Volvo North America Corporation, International Merchandising Corporation, and Proserv, Inc. v. Men's International Professional Tennis Council, M. Marshall Happer, Iii, and Philippe Chatrier, Men's International Professional Tennis Council and M. Marshall Happer, Iii, Counterclaimants v. Volvo North America Corporation, International Merchandising Corporation, and Proserv, Inc., Counterclaim-Defendants v. Donald L. Dell, Raymond S. Benton, Dell, Benton & Falk, Mark H. McCormack International Merchandising Group, International Management Inc., Transworld International Inc., and A.B. Volvo, Additional Counterclaim-Defendants

Citations: 857 F.2d 55; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 14091Docket: 1203

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; August 30, 1988; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

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An appeal was filed by Volvo North America Corporation, International Merchandising Corporation, and ProServ, Inc. against the dismissal of Counts One through Seven of their amended complaint by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The court found that these counts failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Counts One through Five alleged a conspiracy by the Men's International Professional Tennis Council and its officials to violate Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, aimed at monopolizing and restraining trade in men's professional tennis event production, player services, and broadcasting rights. Counts Six and Seven included state law claims for tortious interference with prospective business relations and unfair competition.

The appellate court vacated the dismissal of specific antitrust and common law claims, remanding the case with instructions to allow repleading, while reversing the dismissal of other claims. The amended complaint described the business of men's professional tennis, highlighting that event production involves site selection, marketing, and revenue generation through sponsorships and ticket sales. The 'owner' of the event bears the financial responsibility and receives the generated revenues, often collaborating with third parties for marketing and event management.

An event may have multiple sponsors, including: a) a title sponsor, which has its name in the event's title; b) a presenting sponsor, which markets the event as being 'presented by' them; and c) secondary sponsors, who acquire rights for specific product associations with the event. Volvo serves as an owner, producer, and sponsor of certain men's professional tennis events. IMC and ProServ also own and produce tennis events while providing management services to players. Men's professional tennis events are categorized into two groups: sanctioned events (by MIPTC or the International Tennis Federation, including the Davis Cup and Grand Prix events such as the Grand Slam tournaments) and 'Special Events,' which are unsanctioned. Volvo has historically focused on sanctioned events, while IMC and ProServ have managed both categories.

Historically, until the late 1960s, only amateur players participated in ITF-sanctioned tournaments. The emergence of World Championship Tennis, Inc. (WCT) led to many top players turning professional and competing in WCT events, prompting the ITF to allow professionals in their tournaments. In 1974, ITF co-founded MIPTC, which currently includes representatives from ITF, professional players, and tournament directors, sanctioning Grand Prix events. From 1974 to 1981, MIPTC expanded its Grand Prix events from fifty to ninety, implementing 'Commitment Agreements' for player participation. As a result, WCT agreed to have its events sanctioned by MIPTC, owning eight by 1981.

A dispute arose in 1981 regarding WCT's involvement in the Grand Prix, leading WCT to withdraw and attempt to create an independent circuit. WCT later filed a lawsuit alleging antitrust violations by MIPTC, ITF, and the Association of Tennis Professionals, claiming they conspired to monopolize professional men's tennis.

The lawsuit concluded in the fall of 1983 with the integration of WCT events into the Grand Prix, resulting in the MIPTC-WCT Agreement. Key provisions included: MIPTC's commitment to sanction a minimum number of WCT tournaments and provide scheduling protection; WCT's restriction from sponsoring any events that could negatively impact Grand Prix events without MIPTC approval; WCT's potential termination of its role as an agent for male tennis players under certain conditions; exemptions and scheduling priority for WCT's special events; limitations on the number of sanctioned events by MIPTC; mandatory participation in WCT Finals for qualified players; increased required participation in MIPTC-sanctioned events; and MIPTC's efforts to promote both WCT and MIPTC events among players.

Volvo's involvement in professional tennis began in 1973 with the Volvo International Tennis Tournament. It expanded its sponsorship to include Grand Prix tournaments from 1980-1984 but faced tension with MIPTC after the latter awarded future sponsorship rights to Nabisco Brands, Inc. Although Volvo retained rights to Madison Square Garden for the 1985 Masters Tournament and made broadcasting commitments, MIPTC challenged the legality and ethics of Volvo's contracts. In January 1985, Volvo assigned its rights to MIPTC, which agreed to sanction a tennis event for Volvo, contingent upon Volvo not sponsoring Special Events in North America during Grand Prix weeks or in cities hosting Grand Prix events, along with commitments for mutual promotional cooperation.

