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United States of America, in 87-1756 and in 88-5143 v. Angelita Martinez-Zayas A/K/A "Carmen Lopez", in 87-1749 and in 88-5143, the Honorable Clarence C. Newcomer, Nominal in 88-5143
Citations: 857 F.2d 122; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 11887Docket: 88-5143
Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; August 31, 1988; Federal Appellate Court
Angelita Martinez-Zayas was convicted for possession with intent to distribute twelve kilograms of cocaine, violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). The district court recognized that, under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, she technically qualified for a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years due to the quantity of drugs involved. However, the court determined that Congress did not intend for a middle-level dealer like Martinez-Zayas to receive such a harsh sentence, instead imposing a five-year term without parole based on legislative intent. The government appealed this decision, arguing that the sentence contravened the mandatory sentencing guidelines established by Congress. The Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's interpretation of § 841(b) and directed it to vacate the five-year sentence, requiring a new sentencing consistent with the ten-year minimum. In her cross-appeal, Martinez-Zayas challenged the admissibility of the cocaine evidence, asserting that the government improperly searched her purse under a warrant that only authorized a search of her house. Additionally, she contended the warrant was invalid because it was issued by a non-lawyer bail commissioner rather than an appropriate judicial authority. The court upheld the district court's decision, ruling that the warrant did allow for the search of her purse and that Martinez-Zayas did not adequately raise her Rule 41 claim in the lower court. Even if there were a violation, it did not constitute plain error warranting suppression of the evidence. Martinez-Zayas was convicted for violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (possession with intent to distribute cocaine) and § 856 (maintaining a building for drug storage) after evidence was obtained through a joint operation by the DEA and Philadelphia Police. On November 3, 1986, DEA Agent Richard Fekete received a tip about a cocaine shipment linked to Angel Hernandez, leading to the preparation of a search warrant for 517 West Butler Street, which was authorized by a Philadelphia Municipal Court bail commissioner. The warrant permitted the search for cocaine, other illegal drugs, and related evidence. Upon arrival, agents observed Martinez-Zayas entering the property with a purse. After presenting the warrant, they questioned her and searched her purse, finding identification and over six grams of cocaine, resulting in her arrest. Further investigation revealed significant amounts of drug-cutting substances and more than twelve kilograms of cocaine hidden in the premises. The district court denied a motion to suppress the cocaine, affirming that the warrant was supported by probable cause under the Illinois v. Gates standard. The court noted that the issuance of the warrant by a bail commissioner did not warrant heightened scrutiny, as these officials are trained and qualified to assess probable cause. Martinez-Zayas later filed a supplemental motion to suppress the search of her purse. After a hearing, the court upheld the search, concluding that the government was justified in examining the purse found in her immediate vicinity under the prevailing legal standards. At trial, the parties agreed that over twelve kilograms of cocaine were seized from Martinez-Zayas. She was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and maintaining a building for storing cocaine. Despite the significant quantity involved, the district court decided not to impose the mandatory ten-year minimum sentence typically associated with possession of over five kilograms. The court noted that law enforcement's pursuit of Martinez-Zayas aimed to secure her cooperation against her boyfriend, a suspected major drug distributor. Additionally, the court highlighted her status as a welfare recipient and her refusal to cooperate in the investigation. Citing the legislative intent behind the sentencing guidelines, the court concluded that Congress aimed to target drug kingpins, which Martinez-Zayas did not fit. Consequently, she was sentenced as a "middle-level" dealer under a different provision to a five-year prison term without parole. The appellate review of the sentence was contested. The government argued for jurisdiction based on 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(b)(1), claiming the sentence violated the law due to its application of the new sentencing guidelines to an offense committed before those guidelines' effective date. The court noted that while the statute's procedural provisions apply to sentences imposed after the effective date, it did not resolve whether the statute applies to offenses committed prior to that date, indicating ambiguity in legislative history that did not necessitate a decision on the issue. Shortly after the sentence was imposed, Congress clarified its intent regarding the application of the sentencing statute for offenses committed prior to its effective date. The December 7, 1987 amendment explicitly stated that the new sentencing laws, including Sec. 3742, apply only to offenses committed after November 1, 1987. Consequently, since the offense in question occurred before this date, Sec. 3742 does not provide jurisdiction for the government's appeal. However, under the All Writs Act, the court may issue a writ of mandamus