Council of Carpenters, which upheld a union's reasonable rule regarding the release of mailing labels. The majority emphasizes that the reasonableness of a candidate's request should be evaluated, not the union's rules. In dissent, Circuit Judge K.K. Hall argues that a candidate's request conflicting with established union procedures is inherently unreasonable unless those procedures are shown to be unfair or discriminatory. Hall contends that affirming the district court's conclusion adopts a restrictive interpretation of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), which contradicts its purpose of promoting union democracy. He asserts that democracy operates within a framework of fair procedures and that the majority's assessment overlooks the necessity of context in evaluating the reasonableness of requests. Hall references Supreme Court precedent emphasizing that the LMRDA should not undermine union self-governance and that incumbency advantages should not be overstated. He concludes that there is no evidence that the union's rules unfairly distort the democratic process in favor of incumbents.

Both the Third Circuit and Ninth Circuit have determined that a candidate's adherence to reasonable, nondiscriminatory union procedures is pertinent in assessing the reasonableness of a mailing request. The Donovan court emphasized the importance of fair, uniform rules to prevent even the appearance of disparate treatment and to reduce unnecessary judicial scrutiny. In contrast, the majority opinion asserts that unions lack the authority to organize their electoral processes, even if such structuring promotes union democracy, a conclusion that the dissenting opinion finds unreasonable under section 481(c) of the statute. The dissent argues against the majority's view that the union's challenge to the mailing request is unreasonable, suggesting that the union's argument is broader than acknowledged. Furthermore, the dissent expresses skepticism towards the Secretary of Labor's stance, asserting that it conflicts with reasonable statutory interpretation and the Department of Labor's own regulations, which recognize that distribution of campaign literature can be governed by specific rules and require unions to inform candidates of these conditions.