Volvo alleges that M. Marshall Happer, administrator of MIPTC, actively sought to intimidate tournament owners and producers from engaging with Volvo for Grand Prix events. Happer purportedly contacted major sports networks to assert that Volvo was misleading the public about its sponsorship status and requested that they prevent Volvo from displaying its logo during broadcasts. 

In April 1985, Volvo initiated legal action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, asserting federal antitrust and common law claims against MIPTC, Chatrier, and Happer. An amended complaint filed in September 1985 included IMC and ProServ as co-plaintiffs and alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, claiming conspiracies to monopolize and restrain trade in men's professional tennis. The relevant markets identified by the plaintiffs included the production of tennis events, the tennis-playing services of male athletes, and the television broadcasting rights for these events.

The complaint outlines several alleged Sherman Act violations by MIPTC, including restrictions on event production, player compensation ceilings, and coercive agreements with WCT that stifle competition. Additionally, MIPTC’s requirement for players to sign Commitment Agreements hinders their ability to compete in non-sanctioned tournaments by mandating participation in a minimum number of Grand Prix events and restricting participation in Special Events during key tournament weeks. This leads to significant limitations on player competition opportunities throughout the year.

Players are prohibited from participating in any Special Event within thirty days of significant tournaments (Grand Slam, Masters, WCT Finals, Super Series) if the Special Event occurs within one hundred miles of these tournaments. Additionally, players cannot participate in more than four Special Events during the same week on the same continent as MIPTC Super Series events. MIPTC requires event owners and producers to contribute to a bonus pool for rewarding high-performing players, incentivizing participation in sanctioned events.

Appellants assert that proposed restrictions could further limit their ability to compete in the market for men's professional tennis events. Notable rules include the "Special Event" Rule, preventing the promotion of Special Events during Grand Prix tournament weeks, which lasts forty-eight weeks a year, effectively barring the organization of Special Events. The "Best Interest" Rule grants MIPTC the discretion to refuse sanctioning events that do not serve the sport's best interests, while the "Conflicts of Interest" Rule allows MIPTC to restrict certain players from being invited as wild cards. Lastly, MIPTC seeks to become the exclusive agent for selling broadcasting rights for sanctioned events.

Appellants claim these restrictions harm them as owners and producers of Special Events by limiting player availability, reducing the number of events produced, and decreasing profitability. Volvo claims similar harm as a potential owner. All three appellants argue that the rules diminish their competitive capacity against MIPTC's sanctioned events. The complaint includes five counts alleging various antitrust violations: a group boycott and refusal to deal (Count One), conspiracy to restrain trade (Count Two), acquisition and maintenance of monopoly power (Count Three), attempt to monopolize (Count Four), and conspiracy to monopolize (Count Five).

Appellants allege tortious interference with business relations (Count Six) and unfair competition (Count Seven) by MIPTC, along with claims of breach of contract, fraud, defamation, and product disparagement (Counts Eight through Thirteen) by Volvo. Appellees moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing ripeness (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)), inadequacy of antitrust injury (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)), lack of subject matter jurisdiction for state law claims (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)), and failure to plead fraud with particularity (Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)). On August 10, 1987, Judge Duffy granted the motion to dismiss Counts One through Seven and Thirteen, allowing repleading for Counts Eight through Twelve. He primarily dismissed counts based on failure to state a claim, rather than appellees' arguments. Counts One and Two, alleging Sherman Act violations, were dismissed due to lack of an alleged conspirator and insufficient evidence of unreasonable trade restraints. Count Three (monopolization) was dismissed because MIPTC lacked monopoly power, while Counts Four (attempted monopolization) and Five (conspiracy to monopolize) were not expressly addressed. Count Six was dismissed for failing to show harmed business relations, Count Seven for not demonstrating misappropriation of property, and Count Thirteen for not alleging special damages. Appellants appealed the dismissal of Counts One through Seven and Thirteen, with the court denying the motion to dismiss the appeal for Counts One through Seven while granting it for Count Thirteen. On appeal, Volvo, IMC, and ProServ argue that the district court erred in dismissing claims without allowing amendments, asserting adequate antitrust injury and challenging the dismissal of the tortious interference claim; IMC and ProServ also contest the dismissal of the unfair competition claim, though Volvo has withdrawn this claim. The issue of ripeness regarding MIPTC's proposed rules was not addressed by the district court or raised on appeal, but is suggested for sua sponte consideration due to its relation to the existence of a live case or controversy.