in extraordinary cases if two conditions are met: there are no other adequate means for relief, and the district court made a clear legal error. The government has no other avenue for appellate review due to the lack of jurisdiction from Sec. 3742, necessitating an examination of whether the district court's application of Sec. 841(b) constituted clear error. While sentences within statutory limits typically cannot be reviewed, sentences that deviate from statutory mandates can be scrutinized. The court can consider whether the district court had jurisdiction to impose a certain sentence and whether it acted within its authority. Mandamus may be warranted if a court fails to impose a legally mandated sentence. The government must demonstrate that its entitlement to the writ is "clear and indisputable" to compel the district court to act according to its jurisdiction. The court must also determine if the district court had a nondiscretionary duty under Sec. 841(b) to impose a mandatory ten-year prison term without parole on Martinez-Zayas, which is the central issue in this appeal. Section 841(b)(1)(A) mandates that individuals found guilty of violating subsection (a) involving 5 kilograms or more of cocaine face a minimum sentence of 10 years and a maximum of life imprisonment, without eligibility for probation or parole. Section 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II) establishes a different standard for violations involving 500 grams or more of cocaine, resulting in a minimum sentence of 5 years and a maximum of 40 years, also without probation or parole. The government argues that the district court erred by sentencing Martinez-Zayas to 5 years instead of the required 10 years under Section 841(b)(1)(A), asserting that Congress removed discretion for judges in such cases. Conversely, Martinez-Zayas contends that the legislative history indicates that a mandatory 10-year sentence was not intended in all circumstances, a perspective supported by the district court's ruling. However, the analysis of the statutory language indicates no ambiguity; the law clearly states that for violations involving 5 kilograms or more, a minimum 10-year sentence is obligatory. This case differs from Douglas, where ambiguity allowed discretion for consecutive or concurrent sentences. Here, the explicit directive from Congress indicates that a conviction involving 5 kilograms mandates a 10-year minimum sentence, potentially extending to life. The exceptions in Section 841(b) only allow for increased penalties under specific conditions and do not provide grounds for reducing the mandatory minimum, reflecting Congress's intent to ensure significant incarceration for certain drug offenses. The government argues that the inquiry should end upon identifying clear statutory language, but this perspective oversimplifies judicial precedent. Even in cases of unambiguous statutes, legislative history can warrant deviation from the text if a party demonstrates a "clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary." While legislative history should not overshadow clear statutory purpose, it is essential to consider relevant legislative utterances, though these should not be overemphasized as Congress primarily votes on bill language rather than individual remarks. Martinez-Zayas contends that Congress intended its mandatory sentencing laws to target significant drug traffickers, known as "kingpins." At trial, she portrayed herself as a struggling mother, claiming ignorance of the drug operation associated with her partner, Angel Hernandez, and asserting that she was not involved in the drug activities occurring in her home. Although the jury dismissed her assertions, the district court referenced some of her testimony to conclude that she did not fit the profile aimed at by Section 841(b)(1)(A). However, the legislative history of Section 841(b) does not provide sufficient grounds to deviate from the statute's clear wording. Although congressional debates included references to "kingpins" and "masterminds," these discussions do not constitute an unequivocal legislative intent to exclude individuals like Martinez-Zayas from the statute's application. Reliance on isolated fragments of legislative history to determine congressional intent carries significant risk, necessitating a comprehensive reading of statutory language and overall legislative history. During debates on the 1986 drug bill, Congress acknowledged the severity of drug-related issues, with Senators Domenici, Lautenberg, and Kennedy characterizing drug use and distribution as major societal threats. The bill aimed to punish major traffickers and manufacturers, identifying drug quantity as the primary criterion for imposing heightened sentences. The House Judiciary Committee, after consultations with DEA agents and prosecutors, established specific drug quantities indicative of significant trafficking levels. Senator Byrd emphasized the importance of mandatory minimum sentences to deter crime, asserting that certain serious drug offenses would eliminate judicial discretion in sentencing. He highlighted that individuals identified as "kingpins" would face minimum ten-year sentences based on their drug involvement. This focus on drug quantity as the determinant for mandatory sentencing was codified in Section 841(b), which enforces minimum prison terms based on drug weight. The law imposes stringent penalties, including five- and ten-year minimum sentences, affirming that individuals like Martinez-Zayas, based on drug quantity in her case, fall under this mandatory sentencing requirement. The legislative history aligns with the statute's plain language, reinforcing the intended application of Section 841(b). Martinez-Zayas