The ripeness doctrine serves to prevent courts from engaging in premature adjudication of abstract disagreements, focusing on the timing of legal issues. Two main factors influence ripeness: the fitness of issues for judicial determination and the hardship faced by parties if court consideration is delayed. An issue is deemed fit if it is primarily legal and does not require further factual clarification. Hardship may be assessed based on the potential for imminent injury, which allows for preemptive legal challenges even before actual harm occurs.

In this case, appellants argue that the proposed Special Events Rule has immediate anti-competitive effects, deterring contracts between entities involved in Special Events and MIPTC-sanctioned events due to fears of future enforcement actions. They assert that this creates a real impact on current affairs, making their challenge to the rule ripe for judicial review. The straightforward nature of the proposal, which threatens to limit contractual agreements, suggests that further factual development would not significantly clarify its implications. Thus, the court finds the appellants' challenge to the Special Events Rule ripe for consideration.

Challenges to the Best Interest Rule, the Conflicts of Interest Rule, and the rule on pooled television broadcasting rights are deemed premature and not ripe for review. The appellants argue these rules currently create anticompetitive effects, such as heightened compliance demands from MIPTC and deterrence in contractual relationships with player-agents and television companies. However, these effects are considered more indirect than those of the Special Events Rule, making it difficult to predict the future implications of the other rules without further factual development. Consequently, the court vacates the district court's dismissal with prejudice of the claims related to these rules and instructs that they be dismissed without prejudice, allowing for potential challenges if the rules are enacted.

Additionally, appellees presented four arguments for dismissal, including issues of ripeness, insufficient antitrust claims, lack of jurisdiction over state law claims, and inadequate pleading of fraud claims. The appellants contend that the district court did not address these issues and dismissed the complaint based on unbriefed grounds, which deprived them of the opportunity to respond adequately.

The court erred in dismissing the appellants' complaint without addressing the arguments presented by either party. The dismissal of claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act was based on the court's determination that appellants failed to allege a conspiracy and that their conduct did not constitute unlawful restraints on competition in the men's professional tennis market. The monopolization claim was dismissed due to a lack of monopoly power by the defendant, MIPTC, while claims related to attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize were not considered. The court’s reasoning was unexpected for the appellants, as it did not align with the arguments presented.

The appellate court concluded that the district court's dismissal was improper since it relied on grounds not raised or briefed by the parties. Although a remand could have been considered, the appellate court opted to resolve the issue of antitrust injury directly, as all parties had already addressed this matter in their submissions. The primary argument from the appellees focused on the appellants' lack of 'antitrust standing,' claiming that the amended complaint did not sufficiently demonstrate that the appellants experienced or were threatened with 'antitrust injury,' a necessary element for standing.

Under the Clayton Act, specifically Sections 4 and 16, private parties can initiate actions for antitrust violations. Section 4 allows individuals injured by antitrust violations to sue for damages, while Section 16 provides for injunctive relief against threatened harm. However, courts have restricted these provisions to specific classes of plaintiffs and types of injury, requiring plaintiffs to establish more than just a causal link to the antitrust violation to recover damages or seek an injunction.

Plaintiffs must demonstrate antitrust injury, defined as harm intended to be prevented by antitrust laws, stemming from unlawful actions of defendants. Even if plaintiffs establish antitrust injury, they may be barred from recovery under Section 4 for various reasons, including the nature of the injury (direct or indirect), the presence of a self-interested class capable of enforcing antitrust laws, the speculative nature of the injury, and difficulties in quantifying and distributing damages without overlap. Some of these factors may also restrict claims for injunctive relief under Section 16.

Appellants assert that MIPTC operates as a cartel among tournament owners and producers, limiting competition and harming their interests as owners and producers of Special Events by restricting access to players, reducing the number of events produced, and decreasing profitability. Volvo claims similar injuries as a prospective event owner and producer. All appellants argue that MIPTC's rules hinder their competitive capabilities against sanctioned events organized by the defendants.

In response, MIPTC contends that the practices challenged by appellants do not constitute the type of injury antitrust laws aim to prevent. MIPTC argues that if it is indeed facilitating a cartel, then appellants, being sanctioned tournament owners and producers, lack standing to contest the cartel as they would benefit from its operations. This position parallels a precedent where plaintiffs, who were also beneficiaries of alleged anticompetitive conduct, could not seek damages for that conduct.

The Supreme Court has determined that private parties can raise antitrust challenges against horizontal mergers, even if they are members of a cartel. The Court rejected the idea of a blanket rule preventing cartel members from asserting antitrust claims against one another, arguing that the dynamics within a cartel often lead to conflicting interests among individual members, making cartels inherently unstable compared to monopolies. 

While a trade restraint may benefit the cartel collectively, it could disadvantage specific members, which does not automatically qualify as antitrust injury. For a member to demonstrate antitrust standing, they must show injury aligned with the public interest in competition, rather than merely a loss of potential gains from the cartel's collective actions. The Court cited previous cases to support that a cartel member can challenge the cartel if they credibly assert that competition would better serve their interests and thus align with antitrust laws. 

The document then shifts focus to specific claims made by appellants regarding MIPTC's management of the Grand Prix Circuit, alleging it has restricted their ability to organize tennis events in preferred ways, including site selection, player compensation, and scheduling.

Appellees contend that since appellants are owners and producers of MIPTC-sanctioned events, they benefit from rules that minimize scheduling conflicts and from a prize money ceiling, which they argue does not harm appellants. However, appellants maintain that MIPTC's decisions regarding site locations and scheduling may not align with their interests, potentially disadvantaging them despite their ownership status. They assert that MIPTC uses its authority to protect favored tournaments from competition, which satisfies the antitrust injury requirement. Additionally, rules limiting prize money could hinder appellants' ability to attract top players by offering competitive prizes, suggesting individual interests may diverge from the collective benefit of all event owners.

The document affirms that appellants have standing to challenge MIPTC's actions, as their interests align with promoting competition. Furthermore, the appellants challenge the MIPTC-WCT Agreement, alleging it divides markets and restricts competition. Appellees argue that appellants have not demonstrated antitrust injury from this agreement, claiming that MIPTC's preferential terms for WCT do not equate to anticompetitive behavior. Nevertheless, the court concludes that appellants have standing to contest the agreement on similar grounds as their challenge to MIPTC's scheduling and location decisions, as any collusion between MIPTC and WCT may not equally benefit all cartel members.

The excerpt addresses legal arguments concerning the Commitment Agreements that allegedly restrict men's professional tennis players from competing in non-sanctioned events, impacting the appellants, IMC and ProServ, as event owners and producers. Appellees argue that the appellants benefit from the restrictions since they can attract players to sanctioned Grand Prix events, and they assert that the appellants' claims are merely derivative of potential antitrust claims by the players themselves, which should not confer standing. Furthermore, appellees contend that the appellants have not demonstrated any specific events that suffered due to the Commitment Agreements and that these agreements do not outright prohibit player participation in non-sanctioned events but may increase costs for attracting players.

Despite these arguments, the court concludes that the appellants possess standing to challenge the Commitment Agreements, as the agreements are alleged to discourage player participation in non-sanctioned events, thereby inflating production costs for these events. This impacts event owners and producers, indicating they may have suffered injuries that antitrust laws aim to prevent. The court further finds that the appellants' injuries are not too indirect to warrant dismissal, allowing them to proceed with litigation despite the lack of specific instances of failed tournaments. Thus, all three appellants are deemed to have satisfied the requirement for demonstrating antitrust injury.

Appellees assert that Volvo, ProServ, and IMC lack standing to challenge the bonus pool system, which requires owners and producers of sanctioned events to contribute to a fund that incentivizes player participation. They argue that appellants benefit from the bonus pool, as it provides significant economic motivation for players to engage in Grand Prix events. Consequently, appellants’ potential obligation to contribute to the pool does not constitute an injury under antitrust laws.