argues she should not face a ten-year mandatory prison term based on two points. First, she cites United States v. Gibbs, asserting that facts triggering mandatory penalties are sentencing facts, not elements of the offense, implying that the sentencing judge has discretion to determine these factors independently of the jury. The court disagrees, noting that the parties agreed on the cocaine quantity—twelve kilograms—rendering the judge's fact-finding discretionary task unnecessary. Martinez-Zayas' reliance on Gibbs is deemed misplaced, as Gibbs clarifies that quantity is a penalty provision relevant only at sentencing, not related to guilt. The court emphasizes that the indictment provided sufficient notice regarding the drug amount, and the trial record supported the finding, which Martinez-Zayas did not contest. Second, Martinez-Zayas contends she should be treated as an aider and abettor rather than a principal in her conviction under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a). However, she was indicted solely under this statute, and the jury was not instructed on aiding and abetting, nor did Martinez-Zayas seek such an instruction. This distinguishes her case from United States v. Ambrose, where aiding and abetting was a key factor in the defendants' convictions. The court concludes that the lack of an aiding and abetting charge in her indictment and trial proceedings precludes her argument for a lesser sentencing standard. Martinez-Zayas was convicted as a principal in a drug case, which mandated a ten-year sentence due to the quantity of cocaine involved, regardless of her potential role as an aider and abettor. The government presented substantial evidence against her, including the discovery of twelve kilograms of cocaine hidden in her home and significant drug paraphernalia in her basement. Despite her claims of ignorance regarding the drug activities, the evidence supported the jury's verdict. The court acknowledged the district judge's view that Martinez-Zayas was not a major drug trafficker and only held a middle-level role in a drug ring operated by her boyfriend, Angel Hernandez. However, Congress's sentencing guidelines did not allow the judge to consider her lesser role in determining the sentence. This situation highlights the limitations of mandatory sentencing laws, which apply rigidly based on drug quantity and can encompass less culpable individuals. The court granted the government's motion to resentence Martinez-Zayas under the mandatory sentencing provisions, emphasizing that the inflexible nature of these laws can undermine the justice and effectiveness of the sentencing system. Congress has largely removed the district court's discretion in sentencing by mandating a minimum penalty of ten years for certain offenses, effectively shifting the sentencing authority to prosecutors. This mandatory sentencing framework, particularly under Sec. 841(b), results in individuals like Martinez-Zayas receiving the same penalties as major drug traffickers, despite the court's acknowledgment of her lesser culpability. The court must consider the nature of the offense and the defendant's characteristics when determining sentences, but is constrained by Congress's directives. Martinez-Zayas argues that the district court incorrectly denied her motion to suppress cocaine found in her purse and in her children's bedroom. The court found the search of her purse valid because it was part of the authorized search warrant, which allowed for the examination of items associated with the crime. Martinez-Zayas also challenges the legitimacy of the search warrant issued by a Philadelphia Municipal Court bail commissioner, claiming that such officials lack the authority to issue federal warrants under Fed. R.Crim. P. 41(a). While the district court addressed the bail commissioner's role, it did not consider the Rule 41(a) issue, which Martinez-Zayas had failed to raise at the trial level. Consequently, the appellate review is limited to plain error, focusing on errors that affect substantial rights. The government argues that bail commissioners, trained and authorized under Pennsylvania law, qualify as judges under Rule 41(a), although the rule itself provides limited clarity on this matter. Section 611 permits the issuance of search warrants by judges from U.S. district courts, state or territorial courts of record, or U.S. commissioners. Historical interpretation has indicated that warrants can't be issued on blank forms by municipal court clerks, but U.S. commissioners were explicitly authorized to issue them, even before the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968 mandated that these commissioners be lawyers. However, this does not imply that non-lawyer state officials can qualify as judges of state courts of record. Under Rule 41(a), the determination of whether an individual is a judge of a state court of record is subject to state law, as seen in various case law. Rule 41 includes state judges due to their greater availability compared to federal magistrates. In Pennsylvania, statutory provisions allow judges of the Philadelphia Municipal Court to appoint bail commissioners with specific authorities, including issuing warrants. Pennsylvania law identifies "district justices, bail commissioners, and judges" as non-bar members classified as "minor judiciary." These individuals must complete training and examinations before taking office and engage in annual refresher courses. The training requirements differ by position, with bail commissioners having a shorter initial course compared to district justices. Additionally, Pennsylvania defines "district justices" as justices of the peace, while "judicial officers" encompass judges and various appointive