However, IMC and ProServ, as owners of Special Events, have standing to contest the bonus pool if it discourages player participation in these events. Additionally, Volvo, ProServ, and IMC have standing for two reasons: the bonus pool may deter them from competing against MIPTC, and the interests of individual cartel members can diverge from the collective cartel interests, giving them a vested interest in determining their own investments in player incentives.

Regarding the proposed Special Events Rule, appellants have standing to challenge it because it could inhibit their participation in non-sanctioned tournaments that may compete with MIPTC events. ProServ and IMC can challenge the rule as it may compel them to withdraw from Special Events.

In summary, appellants have standing under antitrust laws to challenge the identified practices. The document transitions to a review of the district court's rulings on the substantive claims of antitrust, tortious interference, and unfair competition. Specifically, under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits contracts or conspiracies that restrain trade, the district court found that appellants did not adequately allege an agreement between two or more parties, as only the ITF was named as a co-conspirator, and it plays a central role in MIPTC's operations.

ITF's status as part of MIPTC precludes any conspiracy claims against it under U.S. law, as one cannot conspire with oneself, as established in United States v. Gisehaltz. Plaintiffs' claims of conspiracy involving unidentified co-conspirators are insufficient, as courts do not recognize such claims without specific parties identified. The district court's application of the principle that one cannot conspire with oneself is contested, given that MIPTC is a collective of various entities, which can violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act as supported by precedents involving joint ventures and associations. 

On appeal, Volvo, IMC, and ProServ assert that the amended complaint identifies three forms of per se illegal conduct: price fixing, horizontal market division, and group boycott. Specifically, the complaint alleges that MIPTC engaged in price fixing by imposing compensation limits on players at sanctioned events. The court reverses the district court's dismissal of the price-fixing claims, acknowledging the potential harm to the appellants. The court refrains from concluding whether the conduct should be classified as per se unlawful or assessed under the Rule of Reason, emphasizing that traditionally, agreements among competitors to fix prices are deemed per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The analysis of such agreements involves more than merely determining the existence of fixed prices.

Price fixing refers to specific business behaviors deemed per se illegal. While courts can classify practices as price fixing, such determinations often require complex economic analysis. Collaboration among producers in professional sports is essential for event execution, and antitrust laws do not penalize necessary agreements. The district court must evaluate arguments regarding player compensation practices to determine whether the per se rule or the Rule of Reason applies.

Appellants allege that appellees engaged in unlawful horizontal market division, as established in cases like United States v. Topco Associates and United States v. Sealy, where defendants reportedly minimized competition among Grand Prix tournaments by scheduling events to avoid overlap. The district court did not address this theory, but the complaint sufficiently alleges an unlawful market division, particularly referencing the MIPTC-WCT Agreement that seemingly divided the tennis market. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of claims related to horizontal market division, leaving open the question of whether these restraints are subject to the per se rule or the Rule of Reason.

Additionally, appellants assert that appellees participated in a group boycott, with the Grand Prix tournaments allegedly agreeing to exclude players who do not accept imposed conditions. The Commitment Agreements create a horizontal agreement among tournament producers dictating terms for player participation. Judge Duffy characterized these agreements as employment contracts requiring players to compete exclusively for MIPTC for a specified duration, noting that employers can set reasonable employment conditions.

Plaintiffs argue that creating an independent tennis event series is unfeasible within the current year, yet the court finds that a thirty-six-week exclusive employment contract is not unreasonably lengthy. The amended complaint sufficiently alleges that the appellees may engage in a group boycott, defined as an agreement among two or more parties to restrict business dealings with certain individuals or only on specific terms. To succeed in a group boycott claim, plaintiffs must show that the defendants intended to restrain competition or expand their monopoly through coercive actions. The court does not yet determine whether to apply a per se rule or the Rule of Reason regarding the alleged concerted refusal to deal, noting that some group boycotts are inherently anticompetitive and should be considered per se violations of antitrust laws.

Additionally, the appellants contend that the district court incorrectly dismissed claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, alleging monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize by MIPTC. Monopolization claims require proof of (1) monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power, distinct from legitimate growth. The plaintiffs assert that MIPTC holds monopoly power in first-rate men's professional tennis events, as evidenced by the 1985 Commitment Agreements signed by the top one hundred players and claims of willful maintenance of monopoly power through a merger with WCT in 1983.

Players are required to sign Commitment Agreements, and owners of sanctioned events must contribute to a bonus pool. While the district court suggested that MIPTC has not willfully maintained a monopoly, this conclusion was deemed inappropriate at the motion to dismiss stage. 

For an attempted monopolization claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, three elements must be proven: (1) anti-competitive or exclusionary conduct, (2) specific intent to monopolize, and (3) a dangerous probability that the attempt will succeed. The court noted that evidence of exclusionary conduct could imply specific intent and, coupled with monopoly power, suggest a dangerous probability of success. The district court did not address the attempted monopolization claim, but the complaint sufficiently alleged the first two elements, allowing for an inference of the third.

Conspiracy to monopolize also requires proof of three elements: (1) concerted action, (2) overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) specific intent to monopolize. The complaint sufficiently alleged concerted action and specific intent, and the practices in question may qualify as overt acts, supporting the claim.

Regarding tortious interference with prospective business relations under New York law, a plaintiff must show that the defendant interfered with existing business relations with the intent to harm or through dishonest means. Although some case law suggests that a specific contract must be identified, the tort can also involve interference with non-contractual business relationships. The court concluded that the district court incorrectly dismissed Volvo's claim for tortious interference, as Volvo alleged that MIPTC interfered with its relations with various parties.

Paragraph 89 of the amended complaint alleges that the defendants have initiated efforts to persuade or intimidate television networks and tournament organizers to obstruct Volvo's promotional activities related to its involvement in tennis events. Paragraph 90 details that Happer, representing MIPTC, sent letters to major networks such as NBC Sports, PBS, ESPN, and USA Network, claiming Volvo was misleading the public regarding its sponsorship of the Grand Prix. In paragraph 92, it is asserted that Happer also sent letters to tournament owners and producers to dissuade them from collaborating with Volvo. Paragraph 94 states that MIPTC representatives have threatened punitive actions against tournament owners and producers to prevent Volvo from displaying its logo. These allegations support a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations, despite Volvo not identifying a specific lost contract. Consequently, the district court's dismissal of Volvo's claim is reversed.

In contrast, ProServ and IMC have not specified any business relations that the defendants interfered with; however, they have not yet exhausted their opportunity to amend their pleadings. The court emphasizes that further amendments should be granted liberally when justice demands. Therefore, the court vacates the dismissal of ProServ and IMC's interference claim with prejudice and remands for it to be dismissed without prejudice, allowing for an amended complaint.

Regarding the unfair competition claim pursued by ProServ and IMC, the tort typically involves the unauthorized use of a plaintiff's property to compete against them. The district court indicated that to establish an unfair competition claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants' actions caused a misappropriation and identify the property or benefit misappropriated. ProServ and IMC have alleged various actions by the defendants, including communications with the media and tournament directors, and the adoption of restrictive competition rules, which they contend constitute unfair competition.

The amended complaint regarding the misappropriated property lacks specificity, with ProServ and IMC alleging that the appellees improperly benefited from the plaintiffs' efforts by misappropriating their property rights for commercial gain. This allegation is deemed insufficient to support a claim of unfair competition. However, ProServ and IMC are granted the opportunity to amend their pleadings to meet the legal standard, leading to the vacating of the dismissal of their unfair competition claim and a remand for a dismissal without prejudice, allowing for a second amended complaint to specify the misappropriated property.

Additionally, the district court's order dismissing the appellants' antitrust challenges to the Best Interest Rule, Conflicts of Interest Rule, and pooled television broadcasting rights is vacated, permitting repleading if the rules are adopted. The dismissal of ProServ and IMC's claims for tortious interference with prospective business relations and unfair competition is also vacated, allowing for repleading.

On other appeal issues, the court finds that the appellants have standing to challenge MIPTC's administration and adequately allege price fixing, market division, monopolization, and conspiracy. Furthermore, Volvo has sufficiently stated a claim for relief regarding interference with prospective business relations, resulting in remand for further proceedings. The excerpt also mentions that recent developments indicate MIPTC plans to drop certain tournaments, and decisions about player participation are influenced by rankings with discretionary "Wild Card" spots.