officials. The term "judge" includes supreme court justices and senior judges, with the definition of "court" referring to judges exercising court powers as authorized by law or court rules. Philadelphia bail commissioners have the authority to issue search warrants, but state law does not clearly define their status in comparison to Municipal Court judges or other appointed nonlegal judicial officers within the court system. Courts from other states provide limited insight, as their focus is more on whether a court is classified as a "court of record" rather than on the definition of a "judge." In Pennsylvania, the only relevant cases indicate that a magistrate's court is not a state court of record, and justices of the peace cannot issue warrants under federal rules. A significant case highlighted the issue of federal agents bypassing appropriate judicial channels to obtain a warrant from a justice of the peace, raising questions about the validity of such practices. Although there are concerns regarding the legality of obtaining search warrants from Philadelphia bail commissioners instead of federal magistrates, this issue does not need resolution at this moment. Even if a violation of Rule 41 occurred, the case is governed by the principle that not all Rule 41 violations warrant the exclusion of evidence unless they are of constitutional significance. Exclusion may only be warranted if there is evidence of prejudice or intentional disregard for the rule. The concept of good faith in this context means that officers did not knowingly violate the rule or act with reckless disregard for its requirements. Suppression of evidence for a violation of Rule 41(d) requires the defendant to demonstrate prejudice. In this case, Martinez-Zayas' claim involves a technical violation of Rule 41, rather than a constitutional issue under the Fourth Amendment. Evidence will only be excluded if the violation meets the Burke test for suppression. The record does not show any reckless disregard or bad faith by the agents in obtaining the warrant, which was issued by a bail commissioner, a role authorized under Pennsylvania law. Although the agents could have sought the warrant from a federal magistrate, the urgency of the situation—prompted by an informant's tip about cocaine distribution—does not imply intentional disregard for Rule 41’s requirements. The joint investigation by the DEA and the Philadelphia Police does not provide grounds to attribute bad faith to the agents. Rule 41 permits warrants from either federal magistrates or judges of state courts of record, and if the bail commissioner qualifies as such under Pennsylvania law, the warrant's issuance was lawful. There is no evidence suggesting the agents believed a federal magistrate would deny the warrant. Furthermore, the validity of the warrant was upheld by the district court, and Martinez-Zayas does not argue its defects. Therefore, the violation of Rule 41(a), if any, does not constitute plain error. The court directed the district court to vacate Martinez-Zayas' five-year sentence and resentence her, while affirming the denial of her motion to suppress the cocaine seized from her purse and home. Drug organizations sometimes replicate competitors' branding to attract customers, as evidenced by the discovery of two rolls of yellow tape, typically associated with the Hernandez organization, alongside six rolls of various colors. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 was amended to apply only to offenses committed after its enactment date. While Martinez-Zayas did not challenge the constitutionality of mandatory sentences under Section 841, her financial situation involved receiving welfare and earning approximately $286 weekly from intermittent employment at a box company, where she worked under an alias due to lack of support from the Welfare Department. Concerns regarding mandatory sentencing highlight that the removal of judicial discretion could lead to unfair outcomes, treating dissimilar offenders similarly and undermining the nuanced nature of individual cases. Congress attempted to address this by establishing sentencing guidelines through 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553 and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994. The Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Ross supports this view, reinforcing that a lawful search extends throughout the premises where the search's objective may be found, allowing for the opening of containers that might conceal the sought-after items. A legitimate search, once defined in purpose and scope, allows for the efficient execution of the search without excessive focus on distinctions among personal items within a home. Martinez-Zayas argues that the search of her purse was unlawful since she was seen carrying it upon entering the house. However, the court disagrees, noting the purse was not on her person but rather on a table approximately four feet away. The analysis centers on whether the search involved her physical possession and the relationship between her and the residence. The Supreme Court has indicated that search warrants can be issued by non-lawyers, emphasizing a common-sense approach to probable cause. Nonetheless, there are concerns about the implications of non-lawyers issuing warrants, including the complexity of search and seizure laws and the potential reliance on law enforcement for guidance. The excerpt also references a past case regarding nighttime searches, clarifying its irrelevance to the current discussion. Additionally, Agent Fekete testified about intelligence regarding cocaine distribution at the location prior to the warrant's issuance, supporting the agents' belief in ongoing illegal activity.